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ABSTRACT
Rival Radical Feminists considers the role of gender and race as master status determining traits
and examines them as influential social markers of identity and representation within a
nineteenth-century feminist social movement (FSM)—the Woman’s Christian Temperance
Union (WCTU). Rival Radical Feminists examines how, within a FSM where gender issues
understandably govern the political narrative that the philosophical core of the movement shifts
into separate and competing spheres when gender issues intersect with racial prejudice?
Specifically, Rival Radical Feminists argues that when both political actors are female, with one
circumscribed politically by her gender, like Willard, and the other by both her race and her
gender, like Wells, issues of power and conflict over these master status positions vie for
rhetorical and ideological dominance within a FSM. Further inquiries are: Which identity
representation dominates? Why? What are the historical, political, and social conditions that
allow such transformation? How do they influence the geographical, political, economic, and
social locations for women, both black and white, within the private and public sphere, then and
now? Finally, what are the circumstances, which allow some marginal groups membership into
the political culture while refusing other marginal groups access?
Rival Radical Feminists draws from several scholarly domains to examine a constellation
of issues surrounding the rhetoric of Willard and Wells over lynching. For example, it explores
the Reconstruction Era and the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th) to interconnect
and situate the robust (re) representation of white women and free black women before, during,
and after the Civil War to gain citizenship. Rival Radical Feminists evaluates theories of identity
politics, critical race theory, geographies of space, feminist social movement rhetoric, and visual
rhetoric to assess the perspective of gender and race. Finally, Rival Radical Feminists examines
vi

ethics, morality, religion, and nineteenth-century feminist activism to analyze and provide
incisive rhetorical inquiry into the transformation of becoming for women as America shifted
from slavery to a post-slavery nation.
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CHAPTER 1
Understanding the Oratorical Legacy of Reconstruction in the
Rhetoric of Frances Willard and Ida B. Wells
__________________________________________
But where one considers different historical characters from the standpoint of a total
development, one could encourage each character to comment upon the others without thereby
sacrificing a perspective upon the lot. This could be got particularly, I think, if historical
characters themselves (i.e., periods or cultures treated as “individual persons”) were considered
never to begin or end, but rather to change in intensity or poignancy.
-Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1969)

During the nineteenth-century, a strong feminist social movement (FSM) challenged the cultural,
social, and political forces. For instance, as the progressive president of the most prominent and
dominant FSM, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), Frances Willard made
woman’s suffrage a central tenet. She also recognized that the inclusion of black women to the
organization would greatly boost the cultural drift (Eggan) of the nation, now that it was unified
over the issue of slavery, despite the devastating losses of the Civil War1. However, Willard’s
revolutionary decision to include black women in the WCTU would have to confront the social
distance that black women and white women experienced in the larger society. Anti-lynching
crusader and orator, Ida B. Wells, would emphasize Willard’s moral paradox over lynching as an
active and vocal member of the WCTU.
Additionally, as white and black women moved into patriarchal domains, they received
increased resistance from males, both white and black, against the new social practices, which
ran counter to social and cultural restrictions on women who move outside the domestic sphere.
Although Willard was a progressive thinker and religious reformist, the massive changes in black
1

See Faust, Drew Gilpin. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. New York: Knopf, 2008.
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representation perhaps overwhelmed even her non-coercive rhetorical style. However, as a
young anti-lynching orator and WCTU member twenty-two years younger, Wells’ coercive
approach to Willard’s position on lynching illuminated how members of dominant groups,
despite their alleged liberal moral and political stance adapt to the complex challenges of cultural
inclusion demanded by previously oppressed groups.
In this first chapter, I will examine identity politics in Willard and Wells within the
political culture2 of the Reconstruction Era and the women’s political culture3 within the WCTU.
The contentious coalition struggle for empowerment through citizenship united white women
and free black women, though at the expense of black women’s agency within the WCTU who
struggled with both their race and gender representations. However, for white women, gender
issues, enshrined in the cult of domesticity, were trumped by the politics of race when black men
were enfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment—a right many white women felt they deserved
after their service during the Civil War. This chapter provides a typological examination of
Willard’s and Well’s conflict over lynching through a rhetorical interpretation of citizenship in
relation to the oratorical legacy of Reconstruction, which constructed their identity not only as
women within a transforming America, but also as sociopolitical actors within a FSM. This
chapter argues that Willard’s and Well’s rhetorical rivalry over the politics and ethics of lynching
was unavoidably influenced by the oratorical shift in the nineteenth-century from a collective to
individual morality. Further, with Willard circumscribed politically by her gender and Wells by
both her race and her gender, this chapter will consider the role of gender and race as “master
status determining traits” (Hughes 357) and examine them as influential social markers of
2

See Larry Diamond “Causes and Effects.” Political Culture & Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. 229-249.
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See Ellen Dubois “Politics and Culture in Women’s History: A Symposium.” Feminist Studies 6 (1980): 28-36.
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identity, representation, and contention within the same FSM.
The rhetorical culture of the nineteenth-century was radically changed by the politics of
identity4, which was deeply influenced by the Reconstruction Era, a time of immense
evolutionary shift in the political and social consciousness of America. Indeed, Gregory Clark
and Michael S. Halloran believe identity reformation was related to the shift in “[oratorical]
culture [which] was transformed by an emerging individualistic spirit that, in diverse social and
institutional forms, challenged the traditional principle of collective moral authority by
establishing as a new principle the moral authority of the individual” (3). No-where would this
new ideology5 of the self express itself more clearly, and particularly in white women and free
black women, than in nineteenth-century feminist social movements (FSM) like the WCTU, an
organization also challenged and changed by the transforming ambiguities of the Reconstruction
Era.
For Willard and Wells, bringing awareness and countering conventional and longestablished attitudes toward gender and race were principles upon which their activist and civic
rhetoric was based. Yet, despite their individual conceptions of these influential sociopolitical
markers of identity and representation, neither women was stifled by these conceptions in her
rhetoric given the denial of legal, civil, political, and social rights—in short, power. According
to Michel Foucault, this subordination of the individual by the state is more than an extended
footnote of the state’s authority. Rather, it is a marker of subjugation heavily influenced by a
harmonious relation with hegemony that “imposes a law of truth on him which he must

4

I am referring to gender, race, class, sexuality or any socially recognized identity, which is brought to the
foreground and creates attitudes that displace a subject and generates political, social, and/or economic inequalities.
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I am relying upon Althusser’s notion of ideology, which argues that a system of beliefs is engraved in the subject
and influences her views in the political culture. Also, ideologies are used to subjugate subjects as well.
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recognize and which others have to recognize in him” (781). Foucault’s radical mode of inquiry
further intimates a duality in the subject that restricts and terrorizes a subject’s tendency for selfdefinition arguing, “It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects” (781).
However, in Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics
Sidney Tarrow contends that the question of agency, any action that the sociopolitical actor takes
to undo hegemonic power, becomes avoidable. Further, he asserts agitation is not performed in
an essentially individual space; rather, it involves multiple agents of change also shaped by the
same invention discourses of power systems who want to resist under the umbrella of a social
movement. Tarrow writes,
[. . .] people engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities
and constraints change and then, by strategically employing a repertoire of
collection action, create new opportunities, which are used by others in widening
cycles of contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in
society, when they bring people together around inherited cultural symbols, and
when they can build on or construct dense social networks and connective
structures, then these episodes of contention result in sustained interactions with
opponents—specifically, in social movements (19).
Wells’ lack of agency within the larger population and the popular FSM was the rhetorical
foundation upon which she built her criticism of Willard’s ideological endorsement of lynching
black men. Indeed, in Wells’ mind, Willard’s reticence to speak out definitively and publicly
against lynching signified her allegiance to the ideology of the Southern Conservatives who
believed “True [White] Womanhood” needed defense from the preying sexual urges of black
men. Central to Well’s rhetorical strategy was to place emphasis on the WCTU’s and Willard’s
4

Christian morality—the ethical structure of both the organization’s and Willard’s rhetoric. From
Well’s perspective, as expressed in On Lynchings, the WCTU and Willard like “the Antebellum
south and the New South” were “wedded to any method […] for the subjugation of the young
manhood of the race” which included “murdering, burning and lynching” (47) as exchange for
protection of “True [White] Womanhood” wholesomeness and propriety. Wells’ criticism of the
WCTU’s moral standards, but particularly of Willard’s Christian morals and ethics, echoes
Clark’s and Halloran’s position that “every individual has a natural right to freedom of
conscience and action”6 (11). Therefore, Wells would publicly press Willard to expose the
genuine meaning of her comments, which for Wells were neither neutral nor contradictory on
Willard’s connection of race, lynching, and politics.
By conceptualizing Willard’s position on lynching as a moral paradox, Wells created
discord within the WCTU by criticizing and challenging the admired Willard’s ideology. Like
many abolitionists, Willard’s rhetoric was interwoven with the reformist idealism of
Methodism—a revivalist theology of the Second Great Awakening (1780-1830), which
advocated societal change a responsibility of religious institutions as much the political system
for the development of a just society. In this respect, Willard’s and Well’s challenges to their
lack of authorial presence in the private and public spheres no doubt stimulated their oratory as
social and political actors as Methodists. However, if we take a rhetorical interpretation of the
legacy of Reconstruction politics, we will see that it also animated the leading question of the
nineteenth-century for white women and free black women—citizenship. In fact, challenges to
their disempowered subject status were focused on, as Clark and Halloran have claimed, “a
rejection of traditional institutional authority” (11). Thus, Willard’s and Wells’s counter6

Emphasis is mine.
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discourse not only critiqued the privileges of free citizens—it also questioned the parity and
egalitarian nature of citizenship, which was bound to their lack of agency.
Constructing and Addressing the “Woman Question” and the “Race Question” in
Willard’s and Well’s Consciousness-Raising Rhetoric
The “Woman Question” in American political culture has always been a topic of conversation,
debate, and conflict in the social order. While patriarchal conceptions of women have
historically fixed them in a political and socially disenfranchised location, it is the dynamic
intersubjectivity between the woman question and race question that has produced the most
vibrant counter discourses on the patriarchal representation of women. For instance, societal
beliefs, myths, and traditions that regulate and institutionalize the cultural production and human
value of women in both the private and public sphere work hand-in-hand to stress and reinforce
the location of women in the social structure. Yet, despite the shifting rhetorical interpretations
to individualism in the nineteenth-century, there were no exceptions to the patriarchal
dimensions of women’s representation. Therefore, women created their own guides to
sociopolitical criticism as a mode for social change, which according to Karlyn Kohrs Campbell,
“might be called a feminine style to cope with the conflicting demands of the podium” (12). For
example, she notes, “Audience members will be addressed as peers, with recognition of authority
on experience [. . .] and efforts will be made to create identification with the experiences of the
audience and those described by the speaker” (13). She argues, “The goal of such rhetoric is
empowerment “(13) and by violating traditional conventions of elocution in her speech and
discursive practices, the feminine speaker is no longer isolated from her audience. Therefore,
Campbell maintains, “consciousness-raising is an attractive communication style to people
working for social change” (13) given old rhetorical structures break down between the speaker
and her audience. For Campbell, the feminine style of consciousness-raising to counter the
6

masculine view as the scale for an effective rhetor was revolutionary since she posits “the very
act of speaking publicly violated concepts of womanhood” (14), which were also under vigorous
debate in the nineteenth-century.
Likewise, for Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L Griffin, feminist rhetors develop distinctive
rhetorical strategies with regard to their gender, and counter to patriarchal rhetorical practices to
define and critique the social order from a feminine perspective. In agreement with Campbell,
Foss and Griffin, believe inclusion rather than exclusion opens discourse between the audience
and the rhetor to provide meaningful interaction. For Foss and Griffin that is an invitational
rhetoric, which they define as “an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship
rooted in equality, immanent value, and self-determination” (5). They go on to say that by
blurring the boundaries between the rhetor and the audience offers “an invitation to the audience
to enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor does” (5) thereby establishing a space for a
shared perspective. For Foss and Griffin, then, with an invitational rhetoric neither frame of
reference liberates one perception over the other; since the overall objective is collective interest
over individual pursuits. They argue “in presenting a particular perspective, the invitational
rhetor does not judge or denigrate other’s perspectives but is open to and tries to appreciate and
validate those perspectives, even [I argue when] they differ dramatically from the rhetor’s own”
(5). This is particularly true on issues of gender and race when these representations are used to
suppress agents in a specific location that excludes them from the sociopolitical order.
To Barbara Welter, patriarchal feminist norms are characterized in the prescriptive and
totalizing representation of “True Womanhood” ideology, which she writes “[. . .] could be
divided into four cardinal virtues—piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity” (152) and, like
slavery had its philosophical roots in religious systems—namely, Christianity. Indeed, the
7

historical social and cultural influences that impose this uniform identity construction on women
has consistently been refused given that neither political nor social cultures are static. They
transform in distinct directions, more ideologically grounded than before, though in unmarked
rhetorical territory to embody an explicit sociopolitical crisis, such as woman’s rights and the
abolition of slavery—both articulated in the same ethical and moral discourse—Christianity—
which used theological rhetoric to legitimatize their subjugation as noncitizens. For example,
during the nineteenth-century religion’s appeal in the public’s imagination offered a moral
coherence to the contradictions in the separate spheres ideology. However, as women
illuminated the incongruities in the Bible regarding their social and cultural treatment their
political consciousness was also raised, which enlivened the rhetorical approach of their social
protest.
The key rhetorical canons sociopolitical actors like Willard and Wells used for
consciousness-raising were the third and fifth—style and delivery. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle
argues one cannot dominate the other in rhetorical expression. For Aristotle, they both involve
approaches that inform one another, and although there are oratorical provinces where they
converge, it is the orator’s unique expression in a stylistic manner, which attributes to the
delivery of the speech and creates an invigorating process of method (style) and mode (delivery).
“For it is not sufficient to have a grasp of what one should say,” Aristotle maintains “but one
must also say these things in the way that one should, and this makes a great contribution to the
character that the speech projects” (1404A). Although Aristotle admits both canons have their
deepest roots in the arts; he nonetheless cautions rhetors against an overdetermined reliance on
style and delivery to convey their arguments. He goes on to say “Justice requires contention
from the facts themselves, so that all other aspects apart from demonstration are ancillary”
8

(1404A).
For both Willard and Wells, justice—that is, impartiality in rights, privileges, and
benefits—would have direct and particular significance in their personal and professional lives
not only as women, but also as professional orators. Therefore, it is worth synthesizing Willard’s
and Well’s stunning and unabashed belief in the redemptive quality of the law’s inherent
integrity to perform its Constitutional function although legally in the sociopolitical culture, both
Willard and Wells were virtually invisible as a woman and as a woman and a black. For
example, in 1889, when Wells divided her time between the feminine profession of teaching and
the analytical, and one can argue, masculine profession of journalism, her identity as a
sociopolitical actor was being groomed. Indeed, not only did Wells come to voice in relation to
her marginalized status as a woman, but more profoundly—as a black woman.
Indeed, after the revolutionary act of suing the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern
Railroad for forcibly removing her from a first-class car after she refused to sit in a segregated
section, the “Race Question” for Wells began to assume even greater privilege than the dynamics
of being a woman. Her judicial knowledge of citizenship, rights, and liberty developed from her
defeat of the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern railroad, which went to the Supreme Court.
Commenting on the Court’s decision, Wells observes in Crusade for Justice, her autobiography,
that,
The gist of that decision was that Negroes were not wards of the nation but
citizens of the individual states, and should therefore appeal to the state courts
for justice instead of to the federal court. The success of my case would have set
a precedent which others [blacks that is] would doubtless have followed. In this,
as in so many other matters, the South wanted the Civil Rights Bill repealed but
9

did not want or intend to give justice to the Negro after robbing him of all sources
from which to secure it. (20)
Ideologies used to subjugate women were, in a sense, the mirror image of the ideological and
philosophical nature of slave subjugation and domination. Therefore, like Wells, Willard was all
too familiar with her limited citizenship, though as a white woman. From this marginal
boundary, Willard, like Wells, developed a lively social politic, which closely examined the
affairs of women and the consequences of women’s marginal status. Although Willard
understood her full prescription and threat under the law as a woman, and understood women’s
different legal composition under it compared to men, Willard framed her consciousness-raising
rhetoric around theological conceptions of morality first, and the law second. However, Wells,
as a woman and a black understood how deeply unprotected she was by the legal system, so she
voiced her consciousness-raising rhetoric around interpretations of the law first, and theological
conceptions second.
On the other hand, Willard, as an influential orator, reflected on her role as a woman in
every endeavor that she engaged to illuminate the innumerable possibilities awaiting women
outside the cult of domesticity. For example, while learning to ride the bicycle at the age of fiftythree, Willard joined that task with a theological influence to analyze the impact that women’s
social hindrance had on their ideological and sociological capacity to flourish. “If I am asked to
explain why I learned the bicycle I should say I did it as an act of grace, if not actual religion”
(72). Although Willard acknowledges the health benefits of riding the bicycle, she admits her
new venture was not based on purely health needs. Indeed, it emerged from the “Woman
Question,” which was prominently featured in her rhetoric throughout her life. Willard says
I also wanted to help women to a wider world, for I hold that the more interests
10

women and men can have in common, in thought, word, and deed, the happier
will it be for the home. Besides, there was a special value to women in the
conquest of the bicycle by a woman in her fifty-third year, and one who had so
many comrades in the white-ribbon army that her action would be widely
influential. (73)
In the final part of her essay, Willard articulates in more detail that bicycle riding is not only a
healthy lifestyle choice, but a consciousness-raising act based on self-empowerment, pointing
out,
I did it from pure natural love of adventure—a love long hampered and impeded,
like a brook that runs underground, but in this enterprise bubbling up again with
somewhat of its pristine freshness and taking its merry course as of old.
Second, from a love of acquiring this new implement of power and literally
putting it underfoot.
Last, but not least, because a good many people thought I could not do it at my
age. (73)
While both Willard and Wells were deprived of the total vision of citizenship articulated in the
Declaration of Independence and attempted to disable institutions they saw as hostile and
complicit in their isolation by their consciousness-raising rhetoric. Although risky, it can be
argued religion played a more prominent role in stripping Willard of her social and political
rights, and the law played a crucial role in disabling Wells’s capacity to participate in the sociopolitical order given the tone and agenda of each orator’s consciousness-raising rhetoric. Indeed,
for both Willard and Wells, what emerged from their identity paradoxes as a woman and as a
11

black and a woman, were ontological narratives of self—that is, narratives about the nature of
being as each interpreted it. In linking the symbiotic discourses of gender and race to citizenship,
both women were in a judicial and theological dispute over their location within the
sociopolitical culture, which structured their being around prescriptive norms, values, and
symbols. By asserting their constructed conceptions of identity in cultural dressing, Willard and
Wells also disputed the patriarchal influences and visions of their representation. In doing so,
they consistently illuminated the limitations of patriarchal definitions in comparison to their
constructions of identity.
In “America’s Racial-Ethnic Cultures: Opposition Within a Mythical Melting Pot,”
Bonnie L. Mitchell and Joe R. Feagin note that by engaging in a culture of resistance or
oppositional culture, marginalized groups in response to the loss of social and political rights,
privileges, and benefits will,
[…] preserve dignity and autonomy, to provide an alternative construction of
identity (one not based entirely on deprivation), and to give members of the
dominant group an insightful critique of their own culture. From this perspective,
members of oppressed subordinate groups are not powerless pawns that merely
react to circumstances beyond their control, but rather are reflective, creative
agents that construct a separate reality in which to survive. (69)
Although Mitchell and Feagin illustrate the special significance of preserving essential aspects of
cultural legacy, they do not attach importance to the invisibility and seeming indifference of the
power dynamic of political systems and its interplay in relation to these deeply embedded
cultural markers of identity, which are also complicit in the subject’s discipline in the social
order. Further, they take no notice of these cultural institutions of disciplinary power as
12

normalizing agents on the subject to acquiesce willingly to its non-coercive authority, as opposed
to the seemingly coercive force of political institutions or what Foucault calls, the “rituals of
truth” masked as knowledge (Discipline and Punish 194). However, they cogently point out that
these cultural artifacts serve as a pretext for reform by the social order when they come in
contact with and/or misinterpret and/or ignore pronounced sociopolitical ideology, which
identifies, contains, and limits subordinate groups in their difference. Mitchell and Feagin
explain that:
While maintaining strong links with the past, all cultures are in a constant process
of reformation in response to pressures of the context in which they operate.
These cultures of resistance retain some precontact elements, most noticeably in
their systems of meaning and in subtle aspects of appropriate interpersonal
interaction. At the same time, they alter the usage of elements of the larger
culture to conform to their specific attitudes toward themselves and their world.
(70)
In spite of such opposition, Mitchell and Feagin conclude that various approaches to structural
and material changes will occur to counter “the interplay of these forces and the ensuing
conflicts and diverse formulations of racial [. . .] ethnic [and women’s] cultures” thereby to
“provide the wealth of lived experience from which social change continues to emerge” (70).
Willard’s and Wells’s identity in the social order as a gendered and/or racialized noncitizens
nourished their consciousness-raising campaigns, which enabled them to revolt against
sociopolitical forces. Their subordinated status as a woman and as a black and a woman also
informed and shaped their polemic over the ethics, morality, and legality of lynching.

13

Material Bodies and the Economic Politics of Lynching
In the nineteenth-century, white women’s and black men’s and women’s bodies were legally
defined and judicially argued in rhetoric with economic and political content, influences, and
consequences. Although lynching made no economic sense to slave-owners, given that the
bodies of slaves were a valuable commodity, it was not unheard of lynching slaves for trivial
infractions (Dray 2003), albeit this form of corporeal punishment was infrequent. However, for
Wells, the interconnection between the material body of the slave and its economic worth was
apparent and she argues, significantly united to the agency of the slave and the politics of
lynching (Allen et. al. 2000). That is, one could destroy the spirit—but not the physical body,
because as Wells notes, it was “too valuable” ( Red Record 5). By breaking the unity of the spirit
and its relation to the body, an opposition is created between these two spheres of consciousness
in the slave to disrupt any urge for identity. That is, any convincing argument a slave could
conjure to justify their humanity would be disabused by a conflict between the body and mind.
As Wells points out, “the Southern white man owned the Negro body and soul” and she
concludes, “It was to his interest to dwarf the soul and preserve the body (Red Record 5).
Immediately following the Civil War, a rise in black lynchings increased exponentially.
Indeed, writes Jacqueline Jones Royster, “during the post-Civil War era, lynching and other acts
of mob violence against African Americans [. . .] steadily increased, with the first peak occurring
in 1892” ( 9). Royster quotes Wells’s statistics in the Red Record when Blacks were targeted
more than other racial groups for lynching, and particularly blacks in the South and she
concludes that “a distinctive shift occurred” (10). For Wells, the rapid advance in black lynching
was directly related to the rise of black prestige and economic achievements into the social order
during the Reconstruction Era (1865-1877), which played a pivotal role in racial uplift. Given
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these intertwining facts, Wells argues “a new system of intimidation came into vogue” (Red
Record 5) to obstruct the brisk progress of black social and economic mobility:—lynching.
Indeed, Wells’s analysis of lynching became part of her rhetoric in the black-owned and
progressive newspaper, Free Speech, in which she partly shared ownership. Believing the law’s
view and response to the increased lynchings was negligible and unlawful; Wells skillfully
removed the romantic notions of American society in her Free Speech editorials by sharply
contrasting this dominant view under a moral canopy with the lived reality of black life. For
Robert S. Cathcart, when the vision of a society collides with a lack of moral response to one of
the most fundamental ideologies of the social structure, such as equality, challenges to the
national ideals will occur. For Cathcart, “[…] confrontational rhetoric occurs only in special and
limited circumstances, such as periods of societal breakdown or when moral underpinnings are
called into question” (104) to signify, with rhetorical force, an absence of ethics within the
sociopolitical structure. Cathcart argues that confrontational rhetoric is not unpatriotic. In
contrast, he maintains, it is provocative discourse, that threatens not the balance of the
sociopolitical order, but seeks to constrain conflicting and exploitative ideologies that frustrate
the moral ambition of the political culture. He says, “It is this confrontational aspect—the
questioning of the basic values and societal norms—that makes true movements a real threat that
cannot be explained away as a temporary malfunction of the system or as the conspiratorial work
of a handful of fanatics” (104). Further, Cathcart maintains that agitation as a critical approach
to restore and perhaps clarify and reshape social order is necessary in times of sociopolitical
unrest.
By1892, the task of arousing outrage over lynching had become acutely personal for
Wells. Thus, her identity as a confrontational rhetorician was radically transformed from
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American agitator to international anti-lynching orator. For some scholars, The Lynching at the
Curve in Memphis of three black men—Calvin McDowell, Henry Stewart, and especially Wells’
close friend, Thomas Moss, cast Wells into extreme absorption of her anti-lynching crusade,
which was resistant to and opposed any discourse—legal or moral—that might reveal non-action
and/or a silent bias toward the ideology behind lynching. Believing Memphis was safe prior to
the lynching of McDowell, Stewart, and Moss, Wells wrote their murders “[. . .] opened my eyes
to what lynching was really about,” this event confirmed her earlier theorizing that lynching
largely aimed to suppress the economic advances of blacks. That is, she maintains, lynching
provided an “An excuse to get rid of Negroes who were acquiring wealth and property”
(Crusade 64). Wells, like many blacks, shared a collective vulnerability and felt equally
victimized with each death attributed to lynching. As such, the increased intensity and
dimension of Well’s confrontational rhetoric after the Lynching at the Curve clearly illustrates
Cathcart’s point, which posits,
Through confrontation the seekers of change (the victims) experience a
conversion wherein they recognize their own guilt, transcend the faulty order and
acquire a new perspective. This “symbolic rejection of the existing order is a
purgative act of transformation and transcendence. It affirms the commitment of
the converted to the movement—to the new understanding . . . and hence it
endows them with a new condition ‘substance’—with a new identity, a new unity,
a new motive. (107)
Wells’ identity as a black and as a woman had become politicized with the increase in lynchings.
In terms of this issue, she was shaped by her race more than her gender—that is, her chances of
being lynched were more distinctly related to her race than her gender. Further, she knew the
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dynamics and consequences of her vocal anti-lynching campaign made her a target as well7.
Already deeply disenchanted with the legal non-action in America over lynching, Wells needed
new tactical response. Therefore, Wells contextualized lynching under a religious morality—and
particularly under Methodism—a social reformist faith of which both she and Willard were
lifelong converts and active members. Believing moral outrage would perhaps lead to federal
defense, Well’s confrontational rhetoric bridged Christian evangelicalism to politics. By
mapping the political act of lynching to a lack of Christian morality, which she believed as a
Second Awakening Methodist was not separate and distinct from one’s politics, Wells
problematized the nature of Christian morality and its relation to the progressive notion of
woman and black citizenship. In the end, Wells firmly perceived politics as having a distinctly
religious component—a conception that would shape and create rhetorical stress among her, the
WCTU, and Willard.
Willard was an inspiring woman—in the WCTU, America, and the United Kingdom.
Her significance as an inspirational and rousing orator for women’s including women of color,
and human rights should not go unnoticed given the comprehensive political, social, and
economic collapse of civil and legal rights in the nineteenth-century for these marginalized
groups. Given this fact, the central approach for Willard’s social reformism was whole—both the
private and public sphere contributed substantially to the disintegration of the civil and legal
stature of these subjugated groups within the social order, and to inequality and exploitation,
which she would vigorously confront under her expansion of the WCTU’s platform as its second
president.
However, Willard, like Wells a devout reformist Methodist, believed moral stagnation
7

Wells’ life was under constant scrutiny after she wrote an article arguing that white women and black men were in
volunteer sexual relationships . At one point she even relocated to New York to escape threats on her life.
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increased the failure of the order of things in the polity. Therefore, the political elements that
contributed to the moral weakness of the systems and institutions of society and presented
religiously stimulated rhetorical opportunities for unraveling the functions of power were critical
to bringing political and moral coherence to the conflict over women’s and human rights. And it
is here, as a self-conscious activist for women’s and human rights, that Willard’s position on the
lynching of black men blurs for Wells, given her extraordinary commitment to Methodism and
her progressive critique on the immorality of slavery.
For instance, in her diary on the day of the militant abolitionist’s John Brown’s hanging,
December 2, 1859, Willard critically assesses not only the inhumanity of his execution, which
she renounces, but also the politics over slavery which sanctioned his capital punishment.
Willard writes that John Brown,
[. . .] risked his life to help his fellow men—the slaves of the South, & he has
lost it. I do not believe him to have been insane or fanatical. I believe him to
have been a Christian man of strong, unwavering mind. I believe that in his sight
who is greater than Virginia and her rulers, John Brown’s intention was
righteous—and his death the death of a martyr [. . .]. Posterity will view it so. A
shame has come upon our Nation today that no repentance shall avail to dissapate.
(Writing Out My Heart 51-52)
Although Willard is firmly against the hanging of Brown, she affirms her patriotism and
commitment to American ideals saying, “Because I love my Country truly, I could weep for her
today [. . .]” (52) since, she seems to argue, Virginia’s lawmakers are conceptually, but most
importantly, morally wrong both on the slavery issue and Brown’s hanging. In the evening of
that same day, when the confirming news of Brown’s execution arrives, Willard writes of the
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compounding emotional impact it had on her and laments, “I feel mingled anger, pity, and
disgust” (52). Despite her anguish, Willard is quick to support the inherent justice she believes
is embodied in the law and which is ultimately guided by, “[. . .] the Power that transcends all
other powers” who operates “sure & steadfast” (52) in spite of immense moral ambiguities.
Indeed, Willard’s and Well’s re/interpretation over their cultural production within the
social order not only compounded the tension between black social representation and white
panic over lynching, but it also fostered competition among two sociopolitical marginalized
groups and increased their fear of each other. For David Sibley, when marginalized groups who
have been pushed to the borders of a society compete for inclusion within a limited sociopolitical
landscape, “internal fear is externalized and security is gained through associating fear with an
external threat” aimed at he surmises “from an array of ‘others’ (6) who are also seeking to
transform and/or affect their current social representation as different into a acceptable sign for
inclusion within the social and political order.
Master Status and the Myth of the “We-Image” in the WCTU
Despite the evolutionary development of a society and the advancement in its cultural, social,
and political patterns, there is a conception that progression creates coherence in ideology and
identity among the polity. That collective identity is achieved through the struggle for social
justice and former incarnations are lost and forgotten. In his seminal essay “Dilemmas and
Contradictions of Status,” Everett C. Hughes notes that “advance of a new group [. . .] to a new
level of positions is not accompanied by complete disappearance of such stereotypes but only by
some modification of them” (356). For example, within the WCTU, where collective action was
vital to erase the imposing social and political constraints upon both black and white women, the
“we-image” did not favor the agency and status lost by black women, who voluntarily
19

conformed to the WCTU’s ideology and authority on social action. Hughes argues that Blacks,
as a racial category, are in a specific classification with influential and distinctive representations
that are produced by an American system of identity construction. “Membership in the Negro8
race, as defined in American mores and/or law, may be called a master status-determining trait,”
which, he argues, “[. . .] tends to overpower, in most crucial situations, any other characteristics
which might run counter to it” (357). However, gender, in America is also considered a “master
status determining trait” since its representation, like race, denies or permits (especially for
males) self-authorization and is influenced by traditionalist views of womanhood construction9.
Because of this duality, black women were often forced into a representation dilemma within
desegregated FSM organizations like the WCTU. That is, they were ideologically coerced into
assigning their racial representation and gender representation into a hierarchy based on their
level of struggle within the private and public sphere. A differentiation which is neither easily
recognized nor clearly packaged in neat categories given both identities as symbolic sites within
the social structure is not contained within their own representation—they overlap and often
unnoticed.
In his essay “The Formation of We-Images: A Process of Theory,” Stephen Mennell,
cautions that this kind of adaptation by outsiders to a movement creates an unequal power
balance making it difficult for the characteristics of the “we-image” to emerge since the
outsider’s marginality within the larger society becomes a source of myopic focus within the
movement:
8

Although this reference to Blacks was commonly used in 1945 and not considered offensive, as a Black woman I
find it distasteful. The preferred terms are Black or African-American as a racial category for Americans of African
descent whose ancestors were slaves.
9

The term “master status determining trait” is no longer used exclusively in relation to Blacks, as Hughes used in
1945. Now, the term is applied to all racial groups and both genders, rather than a specific raced group i.e. Blacks,
with socially constructed characteristics.
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When the power ratios between established and outsiders is very unequal,
the oppressed and exploited cannot escape from their position. This is one of the
conditions which makes it most likely that they will take into their own we-image
what the established say about them. This process of stigmatization is a very
common element in domination within such highly unequal power balances, and
it is remarkable how across many varied cases the content of the stigmatization
remains the same. (182)
Mennell notes the branding of the other as “different” locks them within a particular identity
which are both racial and nonracial in character suggesting, “The outsiders are always dirty,
morally unreliable, and lazy, among other things” (182). Further, Mennell argues, by
characterizing the outsider with such abrasive rhetoric “the opprobrium heaped on them by the
established may enter deep into the consciousness of the members of the outcaste” (182) causing
internal fragmentation and reproducing external hostilities within the movement. For example,
although Frances E. W. Harper was an active member of the WCTU, serving in leadership
positions and speaking at national conventions (Mattingly 85), she recognized black women
were treated as outsiders within the WCTU. Though a supporter of the WCTU’s social action
initiatives and their ideology on women’s rights; Harper, similarly to Wells suspected it was
difficult for some white members of the WCTU to move away from the post Reconstruction
view of blacks. As a result, Harper publicly acknowledged in an essay the complex relations
between the old models of black representation, which she believed still weighed heavily in the
minds of liberal whites and the inferior assumptions that they were attached to. She says,
Some of the members of the different Unions have met the question in a liberal
and Christian manners; others have not seemed to have so fully outgrown the old
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shards and shells of the past as to make the distinction between Christian
affiliation and social equality, but still the leaven of more liberal sentiments has
been at work in the Union and produced some hopeful results. (Boyd qtd in
Mattingly 86-87)
Within the WCTU, gender issues maintained a particular domain, and understandably so, given
that as a FSM the WCTU was an organization devoted to the social, political, and economic
needs of women. However, as Harper noted, within the WCTU some white members
consciously or unconsciously created a rhetoric of exclusion for its black members and Harper
asked “if black sheep must climb up some other way” (Harper qtd in Mattingly 87) if black
women are in truth not equal members? In their essay “Collective Identity in Social Movement
Communities,” Verta Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier exam the politicization of collective identity
within the context of social movement communities, noting the marginality exercised over
outsider groups within the larger society are often projected within the movement. For Taylor
and Whittier, this kind of privilege grants permission from a theoretical perspective, but they
argue “Paradoxically, [. . .] for groups organizing to pursue collective ends, the process of
asserting “who we are” often involves a kind of reverse affirmation of the characteristics
attributed to it by the larger society” (111). Yet, despite Willard’s attempt to maintain the
dominance of gender issues within the WCTU, the social, political, and economic issues of race
that Wells elevated in relation to lynching possessed an important position in the rhetorical and
cultural shift in the historical evolution of America.
Protest in the WCTU
In 1893, Wells traced what she considered to be hostile comments Willard made regarding
lynching to a New York newspaper in 1890 after Willard’s “tour in the South” (On Lynchings,
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109). Although the Southern abolitionist sympathizers, like Willard, were philosophically against
lynching, they did not take a political or public stance against it. Wells rejected Willard as a
sympathetic spectator, for although she was the “daughter of abolitionists” (109), as president of
the most influential women’s rights movement in America, Willard provided little movement
support to counteract the prevailing notions on the ethics, morality, and legality of lynching. In
fact, in Well’s view, Willard seemed to reinforce the ideology of lynching when she
characterized black men as preying sexual deviants to keep track of around white women. Wells
writes in Crusade she was aware, perhaps as an active member of the WCTU, of Willard’s trip to
the South and equally cognizant of how Willard racially characterized the act of lynching with
black men. Wells notes,
As to Miss Willard, I had very keen recollection of her first trip throughout the
South in her capacity as president of the National Women’s Christian Temperance
Union. She had been figuratively wined and dined by the best white people of the
South. She made an opening for and received recognition of her organization
such as never before. She was charmed by the culture and hospitality of those by
whom she was entertained. (112)
In this passage Wells’ competence as a skilled rhetorician and a talented investigative journalist
in her task to define Willard as an adversary, rather than an ally of black empowerment are
brilliantly demonstrated. For instance, Wells subtly but harshly indicts not only Willard’s
patriarchal status as president of the WCTU, Wells also cleverly shows contempt for the
privileges that came with Willard being a middle class white woman. To complete her task,
Wells invokes three of the canons—arrangement, style, memory—to portray Willard as a
hypocritical and decadent populist. From the beginning, Wells’ arrangement of her proofs
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begins by establishing Willard’s social and class standing by emphasizing her “first trip [my
emphasis] throughout the South” and “in her capacity as president of the National Women’s
Christian Temperance Union.” Regarding Wells’ style, it is deliberately simple to display the
extravagance of Willard not only being “wined and dined” but by the elite, that is to Wells “the
best white people of the South” who like Willard, only spoke of reform, but did not act on it. As
added proof to Willard’s false kinship with blacks and the woman question, Wells draws
attention to Willard’s own political ambition saying, “She made an opening for, and received
recognition.” Further, Wells presents Willard as though she were the solitary consciousness of
the WCTU by labeling it “her organization.” However, Wells’ most serious condemnation of
Willard is particularly offensive because it implies Willard’s motives for going to the South were
not consciousness-raising but to be “entertained” by the very people who showed a tolerance for
the lynching of black men. Finally, in detailing these events Wells’ memory is both voyeuristic
and embittered. That is, Wells’s gaze upon Willard’s activities still appears obsessive after so
many years. In addition, her resentful feelings towards Willard’s status and privilege as a middle
class white woman, along with the gratification in Willard’s moral failure are also apparent in
Wells’ recollection. Still, throughout Crusade Wells continues to reflect on Willard’s trip to the
South and began to question, like so many blacks who heard of Willard’s comments why
Willard did not defend on principal the representation of blacks. Wells comments
When she went back North there appeared an interview in the New York Voice,
the organ of the temperance forces, in which she practically condoned lynchings.
Every Negro newspaper in the South quoted and criticized that interview.
Marked copies of their journals were sent to her, my own in the number. But so
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far as anyone knew, Miss Willard had never retracted or explained that
interview. (112)
Through her comments in Crusade, Wells presented Willard’s remarks to temperance members.
The fact that Wells could do this illuminates her stature among the overwhelmingly white
middle-class women within the WCTU. Yet, her claim that Willard’s rhetoric clearly shows her
ideological alliance to Southern Conservatives, which condoned the lynching of black men,
appears to have been dismissed by the WCTU hierarchy based on Willard’s strong ethos as
president of the WCTU. Nonetheless, Willard’s reluctance to help reform the representation and
image of black men would also be placed under intense scrutiny not only by Wells, but also by
other prominent black orators such as Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, also a member of the
WCTU, and Frederick Douglass, the most influential black orator on slavery, civil and legal
rights of the nineteenth-century. Wells appears to have given a lot of thought to the specifics of
Willard’s comments and looked for a way to expunge Willard, being familiar with her as the
pioneering leader and moral consciousness of the WCTU. Yet, in Wells’s conception, the
boundaries were neither blurred nor accidental—Willard, she believed, intentionally located the
striking image of white women, rape, and black men in the minds of whites. Wells continues in
Crusade to have an internal discourse on the matter and seems still dismayed by Willard’s
betrayal and reckless comments:
Having this in mind I could not truthfully say that Miss Willard had ever said
anything to condemn lynching; on the contrary she had seemed to condone it in
her famous interview after returning from her first visit in the South. Of course,
my statements were challenged by temperance followers. Not having a copy of
the interview with me, I could not verify my statement. It looked as if I was
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making an attack on the two most noted Americans [Rev. Moody]10 abroad. But I
never mentioned the names of the two individuals in my lectures. I spoke in a
general way as to conditions among our Christian moral forces. But when
someone in the audience would ask the pointed question naming these two
persons, there seemed nothing else for me to do but to tell the truth as I knew it.
(112-113)
According to Wells, Willard’s controversial statements were made when she was asked in the
New York interview ‘“What do you think of the race problem and the Force Bill”’ ( Red Record
62). Willard replied,
Now, as to the ‘race problem’ in its minified, current meaning, I am a true lover
of the southern people—have spoken and worked in, perhaps, 200 of their towns
and cities; have been taken into their love and confidence at scores of hospitable
firesides; have heard them pour out their hearts in the splendid frankness of their
impetuous natures. And I have said to them at such times: ‘When I go North there
will be wafted to you no word from pen or voice that is not loyal to what we are
saying here and now.’ Going South, a woman, a temperance woman, and a
Northern temperance woman—three great barriers to their good will yonder—I
was received by them with a confidence that was one of the most delightful
surprises of my life. I think we have wronged the South, though we did not mean
to do so. The reason was, in part, that we had irreparably wronged ourselves by
putting no safeguards on the ballot box at the North that would sift out alien
10

Dwight Moody was a popular evangelical minister in the 19th century. Both Willard and Wells were at one time
followers of his reformist religion philosophy.
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illiterates. They rule our cities today; the saloon is their palace, and the toddy
stick their scepter. It is not fair that they should vote, nor is it fair that a plantation
Negro, who can neither read nor write, whose ideas are bounded by the fence of
his own field and the price of his own mule, should be entrusted with the ballot.
We ought to have put an educational test upon the ballot from the first. The
Anglo-Saxon race will never submit to be dominated by the Negro so long as his
altitude reaches no higher than the personal liberty of the saloon, and the power of
appreciating the amount of liquor that a dollar will buy. New England would no
more submit to this than South Carolina. ‘Better whisky and more of it’ has been
the rallying cry of great dark-faced mobs in the Southern localities where local
option was snowed under by the colored vote. Temperance has no enemy like
that, for it is unreasoning and unreasonable. Tonight it promises in a great
congregation to vote for temperance at the polls tomorrow; but tomorrow twentyfive cents changes that vote in favor of the liquor-seller. (Red Record 62-63)
The most quoted section of Willard’s interview is when she appears to agree with Southern
Conservatives on lynching by replying,
I pity the southerners, and I believe the great mass of them are as conscientious
and kindly intentioned toward the colored man as an equal number of white
church-members of the North. Would-be demagogues lead the colored people to
destruction. Half-drunken white roughs murder them at the polls, or intimidate
them so that they do not vote. But the better class of people must not be blamed
for this, and a more thoroughly American population than the Christian people of
the South does not exist. They have the traditions, the kindness, the probity, the
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courage of our forefathers. The problem on their hands is immeasurable. The
colored race multiplies like the locusts of Egypt. The grog-shop is its center of
power. ‘The safety of woman, of childhood, of the home, is menaced in a
thousand localities at this moment, so that the men dare not go beyond the sight of
their own roof-tree.’ How little we know of all this, seated in comfort and
affluence here at the North, descanting upon the rights of every man to cast one
vote and have it fairly counted; that well worn shibboleth invoked once more to
dodge a living issue. (Red Record 63)
Willard concludes her interview with the New York Voice arguing “The fact is that illiterate
colored men will not vote at the South until the white population chooses to have them do so;
and under similar conditions they would not at the North” (Red Record 63). With exuberant
disapproval, Wells observes Willard’s final comments in the interview this way:
Here we have Miss Willard’s words in full, condoning fraud, violence,
murder, at the ballot box; rapine [the word raping is assumed], shooting,
hanging and burning; for all these things are done and being done now by
the Southern white people. She does not stop there, but goes a step further
to aid them in blackening the good name of an entire race, as shown by the
sentences quoted in the paragraph above. These utterances, for which the
colored people have never forgiven Miss Willard, and which Frederick
Douglass has denounced as false, are to be found in the Voice of October
23, 1890, a temperance organ published at New York City. (Red Record
63)
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Willard, in an excerpt from her Presidential Address at the WCTU’s national meeting in 1894,
acknowledges to her audience the rhetorical dimensions her public conflict with Wells had taken
by addressing Wells’s charges. She begins “Much misapprehension has arisen in the last year
concerning the attitude of our unions toward the colored people, and an official explanation is in
order” (Erbach). By privileging her framing of the conflict in the New York Voice over Well’s
conception to her audience, Willard locates her comments on black male outrages against white
women within the immoral sexual behavior of white men on black slave women. In connecting
rape to both white and black men, Willard’s rhetorical appeal to her audience, largely liberal
upper and middle class white and black women, links sexual perversion to maleness—a
connection her audience believed was a reflection of all women’s lack of agency in the social
structure regardless of their racial category.
And now about the lynching controversy. Some years ago on my return from the
South I was interviewed by a representative of the New York Voice, and stated
that as one result of my observations and inquiries I believed that it would be
better if not only in the South but throughout the nation we had an educational
rather than a color or sex limit put upon the ballot. To this opinion, without
intending the slightest discrimination against any race, I still adhere. I also said
that in the South the colored vote was often marshaled against the temperance
people by base political leaders for their own purposes, and still hold to that
statement. Furthermore, I said that the nameless outrages perpetrated upon white
women and little girls were a cause of constant anxiety, and this I still believe to
be true; but wish I had said then, as I do now, that the immoralities of white men
in their relations with colored women are the source of intolerable race prejudice
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and hatred, and that there is not a more withering curse upon the manhood of any
nation than that which the eternal laws of nature visited upon those men and those
homes in which the helpless bondwoman was made the victim of her master’s
base desire. (Erbach).
Willard’s dominant framing of the controversy confronted two paradoxes that Wells’s claim
placed on her Methodist values and beliefs: first, that her moral standards were relaxed in white
men and black slave women relations and second, that justice should have no racial boundaries
when both black and white women’s bodies are violated. However, it is important to note the
key feature of Willard’s speech considered the uneven social space of women, both black and
white, within the social structure. For Willard, then, identity, and particularly women’s lack of
agency, was the locus of WTCU counter-reforms. In neither case, she strategically mapped, does
she believe rape morally acceptable; and she emphasizes that the law and moral outcry should
not refuse its power to bring justice to the male perpetrators— both black and white. In short,
Willard seemed to proclaim in her Presidential Address—that Wells missed the point.
Although Wells was present at the 1894 national meeting, her voice was restricted by
WCTU leaders. “At the convention, WCTU leaders had minimized Well’s effect, not only by
limiting her time for speaking, but also by positioning her address after that of two members of
her own race who praised Willard and the WCTU” (Well-Tempered 77). Despite casting Wells
to the periphery of the national meeting, “Willard’s efforts at silencing her critics was ineffective
for a number of reasons” (Well-Tempered 77), which this chapter argues included the crucial
location of the Reconstruction Era where representations of blacks were enthusiastically being
recast and resisted. This dimension of establishing a new interpretation of black identity post
slavery also had its cleavages in the transformation of white identity given the dynamic relation
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of blacks and whites in a slavery society. Nevertheless, for both Willard and Wells, the tension
between the productions of these new spheres of identity during the Reconstruction Era,
provided the conceptual map in which the ideological parameters of their conflict were
grounded.
Although Willard recognized the moral, social, and historical significance the slave issue
would have, in the end, Willard was not about reconceptualizing the system as Wells was.
Rather, she argued for a pronounced moral configuration in the judicial process. In fact, she
was committed to the role of the system, believing its structure was clear—that is, the
characterization and purpose of the systems and institutions of power. Willard’s confrontation
with the systems and institutions of power was on their interpretation regarding the rights and
privileges of women within the social order, while Wells’s debate with these establishments of
power was on the conception of their arguments regarding the civil rights of blacks within the
legal order. Ironically, both Willard and Wells believed restructuring the systems and
institutions of power was a matter of supreme interest to the rhetorical development of their
arguments—for Willard, in the social and political order, and for Wells, in the legal/judicial and
social order.
Like Wells, Willard emphasized the vital role religion played in the political culture to
restrain unfair, unequal, and unethical sovereignty over a targeted group of people. Indeed, for
Wells, the high moral card that Willard played was exactly the proof she needed to shed light on
what she considered Willard’s true nature—neither defender nor protector of human rights—as a
Methodist—when it came to the particularly Southern conventional attitude on lynching black
men. Wells also used this information to politically mobilize her anti-lynching crusade and to
pressure Willard, as the most widely recognized social and political agent of change on women’s
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and human rights issues, into a public denouncement of the Southern Conservatives’ stance on
lynching. In short, Wells recognized the rhetorical situation—the intersubjective activity
between rhetor, issue, and audience. Given the urgency of the social crisis—increased lynching
with no federal defense—the kairotic moment—Willard’s reckless comments, as a high-profile
moral agitator, not only created a rhetorical space for Wells to speak on the act of lynching, but it
was also a critical moment for Wells to bring increased political awareness to the American
public on the factual roots of why black men were being lynched. Commenting on Wells’s
rhetorical skills, Carol Mattingly in Well-Tempered Women observes that “Wells was both an
eloquent orator and sophisticated rhetorician” and concludes “She had carefully chosen the time
and place to criticize Willard for her racist comments” (80), which quickly gained national and
international attention given the public character of the veteran radical and the young
revolutionary, which was buttressed by a recognized and respected abolitionist that both women
respected and considered a friend.
More Reaction Against Willard’s Interview on Lynching
In one of his most recognized speeches delivered on January 9, 1894, at the Metropolitan A.M.
E. Church in Washington, D.C., Frederick Douglass, like Wells, took immediate offense to
Willard’s conception of blacks. As a black male, Douglass’ reaction to Willard’s portrait of
black men was deeply personal given his efforts to shift the visual and political perception of
blacks. He and Willard shared an interest in collective social action for white women and black
men and women. In his speech titled “The So-Called, but Mis-Called Negro Problem,” Douglass
offers a corrective in a mixed black and white—female and male audience to Willard’s
packaging black men as immoral sexual predators:
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And now comes the sweet voice of a Northern woman, of Southern principles, in
the same tome and the same accusation, the good Miss Frances Willard, of the
W.C.T.U. She says in a letter now before me, “I pity the Southerner. The problem
on their hands is immeasurable. The colored race, “she says, “multiplies like the
locusts of Egypt. The safety of woman, of childhood, of the home, is menaced in
a thousand localities at this moment, so that men dare not go beyond the sight of
their own roof tree.” Such then is the crushing indictment drawn up against the
Southern negroes, drawn up, too, by persons who are perhaps the fairest and most
humane of the negro’s accusers. But even they paint him as a moral monster
ferociously invading the sacred rights of women and endangering the homes of
the whites. The crime they allege against the negro, is the most revolting which
men can commit. It is a crime that awakens the intensest abhorrence and invites
mankind to kill the criminal on sight. This charge thus brought against the negro,
and as constantly reiterated by his enemies, is not merely against the individual
culprit, as would be in the case with an individual culprit of any other race, but
it is in a large measure a charge against the colored race as such. (Douglass).
Douglass’s reaction to Willard’s comments sternly cautions her, as a moral and public voice
within the WCTU and the nation, against locating blacks within old identity repertoires. Like
Wells, Douglass knew Willard’s comments were grounded in Social Darwinism ideology, which
characterized blacks as biologically inferior and endorsed the strict confinement of women to the
domestic sphere based on their gender construction.
Cornel West, in his influential essay, “A Genealogy of Modern Racism,” concludes the
scientific approach was the premier model used to structure and define race and that the core of
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these standards of racialized beauty and intelligence can be traced to the Enlightenment—an
intense intellectual period, which, in West’s view, created a ideological space for exploitation
and othering. West continues his claim, arguing the normative gaze, that is “an ideal from which
to order and compare observations [of beauty, intelligence and humanity]” were not accidental,
but was theorized, powerfully constructed, and “consciously projected and promote[d] by many
influential Enlightenment writers, artists, and scholars” (97). Sociologist, Steve Fenton, echoes
West, submitting “racism was not a natural universal form of social differentiation but a specific
historical and […] specifically or predominantly ‘Western/European’” (51-2) construct. West
also suggests that by using science and reason, the rhetoric of the Enlightenment intelligentsia
took on an “intellectual legitimacy” (105) which, rather than cross out the political underpinnings
of race in America, coincides with the incontestable issues of class, gender, and ethnicity, which
also stress rhetoric, to reflect hierarchies. It was difficult to recast these allegedly truths about
blacks since the overreliance of scientific thought was a prevalent practice in the seventeenth and
eighteenth-century (Bizzell and Herzberg 791-99); though in Willard’s and Well’s argument, the
epistemological break11 from the authoritarian theories of science in relation to the inferior
intelligence of white women and black women and men was demonstrating some successes.
Since both Willard and Wells had travelled broadly in the United Kingdomi and in the
same circles, their public and vitriolic brouhaha begin to acquire more ideological meaning as
lynching was being situated as much a moral issue as a matter that required legal adjudication.
Willard created a wall of rhetorical silence in reaction to Wells’s confrontation by refusing to
answer her critics and their accusation, which according to Barry Brummett was neither an
accident nor a rhetorical trick. For Brummett, strategic silence is legitimate when exercised in a
11

This refers to a new way of thinking about scientific thought (17th century) and being released from its privilege as
a code to produce subjects through the strict apparatus or knowledge of science—thus, break.
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manner to affect events when an agent is vulnerable to new challenges. Brummett writes
“Silence becomes [my emphasis] strategic only when talk is expected” and he maintains “Silence
is [my emphasis] strategic when someone has pressing reason to speak, but does not” (289).
Many reactions to Willard’s silence, including Wells’s, believed Willard’s silence was a mistake
and announced her veiled ideological agreement with the Southern Conservatives. Indeed, for
Willard’s critics, her silence appeared to be a strategic error given it not only increased
speculation about her critical judgment, but also mounted suspicion on her image as the moral
embodiment and representation of the WCTU’s progressive social and political agenda. From
Brummett’s perspective, a rhetor’s speechlessness “allows unchecked inference about one’s
motive and actions” (293-94), which for Willard gave legitimacy to Wells’s argument that
Willard exhibited racial prejudice against black men.
Willard’s refusal to speak out early and definitively on her comments only increased the
rhetorical tension between her and Wells. However, as Cathcart notes, victories with special
significance can still occur despite pronounced opposition—both verbal and silent.
Confrontation in social movements, Cathcart maintains, is not a destructive call to arms. Instead
he argues, confrontation is a critical and analytical push between rival agents to define their
competing discourses, and to suggest and discover possible if not common, ideological space for
moral reaction to moral panic in the social order. In his words confrontational rhetoric
[. . .] is a symbolic enactment which dramatizes the complete alienation of the
confronter. As a rhetorical act it is more consummatory than instrumental. It
takes a form which prevents the receiver from construing its meaning as an
expression of personal dissatisfaction or as a prod toward more rapid response to
grievances. Confrontation demands a response that goes beyond the actions of
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the confrontation itself. It is a dramatization created by the forced juxtaposing of
two agents, one standing for the evil, erroneous system and the other upholding
the new or “perfect” order. These two agents must be brought into conflict
through confrontation in order for both to recognize that what is called for is a
moral response appropriate to the moral accusation communicated by the act of
confrontation. (108)
The awareness for rival agents, then, is to establish their ideological distinctions. That is, as
Cathcart suggests they should draw out the specific features of their opposing discourses for
movement action, despite intense and bitter ideological conflict. For David Snow and Robert
Benford, this involves framing; namely, the agents’ defining or rhetorical packaging of their
perspective on the confrontation. Framing, they posit, allows the agent to designate distinct
metaphors, symbols, and rhetoric for judgment. This framing scene, as Snow and Benford
imagine, takes place within the values, belief systems, and morals of an agent’s experience,
perception, and representation—in short, identity. In Snow’s and Benford’s understanding,
framing “refers to interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of
action within one’s present or past environment” (137). By anchoring one agent in a defender
moral camp, and locating the other agent in an offender moral camp, both characterizations—
defender and offender—are obscured by the framing process. Like the initial confrontation,
which is also bound up in contested issues of identity and agency, the representation of self
embodies time, space, and place. That is, by a historical and social construction that has
redressed its reaffirming power as conventional, while obscuring potent signs that point to or
reinforce agency.
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Although Cathcart’s argument is well taken, in my view, it creates a sharply drawn
good/evil dynamic among rival agents and does not promote a productive bridge to coalition
building. In fact, it secures rival agents and particularly agents from the margins of society with
limited social and legal power more securely within their identity construction. For instance,
Willard could not define her subjugation as a white woman without framing it within the
domestic sphere where her marginal status was circumscribed, no more than Wells could
characterize the issue of lynching outside her identity as a black. Therefore, both representations
were framed within Willard’s and Well’s ideological position; and thus, influenced and
reinforced their rhetorical and discursive strategies.
Indeed, the confrontation of the issue for rival agents within a movement is interlocked
with the pronounced impact the issue has on the agent. In short, how close does the moral panic
resonate in the agent’s lived experience? For both Willard and Wells, their subjugation as a
woman and as a woman and a black revealed animosities driven by the systems and institutions
of power, which erased the ideological and historical aspects of Willard’s and Well’s civil and
legal rights—both aspects inextricably intertwined and concentrated in the fervent debate over
gender (white women’s protection), race (black men’s deviant sexual urges), and the politics and
morality over lynching.
Reconstruction and the Clash of Cultures over Citizenship
Although Reconstruction did not stimulate black economic empowerment, it helped usher in a
new consciousness regarding the role blacks would play in the transformed political culture now
that the nation’s moralizing over slavery was complete with the unification of the North and the
South. With the enactment of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, which secured the rights
of former slaves and barred race-based voting respectively, the crossing of a new era in the
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political geography with former slaves participating signaled the broad transformations ahead.
However, what still remained in the new sociopolitical order was the “woman question”
which widened rather than narrowed to create a more equitable society for white women. For
both these groups, dissolving traditional ideologies which linked black women and men and
white women’s identities to social Darwinism was also growing increasingly impotent in its
justification to dominate their representations with science. Yet, despite the fragility of scientific
racism and sexism to define and confine them, white women, like freedwomen and men, were
still framed in terms of non-citizens rather than citizens12 in spite of their patriotism13
demonstrated during the Civil War. Regardless of these ideological obstacles, both groups still
believed citizenship and enfranchisement were inseparable from the ideals embedded in the new
construction of America which they helped to produce.
Indeed, the Civil War marked the turning of the tide for bringing together ideological
arguments among white women and black men and women that would challenge the widely
accepted notions of citizenship. Yet, as the deep-seated and long-standing notions of the black
image were shedding its symbolic container of inferiority, blackness to white women, and
particularly to white men, brought a new danger with it in the transformation—the increased
demand for enfranchisement. This decree for political inclusion by blacks would make them
enfranchisement competitors with their most supportive ally in the antislavery movement—white
women—a civic entitlement they believed due them over the demands of blacks based on natural
rights and their service during the Civil War. However, if the emphasis of citizenship in the
nineteenth-century shifts to a feminine rhetorical framing, then rights and privileges take a
12

See Franklin, John Hope. Reconstruction: After the Civil War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
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Hundreds of women, both black and white provided support during the Civil War; however, their patriotic service
is still one of the most under represented contributions to the war effort.
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dominant role in the discourse and “rhetorics of citizenship” P. Joy Rouse argues “demands a
revised [my emphasis] definition of the citizen” (116) in light of the masculine conceptions of
citizenship that marked them as second-class or marginalized citizens, if indeed they were
considered citizens at all. For example, during the Civil War women, both black and white,
enjoyed increased status in the social order. By participating in the war effort, the substantial
crack they made in the myth of the ‘True Womanhood Ideal’ by volunteering created a new
representation of womanhood, both black and white, which contradicted the duality of their roles
between the private and public spheres. For women, the social stresses of the war impacted their
lives as much as the men who fought the war, and for once and they were not captives to the
domestic, and thus inferiority arguments attached to their feminine identities.
According to Civil War historian, James M. McPherson, “In every respect except death
and wounds in camp and battlefield, the Civil War affected the female half of the population as
profoundly as the male half,” and he maintains women also “played vital roles in economic and
social mobilization” (15), two essential aspects of post-Civil War growth. Indeed, the softening
of gender strictures, which contributed to them being anchored in the domestic sphere allowed
women to make solid and valuable service contributions. By ungendering service contributions
during the Civil War like serving as spies, knitting socks for soldiers, and manufacturing
uniforms and ammunitions McPherson claims, the feminine presence would not only subjugate
the conventional epistemology that firmly established war in the public sphere as a strictly
masculine domain, it would also reshape the dynamics of the domestic sphere (Battle Cry 34-37).
Aileen S. Kraditor asserts this perspective of a reincarnation of the domestic sphere by
women’s service noting “When the Civil War began, the women, still abolitionists as much as
they were fighters for women’s rights, suspended their annual conventions and threw themselves
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into the war effort, to which they made notable contributions” (3). These women saw patriotism
and its concomitant service and activism as a by-product of citizenship. Yet, ironically, by
placing the suffrage movement on hold during the Civil War, Kraditor explains, white women’s
expectations on how their service would be interpreted were impossibly high and “after the war’s
end they resumed their demands for equal rights and for the vote, expecting the Republican
party, out of gratitude for the women’s war activities, to respond more favorably than before”
(3). Furthermore, white women underestimated the shift in the cultural and historical landscape
that extensively altered the political path to citizenship. They erroneously believed that their fate
was secured given the historical roots of their resistance to the legacy of patriarchal domination
in the social order and their service to the country during the Civil War.
While McPherson and Kraditor rightly validate white women’s patriotic service and
contributions during the Civil War efforts, Reconstruction historian, Eric Foner argues in
Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution—1863-1877, that free and freed black women
and men also wanted enfranchisement as the prize in recognition of their war service. Foner
posits “If the war opened doors of opportunity for women, it held out hope for an even more
radical transformation in the condition of the tiny, despised black population of the free states”
(25). If the institutional and structural changes of the Civil War democratized the social order
and as Foner notes “Reconstruction witnessed the birth of the modern black community” (102);
it was the ideology in the Emancipation Proclamation, Foner argues, which compelled a dynamic
paradigm shift:
The Emancipation Proclamation permanently transformed not only the character
of the Civil War, but the problem of Reconstruction. For it suggested that even if,
as Lincoln maintained, the rebelling Southern states remained theoretically a part
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of the Union, they could not resume their erstwhile position without
acknowledging the destruction of slavery—a requirement that implied farreaching changes in Southern society and politics. (35)
As Foner notes, changes would be sweeping: whereas blacks would focus on securing control
over

their

own

identity-formation,

social

inclusion,

economic

empowerment,

and

enfranchisement, white women would agitate for a similar social and political agenda—agency,
empowerment, and enfranchisement. Despite the linkages between race and gender in how they
were contained within the social structure, antagonism emerged between the groups when white
women learned “it was the Negro’s hour” (Campbell 105) and that their citizenship was
sacrificed for black inclusion into the sociopolitical geography.
The effects of choosing a racial viewpoint over a gender viewpoint politically divided
black men and black women over suffrage. For instance, although Sojourner Truth was against
the Fifteenth Amendment because she believed for black women “[. . .] it will be just as bad as it
was before” (Truth qtd. in When and Where 65), other prominent black women like Wells and
Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, were openly in favor of the Fifteenth Amendment despite both
Willard’s and Susan B. Anthony’s public opposition. For black women, racial discourses were a
major obstacle to social and political inclusion rather than gender discourses. Therefore,
according to Paula Giddings, black women overwhelmingly supported dismantling the
structuring ideologies of race to open a space for gender ideologies to collapse. Giddings writes:
The support of the Fifteenth Amendment by Black women did not mean that they
had less interest in their suffrage, economic independence, education, or any other
issue that pertained to them. And their support certainly didn’t mean a collective
willingness to be oppressed by men, Black or White. But Harper and others
41

understood that the rights of Black men had to be secured before Black women
could assert theirs. If the race had no rights, the women’s struggle was
meaningless. (68)
With black men moving closer to the center, black women hypothesized the character and
representation of blackness would shed the trope of its scientific and historical representation—
ideological instruments they argued reinforced stereotypes about blackness and black
womanhood.

In this reading, the master status of race is clearly a dominant force over the

master-status of gender and absorbs the social power that white women have over black men.
Indeed, by giving black men preferential treatment and access to citizenship over white women,
patriarchy reifies its power with a new hegemony—racialized gender14. This clearly
demonstrates that race as a master status overwhelms gender as a rhetorical strategy and major
trope for inclusion to the center, which during the nineteenth-century meant enfranchisement, a
message Frederick Douglass articulated according to Kraditor. She writes,
The view of Frederick Douglass, Negro abolitionists who had from the inception
of the suffrage movement been one of its most steadfast male champions, was
short and full of meaning: To you, he told the women [the inference is white
women, not black women], the vote is desirable; to us [the inference is black men]
it is vital. Many women, however, declared that their rights deserved priority:
first, because women were half the population whereas Negroes were only a small
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I am referring to the signifying effect of race and gender as linking identities/characteristics and having more than
one social meaning. Further the coupling of these two identities can be used as a source of oppression and alienation
in the context of politics to integrate one marginalized group into the political geography, while legitimizing the
separation of another marginalized group from center.
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minority, and second, because in their opinion, after the Civil War the Negro man
was in many ways better off than any woman, black or white. (167)
Despite Douglass’s feminist awareness, it is clear he endorsed in his consciousness many of the
traditional relations between male and female in the nineteenth-century, which created inequities
for women in both the private and public sphere. To reduce white women’s demand for suffrage
as an attractive and privileged accoutrement, rather than their constitutional right as a citizen, and
to declare that suffrage for black men as fundamental and critical speaks to his masculine
ideology. Yet, black women remained fixed in the symbolism embodied within the woman’s role
in both the private and public sphere. For instance, despite their support of the Fifteenth
Amendment “as a prerequisite to achieving their own rights” (Giddings 71) black women were
still disempowered within the domestic sphere—an inescapable space of struggle for power and
agency in spite of their feminist ideals. As a result, the pursuit of racial equality for many black
women subsumed to gender equity within feminist organizations like the WCTU, which offered
them space to agitate, but on the periphery—a location they were all too familiar. Thus, from a
nineteen-century black feminist perspective, their presence met hostility on both private and
domestic fronts. From Sibley’s perspective, marginalized subjects are aware and frustrated by
their framing within the context of social and cultural boundaries. In Sibley’s view:
For the individual or group socialized into believing that the separation of
categories is necessary or desirable, the liminal zone is a source of anxiety. It is a
zone of abjection, one which should be eliminated n order to reduce anxiety, but
this is not always possible. Individuals lack the power to organize their world
into crisp sets and so eliminate spaces of ambiguity. (33)
For instance, Wells hated teaching, but she realized it was a practical and honorable occupation,
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which was neither especially liberating nor too demeaning for a black woman who did not want
to perform domestic labor for a white family. In short, teaching for Wells was a space of innerconflict and debate. Further, although her mother was a washerwoman, Wells characterizes
being a washerwoman, a job that allowed many black women to lift themselves out of poverty as
boring, tedious, and one she refused to perform possibly because the role suggests a sameness
with the characteristics of being a slave—obedience and subservience (Crusade 31).
With their new status as freedwomen and men, blacks were increasingly becoming
socially adjusted, which included more choices other than manual labor for employment.
However, many other groups in the 1890s primarily from southern and eastern Europe, like
Jews, Italians, and Irish immigrants15 suffered from similar sociopolitical disadvantages like
blacks as non- native born Americans and thus were targets for discrimination. As Kraditor
points out, the robust transformation of America during the Reconstruction Era was viewed by
some as a downturn for America because it presented new political inroads like enfranchisement
and civil rights to previously excluded groups like blacks. Now, the new immigrants also
considered “different” were similarly restrained from access to political power because they
threatened native-born dominance in the social order. It must be noted that blacks had very
distinct African cultural and physical characteristics which marked and relegated them to the
lower tier of the social hierarchy. Therefore, although there was fanatical resistance to these new
European ethnicities, most of them were tolerated at a much higher rate than blacks one can
argue because their physical characteristics was less distinct than blacks16. However, it was the
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See Highham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925. 2nd ed. New York:
Athenaeum, 1963.
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See Lieberson, Stanley. A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants since 1880. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980.
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extreme religious and cultural values of the new immigrants that presented threats to native-born
Americans.

Nevertheless, Kraditor argues, Southern Conservatives appeared to enjoy their

Northern neighbors discomfort with the increasing influx of the new immigrants who were
targets of nativist ideologies. Kraditor says,
[. . .] the events of Reconstruction had caused a reaction throughout the country
against universal suffrage and democracy itself; that the North, experiencing an
influx of “new immigrants,” could now understand what the white South have
been saying for many years; and that the salvation of Anglo-Saxon civilization in
the United States depended on the rule of the intelligent, which meant native-born
whites. (169)
Although European ethnic whites also threatened native white dominance in the social order,
according to Mattingly, “Willard again pointed specifically to black voters as the primary
problem” (79) within the new construction of America. A bias, Mattingly argues that,
“reveals[s] her white, middle-class assumptions” (79) on the social and cultural customs of
blacks. Although this is an impossible theory to confirm, we must consider agents are not born in
a social vacuum, that personal ideologies are shaped historically, geographically, and culturally
by the events, people, and environment they live in. In this regard, Willard’s use of
marginalizing rhetoric to articulate her consciousness speaks to the ways the self is significantly
developed by the historical, geographical, and cultural narrative.

Thus, it is not surprising that

Willard’s rhetoric “constitutes an ambiguous zone” (Sibley 33) where subjects are developed and
emerge from a diverse group of stimuli that formulates their perspective, which are sometimes at
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odds with their overall political and social ethos17. For instance, while Willard undermines the
humanity of black men, she clearly demonstrates a recognition and kinship between the mutual
marginality of both black and white women within the sociopolitical order.
According to social theorists, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, the agent’s identity
is not immune from these linking social and cultural forces. That is, ideologies are the byproducts of a particular and entrenched social, cultural, historical, geographical, and political
context because they all inform and participate in framing the ideological apparatus of the
subject and one can argue unconsciously. Therefore, to ignore the interplay between the sociocultural history of the Reconstruction Era and the liberating voices of Willard and Wells
separates them from the locations where they were both radically altered in their consciousnessraising rhetoric. After all, notes Berger and Luckmann, “[. . .] humanity and [. . .] sociality are
inextricably intertwined” (51) despite the complex and conflicting ideologies they spawn in the
rhetor’s representation of herself. Nevertheless, as orators for social justice, both Willard and
Wells were visionary women who realized the polarizing black/white, male/female, and public
/private spheres would not continue to exist as separate domains, but would come together
framed within the new vision of America by breaking free of the traditional and historical
confinements of gender and racial narratives to accommodate all the voices of American
womanhood.
Conclusion
Although Willard’s and Well’s rhetorical slugfest reached its peak in 1893, it is clear that the
roots of their argument were planted years earlier over their personal ideology which was shaped
17

Wells made equally disparaging and racist statements against American-Indians. Although she did not have the
robust criticism that Willard endured, one possible reason is American-Indians had no political voice in the
nineteenth-century.
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by the historic and cultural changes spawned by Reconstruction. The legacy of the
Reconstruction Era did more than change the nature of citizenship in America, it also
reconstructed the representations of two of the most vocal groups vying for suffrage—black
women and white women. However, for both black and white women, this may have
exacerbated the rhetorical distance between them when black men received franchise. Despite
their common goal for woman suffrage, the politics of Reconstruction may account for Willard
and Wells as rivals attempting to preserve her own portion of the periphery in the social order.
By 1895 the public vitriol in the rhetoric between Willard and Wells over the lynching
issue waned. Whether or not their challenges to and for the issue of lynching continued in the
WCTU’s movement culture is not known; however, there may have been some passive
references to the Willard-Wells rhetorical slugfest given Harpers’ pointed comments on black
women and their alienation and constrained roles as leaders within the WCTU’s hierarchy. With
this consideration, it is likely conflict fatigue, rather than ideological consensus gave closure to
the Willard-Wells conflict over lynching, although as Mattingly comments “the national union
went on record against lynching” (95). Given the response by the WCTU, deeply influenced by
the leadership of Willard, and the Wells’ demand for black political and legal recognition, we
should be so bold to presume that the ethical and moral issues surrounding lynching were taken
in full measure.
While feminist ideals should always play an important role in FSMs, the binding of
gender equality to race as its competing master status trope may enhance the understanding of
gender inequality more in the political culture given as race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation are all interlocking oppressions (Collins). Unfortunately, most FSMs during the
nineteenth-century were not progressive enough to recognize the unequal burden that black
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women suffered in these representations along with their gender subordination. Therefore, it
may be prudent to argue that FSMs cannot effectively advance the cause of women without
interconnecting it to the effects of these other integral parts of women’s identities given the
fundamental role they also play in exclusionary practices which constrain the spaces women can
occupy. Members of oppressed groups within organizations that challenge patterns of
discrimination within the larger culture will respond politically to racial stigmas even in a
movement that professes to rebel against these beliefs and stereotypes. As Mattingly notes, “The
controversy between Wells and Willard, while angering most members, nonetheless heightened
racial insensitivity within an organization that had always professed to invite all members
equally” (95). This consequently forced the WCTU to confront its own patterns of racial
prejudice, discrimination, and segregation within the FSM.
This chapter has presented the important role that race and gender as master status
determining traits played in the ideological struggle for dominance over lynching within the
WCTU between its president and woman’s rights activist, Frances Willard and one of its most
vocal black members, orator and anti-lynching crusader, Ida B. Wells. Further, this chapter has
sought to stress the nature of identity politics as an intensive political factor during the
Reconstruction Era as America began the shift from slavery to a post slavery society, and the
challenge of white women and black women and men for citizenship and enfranchisement. In the
next chapter, we will take a further look at the political distinction of race and gender during the
Reconstruction Era, and how these social constructions and representations were legally
embedded in the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th) by partisan framers of the
Constitution.
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CHAPTER 2
The Rhetorical Treatment of Race18 and Gender19 in the Reconstruction Amendments

__________________________________________
For last year's words belong to last year's language
And next year's words await another voice.
-T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets 4: Little Gidding
_____________________________________________________________________________________

The African American scholar and sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois characterized Reconstruction
politics as an era in which America’s cultural, political, and social vision for blacks within the
social structure was obscured and/or hindered by its myopic focus on race. Invoking eyesight as
a metaphor for lack of foresight by the Reconstruction Amendment Framers in the execution of
failed Reconstruction programs like the Freedmen’s Bureau20, Du Bois believed race “[. . .] was
the American Blindspot that made the experiment all the more difficult, and to the South
incomprehensible” (370). Du Bois notes that whites believed blacks were “different from other
human beings (370)” and should not participate in the sociopolitical order with the responsibility
18

Race is an unstable term. That is, it has no coherent, fixed, or apparent meaning or application since it goes
through historical, cultural, and political cycles of construction. While completely aware that race holds no absolute
connotation, its signification in the social order produces meaning which shapes its character and affects the agency
of racialized subjects. Therefore, as a point of inquiry, it is useful to examine race as a rhetorical narrative expressed
through identity.
19

The social meaning of gender is just as complex and incoherent as race. However, within both the private and
public sphere the narratives of gender combined with race takes a different route when it comes to the distribution of
rights and privileges within the social structure. For instance, black women in the nineteenth-century would struggle
for racial equality more than gender equality. That is not to say that the oppression they experienced as women was
invisible. In fact, race, along with social-status, was an interlocking influence in shaping the political management
of the discourse on gender for black women in the nineteenth-century. The mythical , but traditional narrative of
“True Womanhood” during the Victorian era was an essential aspect in structuring inequalities for both black and
white women,. However, since both race and gender often come into contact within the social order and influence
one another it is no wonder their role and performance are frequently cast with similar narratives although both
representations signify contrasting conceptions and ideologies.
20

Although universally regarded by historians as a political and social failure, the Freedmen’s Bureau established in
1865 was part of Reconstruction. Its purpose was to help with the assimilation of freed blacks in the new American
culture while it shifted from slavery to a post slavery system. Despite its many disappointments, the establishment
of schools and churches denied to blacks during slavery was its most recognized accomplishment.
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and privileges of citizenship. The complex web of Darwinian ideology containing black people
also confined white women within spatial, political, and economic spheres. Arguments for
marginalizing these groups were incorporated in the rhetoric of legal narratives like the
Reconstruction Amendments21,which maintained and secured dominant sociopolitical ideology
that characterized the nineteenth-century.
Like Du Bois, who questioned the racial agenda of the Reconstruction Amendment
Framers22, Robert A. Dahl, a contemporary political scholar, questions the ideology of the
Constitutional Framers and their attempt to produce a society with philosophical agendas that
have a white male political thrust. Dahl argues the Constitution developed and written by elitist
Framers “contained at least seven important shortcomings” (15) including opinions on slavery
and suffrage (15-20). Dahl posits,
Enlightened as the Framers’ constitution may have been by the standards of the
eighteenth century, future generations with more democratic aspirations would
find some of its undemocratic features objectionable—and even unacceptable.
The public expression of these growing democratic aspirations was not long in
coming. (20)
Dahl’s inquiry, like Du Bois’s, critically reviews the ambiguity of race and gender as politicized
identities. The robust cultural and historical transformation of postbellum America offered
fertile ground for a discourse of race and gender. The Reconstruction Amendments serve as
legal narratives to examine how politicized representations contributed to the identity formation,
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Although many political figures were associated with drafting the Reconstruction Amendments, Republican
Congressman John Bingham (Ohio) was the chief architect of the controversial 14th Amendment that enfranchised
black men over white women.
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social activism, and rivalry between Willard and Wells over lynching. With the “historic
consciousness of oppression” (Adam 35) of race in relation to slavery for black women, and
gender in relation to the subjugation of white women within the domestic sphere, the political
culture of the nineteenth-century provides an important rhetorical space to study the ideological
presence of rhetoric contained in the Reconstruction Amendments. Constitutional law scholar,
Paul Gewirtz, maintains, “treating law as narrative and rhetoric means looking at [. . .] the
language used as much as the idea expressed” (3). By shifting our focus on the dialectic between
narrative and rhetoric in law, Gewirtz contends the dynamic relation:
[. . .] emphasizes the ways legal processes involve speakers in exchange with
audiences everywhere. It sees laws as artifacts that reveal a culture, not just
policies that shape the culture. And because its focus is story as much as rule, it
encourages awareness of the particular human lives that are the subjects or objects
of the law, even when that particularity is subordinated to the generalizing
impulses of legal regulation. (3)
This chapter examines the legal rhetoric of the Reconstruction Amendments to interpret race and
gender as emancipatory claims for equality. Further, it examines black women’s citizenship and
suffrage rivalry with white women—another nineteenth-century politicized identity group. It
also proposes that the Reconstruction Amendments as legal artifacts were historically and
culturally embedded with the symbolic systems and meanings of race and gender. The aim is to
demonstrate, as Gewirtz argues, that legal narratives like the Reconstruction Amendments reveal
ideologies that are historically and culturally contingent; further, they reflect and influence the
social order, which includes a legal ambition to interpret race and gender according to the
situatedness of the dominant group on the racial hierarchy. In the nineteenth-century, this was an
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exclusively white male domain.
Legal scholar James Boyd White, in “Thinking about Our Language” proposes that the
subject should participate in conversation rather than in conflict with the cultural sources from
which rhetoric receives its power and authority. Boyd writes,
We are always making ourselves, as individuals and communities, always making
our language; yet we are always being made by our language, by our past, and by
the actions of others, and the line between the making and the made is never clear.
This means, among other things, that our own habits of mind, of perception, and
of feeling are contingent and changeable; they are thus a central part of our proper
subject, and this is true for us not only as citizens, or cultural actors more
generally, but in our professional lives, as lawyers and teachers and writers.
Our work cannot claim to be the kind of science that assumes a validity
beyond culture, beyond language, but should hope to be a literary or
rhetorical art, a way of working with and within our language. (1964)
Willard’s and Wells’s social justice movements did just this as they engaged in agonistic
rhetorical struggle23 to debate the democratic values of America. They examined the historical
and cultural codifying of their specific subjectivities, which includes their agitation for
“gendered” social, political, geographical, and economic equity. Further, neither Willard nor
Wells believed there was a specific rhetoric in America’s legal narratives that excluded them as
gendered and racialized people from the privileges and rights that came with being full and
enfranchised citizens. Both feminist agitators sought to displace the political management on
race and gender in legal narratives by making a case for the moral tenor embedded in the rhetoric
23
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of legal narratives like the Declaration of Independence, which they both valued and which
heavily influenced their social reformist campaigns.
Finally, this chapter explores the emergence of both race and gender as master status
discourses and analyzes their discursive, historical, and cultural point of convergence in
Willard’s and Well’s social justice struggle. In this way, the impact of Willard’s and Wells’s
political orations, richly informed by historical and cultural influences on gender and race,
provides critical confirmation of the complex relations between race, gender, politics, and ethics
within legal narratives. Indeed, as social activists, both Willard and Wells knew the immense
power of rhetoric to destabilize the social order and to make meaning. Therefore, their
interlocking “gendered interest” in legal discourse and its narrative role in the construction of
women within the social order had a particular relevance to them. For Boyd, this means trying to
work out a balance between the extremes involved in the construction and evaluation of
language—a task that includes a methodology for analyzing the intersection of political and
ethical rhetoric by both its consumers and framers. Boyd suggests:
Once one looks to the languages in which community and character are
constituted, one suddenly sees that political and social analysis involves the
understanding of a whole set of things not normally thought to belong to it:
language, mind, and the reciprocal relation between them; the way language is
made and changed, by individuals and by communities; and the way language
resists change. (Boyd1964)
Boyd further proposes:
To think about language, especially about language change, is to
require attention to the processes of speaking and reading more generally, to
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composition and interpretation. This in turn brings into our field of concern the
nature of the ethical and political relations that are appropriate to people who
conceive of themselves as language-users and language-makers. (Boyd 1964)
By mapping racialized and gendered rhetoric in legal narratives like the Reconstruction
Amendments, the symbolic representations of race and gender as “distinctive” political
groupings emerge as a critical lens to view the historical and cultural dependency of these two
politicized identities in the sociopolitical culture. How do legal narratives use rhetoric to
articulate the nature of race and gender? What do the symbolic representations refer to within
the law? How do the symbolic representations in the law reinforce constructions of race and
gender in the social order? By answering these questions, new approaches in rhetorical
historiography are expanded to examine legal narratives as discourses that reproduce politicized
representations like race and gender. The narratives convey ideology—that is consciously or
unconsciously—infused with power and authority from the historical and cultural moment. A
final objective of this chapter is to increase the political consciousness of women by
demonstrating that legal thought is a discursive process that reflects and conveys the ideology of
the state. This ideology in the United States has historically disempowered women, and
particularly women of color, in the political geography.
The Problem of Race and Gender: Cultural Reflections
In the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, black and white women’s inferiority was viewed as a
scientific fact. Not only was scientific knowledge used to narrate the lives of both groups, but it
also repressed the spatial movement within the social order for women, both black and white.
They also lacked appropriate avenues to protest their spatial confinement in the private and
public sphere. For women, this lack of mobility within the social order not only reinforced social
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and cultural traditions, but also strengthened religiously ordained discourses on their
marginalization and disempowerment. For Robert Sack, “[t]erritorial rules about what is in or
out of place pervade and structure lives” and, he continues, “provide specific examples of how
space has power” (326). For example, while feminist organizations like the WCTU did not
silence the liberating voices of white women, the status and role of black women within the
WCTU were viewed and preserved with the same form of scientific reasoning that also limited
their territoriality within the social order. Sack contends, “[t]erritorial and social rules are
mutually constitutive” (327) and become complicit in the extent to which a subject is able to
function within the social order. Thus, the oppositional identities of black women were under
constant jurisdiction by authorial voices, which constrained their agency within and outside the
WCTU.
Although the most distinguishing feature of Sack‘s theory is the conflation of space and
power, he is quick to note that “the specific place does not have power but rather [. . .] it resides
in spatial relations, especially the distances” (327). Since black and white women were highly
constrained in their social and cultural distance outside of the WCTU, as members within the
FSM the complex sociopolitical racial issues in the larger polity inevitably appeared creating
racial tension between the two groups. While Willard and WCTU were indeed progressive in
their politics, their social justice principles were inadequate to meet the new representation of
black womanhood. Without a doubt, black women believed they were not within the WCTU
hierarchy of power where ideologies are conceptualized no more than they were in the larger
political culture. Therefore, they tackled not only the problem of their marginal space within the
WCTU head on; they also provoked the issue over their powerlessness or lack of voice within
the FSM. However, their focus on economic and social rights for black women was especially
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significant to white women’s focus on civil and political rights for white women because both
were central to Willard’s overall theme for both black and white women—universal human
rights.
Despite their exploitation and oppression within the WCTU’s feminine version of
patriarchy, black women did have autonomy and vocalization of their situatedness in black-only
chapters of the WCTU. In some white WCTU chapters, Mattingly notes, “black members did
have the option of joining an existing white union or forming their own” (87). However, as in
many areas of social and cultural transformations, the South struggled with the changes, and not
surprisingly, Mattingly adds, “Black women in the South were seldom given that choice” (87) to
participate in a white chapter of the WCTU. Within the overall leadership of the WCTU, black
women, and most particularly Southern black women, were spatially limited and alienated from
the center of power. Despite their limited role, black women were still able to use their restricted
domain within the WCTU as another site for agonistic struggle. Within the overall leadership of
the WCTU, black women, and most particularly Southern black women, were spatially limited
and alienated from the center of power. Despite their limited role, black women were still able
to use their restricted domain within the WCTU as another site for agonistic struggle. For
example, black feminist orator, Frances Ellen Walker Harper in her essay “The Woman’s
Christian Temperance Union and the Colored Woman” writes candidly and forcefully about the
contradiction in the WCTU’s “notion of equal membership for African Americans” (WellTempered 86-87). By making the marginal space and powerlessness of black women in the
WCTU visible, Harper, friend to both Willard and Wells laid down the stakes of the division by
arguing that the WCTU violated its own code on social gospel justice. However, while she
continued as a vocal member in the WCTU despite her grievance on behalf of black women,
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Harper was still asked by black members, “if black sheep must climb up some other way” to
achieve equal membership status within the WCTU (Well-Tempered 87). Indeed, writes Sack,
“places constrain and enable” the subject and present opportunities for personal sovereignty. In
Sack’s understanding, “[n]ot only can place help mold or destroy the self, it can also liberate it”
(329) from the spatial and cultural restrictions that view the agent’s existence within a social
movement as decentering. For Sack, then, place has a vital and dual role in its interplay with the
subject: it can both reify hegemonic power thereby forcing the subject to the margin and it can
disarm traditional and institutional patriarchal hegemonic practices to liberate the subject from
the margins. In short, Sack seems to argue, place can equally impose and neutralize dominance
in the social order.
Guobin Yang extends Sack’s theory, arguing that social movements play an important
role in the psychological development of the agent’s identity. For Yang, the subject can become
so obscured in its role as a member of the social movement that their own identity is barely
perceptible to them. This may create tensions and thrust them onto the liminal stage, another
spatial location that limits, restricts, circumscribes, and confines the oppositional subject. In the
words of Yang,
The liminal stage involves one of all three kinds of separation: spatial, temporal,
and social/moral. When ritual subjects are separated from the familiar space, the
routine temporal order, or the structures of moral obligations and social ties, they
enter a liminal time/space. (383)
Membership in a social movement may place the subject on such a sensory threshold; the subject
may have problems coping with the expression of an identity circumscribed by their membership
within the social movement because of the inhospitality of their relations within the organization.
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Yet, similar to Sack, Yang posits the social distance that the subject experiences within the social
movement is an ideal space for reflection, design, and balance. Yang writes:
Theoretically, a social movement can be conceptualized as a liminal happening in
general social processes. It separates its participants from existing social
structures and locates them in a liminal situation. The characteristics of the
liminal situation—freedom, egalitarianism, communion, and creativity—provide
the conditions for personal change. (384)
It is clear that black women within the WCTU endured the spatial confinement of the feminist
social movement, and white women were similarly stifled by historical social and cultural
practices in the nineteenth century that restricted their movement within the public sphere.
However, gender, and particularly white gendered conceptualizations of marginality, is viewed
as a natural rather than political place of masculine hegemony. Thus, for critical race theorists,
the marginality of white women’s agency does not emerge from a site of extreme social
pathology in the same way as oppositional identities, but a site of white women’s relative
privilege and complicity in their spatial assignment—the domestic sphere. For example, in her
attempt to break free from the “territorial and social rules” that stifled her intellectual
development, Willard became anguished and in conflict by her mother’s idealized version of her
life after she graduated from college. While the application of the domestic sphere in the
nineteenth century did define private boundaries for middle class black women, like Wells.
However, the ideology behind the domestic sphere’s span of control and reification was
particularly harsh in its enforcement and defining boundaries on white women’s agency24 even
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from other women. In her journal entry dated February 14, 1859, Willard recounts her mother’s
words regarding her future:
You are not strong and—you cannot protect and sustain yourself—you
cannot battle with this great, cold world alone. [. . .] God has ordered it
so. If you act in opposition to His decree you are out of the right path—
you are in danger. At the close of the next term, you will have acquired a
good education. [. . .] Another year of hard study will ‘tell’ upon your
appearance and vitality. Another year of subjection to the routine of college
duties and regulations will fade you, too. Graduate next July. Be relieved from
college restrictions. [. . .] The world will like you better. You must take the
world as it is, and not as it ought to be,—you must not war with your fate. You
are in Rome;—you must do as Romans do. They that are not with us, are
against us. It is for your best interest to please the world. (Writing Out My Heart
37-38)
Willard, simultaneously rejects the spatial and social representation of the feminine ideal while
affirming her idealized self by dialectic. Within her journal, she proclaims, “These are Mother’s
ideas”(38). Further, she asks in resistance “Am I to be chained down to the world?” “To do as
the world thinks best, and wisest?” (38). By formulating an interpretation of her representation
with an interpretive lens developed in the liberatory space of the liminal state , Willard exercises
the power of self-identification which come from interpreting the self through one’s own voice
by evaluating the soundness of her mother’s critique by questioning her own intentions.
Jacqueline Jones Royster’s essay, “When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own,”
were contained with the traditional and legitimate hegemony of religion—a strategy that appeared neutral in its
enforcement of their domestic assignment.
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holds particularly true to the subject articulating their own interpretive lens. In her examination
of self-representation by black women, Royster addresses the dialectic between the interpretation
and expression of the subject with-in conversation with multiple discourses. Royster argues,
“using subject position as a terministic screen in cross-boundary discourse permits analysis to
operate kaleidoscopically, thereby permitting interpretation to be richly informed by the
converging dialectical perspectives” (29). Royster points to subjectivity as a location for a
deeper and richer context for reflections on the emergence of the agent without the limiting gaze
of an essentialist view. In Royster’s understanding, “subjectivity as a defining value pays
attention dynamically to context, ways of knowing, language abilities, and experience, and by
doing so it has a consequent potential to deepen, broaden, and enrich our interpretive views in
dynamic ways as well” (29). Royster claims that outsider views on the subject “embody ways of
seeing, knowing, being, and acting that probably suggest as much about the speaker and the
context as they do about the targeted subject matter” (31). Like Sack and Gang, Royster concurs
that “amid the chaos of difference” (37) subjects do not have to dissolve within the liminal state,
but can evolve by imagining their own representation and becoming what they imagine. For
Willard, this meant rejecting the Victorian ideal of marriage and children for her personal ideal
of being single and working as a social activist.
Although Sack’s, Gang’s, and Royster’s perspective on the oppression of the subject
within a liminal state and within social movements is useful, many scholars are divided when the
racialized and gendered subject encounters discourses and ideologies on the social and cultural
role of the subject marked by these politicized identities. For sociologist Steve Fenton,
In the USA in particular we have to accept that we are dealing with a social order
which has incorporated, in a pervasive and persistent way, the idea of ‘racial
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difference’, and that this in many ways matches real divisions and inequalities in
the American social structure. This is precisely what is meant by ‘racialisation’–
that there is both a set of powerful ideas and beliefs about ‘race’ and also a
matching of this set of ideas with the differential social incorporation of groups
commonly perceived as ‘racially different.’ (4)
In relation to gender, Fenton believes, “The state-political and the economic tendencies which
have contributed to the formation of [. . .] racism are also implicated in the forming of gender
roles and ideologies” (53). That is, gender, also shaped and interpreted by the same
methodologies that separate the oppositional identities from the center of society, historically has
a particular emphasis to disempower not only women of color, but also all women from civil and
political rights. For men, by contrast, the focus was to exclude racialized men rather than all
men from civil and political rights.
Similar to Fenton, Michael Omi and Howard Winant view race as an ongoing historical
discourse grounded in scientific thought. In their theory about race, Omi and Winant argue that
“race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to
different types of human bodies”25 (55). Omi and Winant also speak to race and the systems that
shape and arrange it within the social order. They locate this pattern of racial configuring in the
context of racial formation, which has coherence despite its subjugating intentions on the
racialized and, by extension, gendered body. From Omi and Winant’s perspective, racial
formation is “the sociohistorical process, by which racial categories are created, inhabited,
transformed, and destroyed” (55) because they are deeply embedded within “both social
structure and cultural representation” (56). Thus, for Omi and Winant, race is both strategic and
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transformative. That is, it converts its structures to the epistemological context as it emerges
within a particular historical moment. They argue that race does not remain in a concrete and
visible state although the result is the same—subjugation of the racialized and gendered body.
Omi and Winant buttress Fenton’s claim about the myriad ways that racial patterns change. The
subject’s perception of race also changes with great effect. Fenton observes, “Since racial
formation is always historically situated, our understanding of the significance of race, and the
ways race structures society, has changed enormously over time” (61). However, as race cuts
across historical, social, and cultural borders the mythology of its scientific rationality remains,
according to Stuart Hall, in “relations of dominance and subordination” (44). These relations can
be seen, in the rhetoric of legal narratives like the Reconstruction Amendments, which legitimize
the social order’s ideologies on race and gender constructions. Ultimately, then, “race [and
gender] is now a preeminently political phenomenon” (Omi and Winant 65). Both race and
gender positions are traceable to the rhetoric in the Reconstruction Amendments, which act as
narratives not only of the social and cultural relations of that era, but also of the framers’ role in
replicating and conveying that historical moment when the imperialist power of the law made
discrimination appear morally fair and neutral.
Race and Gender: Definitions
Despite their constitution of the racialized and gendered subject, race and gender are not
negotiated terms—they are self-legitimatizing. That is, they are submerged within systems,
institutions, and arrangements. Race and gender—as recognized ideologies of historical, cultural,
and social dominance—pose significant challenges for scholars who wish to interpret the
structures of race and gender as politicized identities. However, given the rhetorical force of
race and gender in the consciousness of the social, cultural, historical, and political orders, many
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scholars still confront the legitimacy of their power over the race and gendered subject and offer
critique to these contested terms as identity markers.
Sally Haslanger’s essay “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want
Them To Be?” is a poignant example of the complexity that race and gender articulations pose
for scholars. Even in the title, Haslanger addresses the question by demonstrating the struggle
against the compelling force and influence of their rhetoric by their aesthetic encasing of the
word what. While she contests race and gender as distinct reinforcing ideologies, Haslanger
recognizes their power as collaborative systems of dominance rather than individual rhetorics
that regulate racialized and gendered bodies. Haslanger argues that racialized and gendered
subjects must resist the “prescriptive force” (48) of the terms race and gender. Haslanger also
mentions that “working with a model that demonstrates some of the parallels between race and
gender also help us locate important differences between them” (32). She claims that the
contextualization of race and gender is central to any interpretation, but suggests that inquiry into
the identity of race and gender begins in our “everyday vocabularies of race and gender” (34),
which are central to the development of their ideological role in “the politics of the speech
context” (35).
Like Haslanger, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., confronts the challenge of a specific
interpretation of race by first reinforcing its interpretive complication. He encases the term
within quotation marks in the title of his seminal collection, “Race,” Writing, and Difference.
For Gates, race is a “dangerous trope” (5) with a lot of ideological currency to represent
oppositional identities. In that regard, Gates observes, “the term ‘race’ has both described and
inscribed differences of language, belief system, artistic tradition, and gene pool, as well as all
sorts of supposedly natural attributes such as rhythm, athletic ability, celebration, usury, fidelity,
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and so forth” (5). While acknowledging the rhetorical and ideological force of race, Gates
argues against reproducing those rhetorical and ideological representations. Gates posits race as
“the ultimate trope of difference because it is so very arbitrary in its application” (5) since it does
not adhere to any explicit interpretive code. Gates also suggests that employing the rhetoric of
race to “describe and inscribe” neutralizes the agent’s power to deauthorize agency over the
racialized subject. For Gates, then, the public plays an active role in shaping racial discourse by
validating its rhetoric in using racialized terms despite the important role race rhetoric holds in
constructing racialized bodies. Gates maintains,
[. . .] we carelessly use language in such a way as to will this sense of
natural difference into our formulations. To do so is to engage in a
pernicious act of language, one which exacerbates the complex problem of
cultural or ethnic difference, rather than to assuage or redress it. (5)
Willard’s utterances regarding the negative associations she applied to black men are a classic
example of Gates’ claim. For example, although Wells reprimanded Willard for her slur against
black manhood (See Chapter 1), it can be argued that Willard did not comprehend the vast
trajectory and timing of her words. She did not appreciate the impact of her words in terms of
slavery history and the current lynching crisis in America, particularly in the South. As
Mattingly notes, “Willard had, Wells believed, supported the lynching of black men, because the
rhetoric of Willard’s statement, even if not explicitly justifying lynching, did in fact support the
assumptions on which lynchings was based” (80). Here is the juncture where rhetoric and
politics are intrinsically intertwined with ideology by the master status of race and gender. As
social actors in the nineteenth century, Willard’s status position as a white woman had a higher
moral and material value than Wells’ status position as a black woman, which both were aware
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of. However, the ideological representations of each master status position—gender and race—
failed to see the sociohistorical change of both identities, which ironically where dependent upon
one another for institutional change within the social order. Yet, despite the ideological change
in postbellum America over gender and race, the new charting of race was moving on a faster
train than the shaping of a new construction of ‘white’ womanhood.
Cinema and cultural studies theorist Richard Dyer, argues that although “racial
judgments” may not always be the dominant factor when making assessments, “ it is never not a
factor, never not in play” given race stresses difference between subjects and establishes
boundaries. Here again it is important to note that race and gender are “floating signifiers”26
with rhetorical features that are often obscured by a dominant signifying system that produces
images based on the negative social attitudes projected through those representations. Dyer goes
on to say “white people create the dominate images of the world and don’t quite see that they
thus construct the world in their own image” (9). Because of Willard’s social prejudices towards
black men, the limitations she established about them as a white woman were imposed with
hostility in her preconceptions and definitions of all black people, a point that compelled Wells
to challenge Willard on her constitution of blacks. For Dyer, “whiteness is only racial when it is
'marked' by the presence of the truly raced, that is, the non-white subject” (14), who become
vulnerable to their own conceptions regarding the symbols they use to define, shape, and locate
the racialized other. That is, the dominant view’s ideology is revealed as a false signifier when
confronted by the resistant discourse of the marginalized. For example, according to Mattingly,
the terms used by Willard in her 1894 WCTU Presidential Address to depict blackness were also
26
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under heavy scrutiny at a meeting of the influential Tawawa Literary Society27 where Wells, as
a speaker, “carefully avoided ad hominem attacks” (80) against Willard. However, Mattingly
writes, “The outrage expressed at those black women who honored Frances Willard is intensified
by the specific use of the term “Afro-American” for black women generally, but of “colored” in
reference to those felt to be complicit with denigration of the race” (81).
Liberal feminist theorist Judith Butler argues that the use of rhetoric is a complex
threshold that is barely perceptible by the gendered speaking subject. Butler argues against a
feminine identity, which imposes an undisputed conception of what is feminine. For Butler,
gender is not a stable term. Rather, it shifts within cultural, political, and historical frames,
thereby eluding and maintaining a fixed interpretation. For Butler, then, it is not biology that
normalizes gender, but discourse. In that regard, Butler maintains that gender is performative
and shaped in the ideology of rhetoric, which induces the subject to act within the mirror image
ascribed by the particular sociopolitical culture that legitimizes its regulation. Thus, for Butler
these
[. . .] acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense
that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.
That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status
apart from the various acts which constitute its reality. (173)
In this regard, Butler extends Dyer’s account by drawing on both gendered and rhetorical
concepts, rather than a purely racial contextualization. Butler argues, “Language gains the power
to create “the socially real” through the locutionary acts of speaking subjects” (146). Thus, for
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The Tawawa Literary Society (1874) was an exclusive class-based group in Cleveland, Ohio that promoted
appreciation of the arts and Christian values among the growing black elite.

66

Butler, the speaking subject, and particularly the gendered speaking subject, is in liminal
struggle, for women are simultaneously the oppressed and the oppressor in trying to construct an
interpretation for their lived reality. Butler writes, “Discourse becomes oppressive when it
requires that the speaking subject, in order to speak, participate in the very terms of that
oppression—that is, take for granted the speaking subject’s own impossibility and
unintelligibility” (147). For Butler then, “Domination occurs through a language which, in its
plastic social action, creates a second-order,” that is she proclaims an “artificial ontology, an
illusion of difference, disparity, and consequently, hierarchy that becomes social reality” (150).
However, like Sack, Gang, and Royster, Butler believes that the subject can overcome the
tyranny of the liminal stage by resisting the confines of its geographical and political boundaries.
Butler suggests that the speaking subject can produce radical, liberating, and inclusive oratory by
confronting rhetorical restrictions that both are exploitative and exclusionary. Therefore, in
Butler’s opinion, “Language has a dual possibility: It can be used to assert a true and inclusive
universality of persons, or it can institute a hierarchy in which only some persons are eligible to
speak and others, by virtue of their exclusion from the universal point of view, cannot “speak”
without simultaneously deauthorizing that speech” (153). Indeed, rhetoric serves as a pretext for
both inclusivity and rebelliousness. The two, demonstrate the sociopolitical fusion of movement
protest.
Another consequence of Willard’s comments on black manhood was that they shifted the
master narrative of gender within the WCTU to the master narrative of race within the
progressive feminist organization. Mattingly notes that when Willard finally broke her polite
silence after many calls for a rebuttal, an editorial in the Cleveland Gazette28 questioned the
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sincerity of her comments, claiming that Willard,
waited a long time and then “beat all about the bush” before going in on the lynch
question. When she did go in (not far either), Miss Willard could not refrain
from doing two things which neither add to her prestige nor accomplish what she
desired. They were her covert attack upon Miss Ida B. Wells and the cause she
represents at present, and the casting of a little “sop” to the south when she said in
substance that she didn’t believe there were white women in the south who
encouraged Afro-Americans there to make certain advances to them. (81)
It is at this point where the cultural and social distance between Willard and Wells is exposed.
Further, the ideological divide between the two orators widened when Wells argued against the
patriarchal status of Willard within the WCTU and demanded that Willard, as WCTU president
and moral social reformer, unpack her suspiciously cryptic comments in the New York Voice
that criminalized black manhood and justified their being lynched.
The Rhetorical Conceptualization of Race and Gender in Legal Narratives
In his essay “The Ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Michael Calvin McGee
argues that political rhetoric is more than simply a mish mash of densely populated narratives.
Political rhetoric, he maintains, draws its rhetorical power from ideographs. That is, words,
phrases, and symbols shape a particular ideological perspective. As ideographs, race and gender
can transform the ideological nature of rhetoric by imposing and/or constraining any competing
articulations on a signifying system. Further, both race and gender as ideographs provide
contextual continuity between rhetoric and ideology for the subject although these
representations are both governed by sociopolitical constructions. From McGee’s perspective,
influential in topics that affected black empowerment in the nineteenth-century.
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“[. . .] ideology in practice is a political language,” which is “preserved in rhetorical documents”
and has “the capacity to dictate decision and control belief and behavior” (5). For McGee,
ideology directs and shapes “freedom” and has “power on [the] consciousness” of the subject
and “an influence on the belief and behavior” on both “the ruler [and] the ruled” (5). Structured
around societal and political patterns, beliefs, and symbols, McGee goes on to say ideographs
“signify and “contain” a unique ideological commitment” (7). Therefore, he argues, ideographs
“exist in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness”
(7) with a particular interpretive and conceptual ambition.
For McGee, ideographs do not mask their ideological and rhetorical nature in history—
they are imbued with it. That is, the contemporary management of an ideograph is in a constant
dialectic with its ideological and historical expression. McGee observes that, “when we engage
ideological argument, when we cause ideographs to do work 29in explaining, justifying, or
guiding policy in specific situations, the relationship of ideographs changes” (13). McGee
argues that, although ideographs are historically bound, their symbolic meaning is carved from
their historical situatedness, and their present development can be fully interpreted only in terms
of reflection on their previous expression: “No present ideology can be divorced from past
commitments if only because the very words used to express present dislocations have a history
that establishes the category of their meaning” (14). In short, for McGee, history in relation to
ideology and ideographs is never dead and gone; it is always alive and present.
Like McGee, legal scholars Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, believe we must
study history through legal narratives to know who we are. For Amsterdam and Bruner, legal
narratives are not separate from a culture—they are embroidered within it. In Amsterdam and
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Bruner’s reading, legal narratives reflect not only the legal and civil order, but also the cultural,
social, and political way we think and communicate. In short, legal narratives like the
Reconstruction Amendments frame a culture’s belief systems and values in the rhetoric of its
law. This gives legal narratives special significance in characterizing the historical and
ideological spheres of a society. Amsterdam and Bruner write:
Law is one of society’s means for maintaining continuity in value judgments
across time and changing conditions. It does not encompass all value judgments
but is centrally concerned with those that are seen as affecting the stability of a
community—including the criteria for determining which ones these are. Such
value judgments must evolve through a process of repeated applications in which
they are simultaneously reaffirmed and tested, made to fit anew through mutation
and thereby preserved. (140)
Amsterdam and Bruner also examine the role of race within the narrative of law, arguing that
“issues of race are among the central problems that have preoccupied American society since
colonial times” (246). Indeed, the explicit relation between race and the Reconstruction
Amendments illustrates the integrated nature of culture, history, politics, and power. Power, that
is, for Michel Foucault, “in its more ‘peripheral’ effects” which “also makes it possible to use its
mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order” (93) by masking its ideological
dominance and thwarting challenges from opposing forces who reject its claim as social and
political reality. This, according to Foucault, serves to motivate such actions as “the right to kill
those who represented a kind of biological danger to others” (139) either by lynching or by
insulating them from the structure of society.
The objectives of the Reconstruction Amendments were clear—to declare America’s
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decisive break from slavery to a post-slavery society within its legal culture. Although the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments all took root within the Constitution by 1870,
they did not erase the exploitation and oppression many newly freed blacks experienced. The
social and political situation was too broad and complex to be so simply repaired. However,
deep questions developed from the amendments about the role of race, rights, and equality for
blacks within post-slavery America. Questions regulating the social and political role of women
became much more pronounced as well.
In her essay “Soul Murder and Slavery,” historian Nell Irvin Painter argues that slavery
as an institution not only reiterated the complex nature of race and gender, but also created a
discourse of its own that was boundless in its reach and scope. For Painter, the ideology of race
and gender were not only culturally intertwined in the popular imagination of postbellum
America, but they were also connected by the rhetoric of patriarchy in the private, which were
consecrated in within the rhetoric of and ideology of slavery (23-24). Although Willard, as a
white middle-class woman , enjoyed more social and political benefits than Wells, both women
suffered from the same disempowering tyranny—the Constitution. Thus, the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which together constitute the
Reconstruction Amendments, are to be regarded as ideographs. As McGee has pointed out, they
“are bound within the [rhetorical and ideological] culture which they define” (9) as testimony to
the abiding power of their historical and contemporary narrative in structuring the social order.
The Reconstruction Amendments: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
The Constitution of the United States is perhaps one of the most recognized documents in the
world, with fundamental laws that both establish its system of government and chart the rights
and civil liberties of its citizenry. Yet, because of cultural and political shifts, amendments are
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added to the Constitution after being ratified to meet unpredictable challenges that come with
inescapable waves of transformation and social revolution. However, like all ratified
amendments to the Constitution, they are specific to the ideological dominance of a historical
political culture and contained in a mixed rhetoric of morality and patriotism. Thus, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments30 to the United States Constitution are placed
within a specific historical location, which many scholars argue reflects not only the aspirations
of a new America, but also the shame of a moral system that constrained its overarching values
and beliefs.
In her essay, “Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage,
and the United states Constitution, 1820-1878,” Ellen Carol DuBois argues that Reconstruction
was not only a forceful political period for freed blacks, but it was also the historical stage where
white women’s rights activism “strengthened the belief that the right to vote was a natural
right”(845). This conviction, DuBois continues, “made the case for woman suffrage much
stronger, more self-evident than it had ever been” (845) and added to the overall reformist zeal
for transformation in the nineteenth century after the Civil War, which would either change or
crush the drive towards restructuring.
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment31 to the Constitution, ratified on December 6,
1865 provides that
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
30
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States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
The Thirteenth Amendment is the rhetorical map that took action against America’s peculiar
institution by abolishing slavery in the Union States. In addition, the word “slavery” was finally
written in the Constitution, which legally signified an admission of “involuntary servitude.” It
also, with presidential authority, ended legally sanctioned forced labor “except as punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” While the Thirteenth Amendment
speaks to a future of a slave free society it must be noted that the social revolution started by the
Antislavery Movement, a point discussed in the next chapter, was a major force in advancing a
new moral rhetoric and ideology to stop legalized slavery in America. Despite the removal of
slavery from the social order, America, still functioned as an emerging world power and still
ideologically supported conquest as form of expansion as indicated by the phrase “or any place
subject to their jurisdiction” in the last part of section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The official end of slavery did not bring the social, economic, or political changes that
newly freed blacks envisioned. Many whites were still ideologically committed to the inferiority
of blacks based on Social Darwinism; therefore, they resisted attempts to broaden the presence of
blacks in the larger sociopolitical order. However, the oppositional voices of white and black
women were becoming more ethos-driven rather than pathos-driven. That is, they began to rely
on their intellectualism and political/legal knowledge rather than a strictly moral rhetoric as an
appeal to their struggle for suffrage. From DuBois’ perspective,
During Reconstruction the demand for woman suffrage flourished because it was
the most forceful way of expressing—and the most powerful tool for
achieving—women’s equality with men. At first, women’s rights advocates
demanded political rights for all without regard to race or sex. Once the
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments were ratified without woman
suffrage, however, they began to argue for the equality not of individuals but of
sexes. Thus began a long process by which ideas about the fundamental
differences between women and men began to be subsumed within a women’s
rights framework. (837)
In this regard, the dominant ideology and rhetoric imbued with racist and divisive overtones
were losing their authoritarianism given that the empowering voices on the margins were
becoming more persuasive and less tolerant of the racial and gendered ordering (King and Smith
75) that subordinated them. Still, racism towards blacks was a major factor in nineteenth-century
American politics as anti-black racist forces did not oppose the widening social and cultural
changes. Yet, despite all the moral conflict over the racial divide in America, white men were
more comfortable with black men voting than white women—a distinction that would take many
years to modify in another amendment to the Constitution32.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified on July 9, 1868
provides that
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, provides that
32

The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified on August 18, 1920, secured the vote for women by overturning the genderbased ordering in the Fourteenth Amendment by inserting the word “male” as a condition for voting.

74

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.
The rhetoric of the Fourteenth Amendment (Sections 1 and 2)33 was distinct on two fronts, its
definition of citizenship was broad and inclusive enough to include former slaves, and the term
“male” was included in the United States Constitution for the first time. The conspicuous
relation of the words “citizens” and “voters” to the gendered male was problematic for women’s
rights activist like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony because it suggested that
women were neither citizens nor voters.
Less controversial, but no less significant for blacks, were the citizenship and civil rights
clauses inscribed in the rhetoric of the legal narrative34. From a legal perspective, these clauses
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were a new mode of constitutional protection and reaction against the Black codes35 enacted by
the Southern states to control the economic advances of freed blacks and to restrict their rights
and privileges. Like their Northern liberators, many freed blacks argued that the black codes
reinstituted slavery and served as a legal supplement to protect and keep a slave-free labor
system under the control of white Southern Conservative landowners. Unfortunately, although
theoretically the rhetoric in the citizenship and civil rights clauses prohibited the black codes,
little was done to protect blacks from the violation of their constitutional rights by the Southern
plantation owners. For many women’s rights activists, using exclusionary rhetoric to sanction
and refer the concept of citizenship to the gendered male construction in the rhetoric of the
Fourteenth Amendment both secured legal inequities between women and men and reinforced
social and political disparities.
According to feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, the distinction with regard to
rights/privileges also motivated questions regarding the nature of gender and its relation to the
rhetoric of legal narratives. For MacKinnon, “[g]ender [. . .] is lived as ontology, not
epistemology” (237) and the interrelationship between law and ideology is incongruent and
male-gendered; it shapes women’s representation within the culture rather than reflecting how
women are shaped within the culture. MacKinnon criticizes the orthodoxy of law, arguing that
its authority “reenters life marked by power” (237). In this regard, for MacKinnon, “law
becomes legitimate, and social dominance becomes invisible” as a normalizing discourse “both
invisible and legitimate” to justify the considerable bias toward males “by adopting the male
point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society” (237).
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James Boyd White concludes in The Legal Imagination that rhetoric plays a critical
interpretive role in legal narratives. In particular, White argues that law is more than just judicial
opinions and constitutional analysis; it converts the human experience into legal foundations
through discourse: “I think that the law is not merely a system of rules (or rules and principles),
or reducible to policy choices or class interests, but that it is rather what I call a language, by
which I do not mean just a set of terms and locutions, but habits of mind and expectations—what
might also be called a culture” (xiii). Boyd rejects the orthodox perception that law is
indiscernible because it is locked in the prison-house of language. Rather, he proclaims, “[law]
is an enormously rich and complex system of thought and expression, of social definitions and
practices, which can be learned and mastered, modified or preserved, by the individual mind”
(xiii). For Boyd, then, law has the effect of being both a cultural and interpretive broker. That
is, law not only translates the symbols, beliefs, and values of a culture—its ideology—but for
Boyd “law makes a world” (xiii) by illuminating the historical struggle over a culture’s ideology
and securing it as the legal consciousness and discourse of that culture.
MacKinnon’s invokes a Burkean “perspective by incongruity”36 to display law’s
contrasting angles, and also to dispel the legal orthodoxy claim that law is blind to gender and
race representations, a premise addressed later in this chapter. For MacKinnon, the liberal force
of this myth underwrites and confirms its invisible power:
Through legal mediation, male dominance is made to seem a feature of life, not a
one-sided construct imposed by force for the advantage of a dominant group. To
the degree it succeeds ontologically, male dominance does not look
epistemological: control over being produces control over consciousness, fusing
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material conditions with consciousness in a way that is inextricable short of social
change. Dominance reified becomes difference. Coercion legitimated becomes
consent. Reality objectified becomes ideas; ideas objectified become reality.
Politics neutralized and naturalized becomes morality. Discrimination in society
becomes nondiscrimination in law. Law is a real moment in the social
construction of these mirror-imaged inversions as truth. (238)
MacKinnon argues that law is a male-dominated discourse. She claims that women are left out
of legislating law because they lack historical legal, civil, political, and social status.
MacKinnon writes,
Those with power in civil society, not women, design its norms and institutions,
which become the status quo. Those with power, not usually women, write
constitutions, which become law’s highest standards. Those with power in
political systems that women did not design and from which women have been
excluded write legislation, which sets ruling values. (238)
Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not make it illegal to deny blacks franchise based on
their race, four years later the Fifteenth Amendment did. More importantly, for a second time,
legislation was silent about the vote based on gender, and as Ellen DuBois notes, “language was
introduced that insulated the subordinate’s group’s status from constitutional interference” (848).
Women’s political exclusion gained its authority from a legal history that subordinated them
with the same application of Social Darwinism that viewed blacks as biologically inferior. In the
same way, women were viewed as biologically inferior to men. Therefore, women should be
subordinate to men in both the private and particularly the public sphere given their limited skills
at logical and analytical thinking. Because of this ideology, during the Victorian era men enjoyed
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a favorable constitutional advantage over women (Farnsworth) that was supported by the
amendments, which was authorized by Darwinian philosophy.37
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment38 to the Constitution, ratified on February 3, 1868,
provides that
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Because women were not mentioned, both the Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth
Amendments encountered resistance from white women’s rights activists. They rebelled not only
against their lack of political power, but also against their spatial confinement within the social
order. To DuBois, for feminists, “The Fifteenth Amendment represented a more powerful
defense of the freedmen’s political rights, but that only underlined the Republicans’ refusal to
include discrimination by sex with that by race, color, and previous condition of servitude in the
constitutional guarantee of political rights” (848).
Despite their increased political and civil rights, black men were just as subordinated in
their race as white women were subordinated in their gender. However, black women struggled
to rise above the ideological representation of both identities. Yet, as DuBois comments, “One
strength of the Reconstruction-era approach was that it focused more attention on black women
than ever before—or after—in the long drive for woman suffrage” (846). Despite the barriers
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that black women were breaking, scientific racism used to reaffirming white racial dominance
was the model ideology for interpreting gender subjugation. That is, it advocated that white men
were superior by nature; therefore, they were justified in dominating and suppressing peoples
and groups they considered inferior. In this regard, as women’s rights activist awareness better
understood that this conceptual mechanism—male innate superiority—was a foundational
rhetoric in legal narratives, revolt and dissent over suffrage for women was unavoidable. As
DuBois has pointed out,
The new suffrage arguments also contained a strong theme of race antagonism, a
reaction to the strategic antagonism between black suffrage and woman
suffrage. Whereas the advocates of universal suffrage had claimed
comradeship between men of the disfranchised and despised classes and all
women, woman suffrage advocates now claimed that the enfranchisement of
black men created “an aristocracy of sex” because it elevated all men over all
women. (850)
Women’s rights activists were forced to revise their vision of how they would edit and reshape
the ‘True Womanhood’ ideal and usher in a new image, which included women as full and active
enfranchised members of the political culture. Consequently, the already inflamed rhetoric over
race and gender within the Reconstruction culture became even more volatile, as both black and
white women’s rights activists stepped up their oratory and collectively confronted the
patriarchal establishment that limited their entrance into socio-political domains of power.
Political + Legal Reform = Space & Time
Although a political and legal utopia was not the objective of women’s rights activists, they
knew they had been, and would continue to be, shaped by their racial and gender classifications
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within the social sphere. However, by situating their argument for suffrage within the political
and legal sphere, they relied on the rhetoric of legal narratives as a counterargument to the Social
Darwin claims that narrowly defined them as less than male and white. Katharine T. Bartlett’s
essay “Feminist Legal Methods” claims that asking the “woman question” is vital to women’s
reauthorizing dominant narratives and ideologies about women. Bartlett suggests addressing the
performance of woman within the social and political culture in order to examine the nature of
patriarchy and the construction of women within a masculine hegemony. Bartlett contends that
asking the woman question reveals the ways in which political choice and
institutional arrangement contribute to women’s subordination. Without the
woman question, differences associated with women are taken for granted and,
unexamined, may serve as a justification for laws that disadvantage women. The
woman question reveals how the position of women reflects the organization of
society rather than the inherent characteristics of women. (843).
Bartlett contests the long-established view that women are by nature different. Instead she
claims, “social structures embody norms that implicitly render women different and thereby
subordinate” (843) them by reinforcing conventional ideologies to legitimate the spatial location
of women within both the private and public sphere. However, for David Harvey, in “Between
Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination,” moments of historical social and
political transformation are the perfect prescription for peoples and groups disenchanted with
their social and political location and the manner in which these locations contribute to their
representations. For Harvey, “Ideological struggles over the meaning and manner of such
representations of place and identity abound” (419). These ideological struggles over identity
representation and space ascribe a particular discourse on the marginalized agent, which is
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established as rationale to impose boundaries. That is, ideological hegemony not only creates
invisible sociopolitical geographies of space, this belief system also is complicit in constructing
the character of the agent that inhabits this spatial location. Sociopolitical geographies of space
are invisible merely because there are no concrete boundaries visible to the naked eye. However,
their unmarked spatial arrangement is recognized more by its social ordering rather than an
aesthetic point of reference. However, as Harvey argues, the agent at some point will resist the
rhetorical representation and the dominant power’s rhetoric to locate them because of the agent’s
yearning for power and self-representation. Harvey writes, “But over and beyond the mere act of
identification, the assignment of place within a socio-spatial structure indicates distinctive roles,
capacities for action, and access to power within the social order” (419), which are endowed with
the vision, observation, and relevance in a particular time and place. Further, Harvey believes
that “the [race], class, gender, cultural, religious and political differentiation in conceptions of
time and space frequently become arenas of social conflict” (420), which are unavoidable
moments in social protest rhetoric to disarm social control by the dominant group.
As DuBois has noted, the Reconstruction Era was a defining space and time for the ideals
of freedom where conventional representations of blacks and women were shedding their longestablished trope of scientific epistemology. For white women, freedom meant equality, justice,
and liberty with regard to gender. For black women, freedom meant equality, justice, and liberty
with regard to race. In many regards, the rhetorical arguments based on their denial and right to
freedom for white and black women were both paradoxically different—and the same. For
instance, both white and black women identified their freedom within their master status
classification. Where they diverged in their own representation was within the social and
political sphere, given that white women identified themselves more closely with their gender
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and black women were identified more closely with their race. Where they intersect is in the
construction of both these identities within the larger cultural imagination, which was reinforced
by their spatial location within the ideology of the “cult of domesticity.” However, both
classifications—woman and black—struggled against a label of scientific inferiority.
According to feminist legal scholar Reva B. Siegel, the structuring of race and gender are
not separate spheres of identity, but interrelated within the complex tapestry of history.
According to Siegel, “A look at history discloses that the network of institutions, practices, and
meanings that support social stratification varies by group, and within groups as well. There are
a variety of institutions [. . .] practices [. . .] and reasons employed to enforce the different social
status of groups” (83). For Siegel, agents are not located in one unifying identity or
representation. In fact, she argues, an agent’s identity is a matter of perspective based on a
particular role that the social and cultural practice provides upon contact with the agent. For
Siegel then, agents possess multiple subjectivities, which determine a judgment and evaluation
by those in power. Siegel argues that since “persons are members of multiple status groups,
there may well be considerable variation in the institutions, practices, and meanings that regulate
the social position of different members of one group” (83). For Siegel, “the American legal
system has played an increasingly self-conscious role in regulating the distributive regimes that
sustain group stratification” (83), and law has a conflicting duality to both “disestablish and to
legitimate the distributive regimes that sustain group stratification” (83) while invoking a
“blindness trope” (84), which is rooted in difference but claims it does not reflect bias or
contradiction within its legal rhetoric. Such a standpoint Siegel argues deepens questions on
anti-discrimination laws rather than eliminates them. She writes,
When we say we are distributing goods and opportunities in a race- and gender83

blind fashion, we recognize group identity but ignore the ordinary status
consequences of group identity for purposes of the relevant social
transaction. Differently put, blindness tropes are concerned with
counteracting the normal status-linked benefits and detriments of group
membership. (84)
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young argues that certain identity groups
experience discrimination veiled within liberal rhetoric impartial or blind to the identity of the
agent. Young’s expansive inquiry into preferential access to valuable goods examines its
relation to representation, law, and sociopolitical transformation. In Young’s perspective, justice
should not nurture the historical agency of the legal system to restrict peoples or groups from
receiving the distribution of its valuable good. For Young, “Justice should refer not only to
distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of
individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation” (39). Young claims that
“all oppressed people face a common condition” (40) independent of their social and political
status. However, she argues, there are five functions which best illustrate the common
boundaries that oppressed people encounter. For Young, “exploitation, marginalization,
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence” (40) enforce the span of control by
institutions to reify their power with a strategy that appears impartial, conventional, and with
pretentions of a color- and gender-blind rhetoric. For Young, then, oppression is part of “the
normal processes of everyday life”39 (41), which are nothing more than ideological instruments
of patriarchal domination. Further, Young proclaims, oppression targets specific social groups
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by exercising its authority to control and direct the distribution of goods, services, and resources.
Critical legal studies theorist Neil Gotanda agrees with Young that oppression singles out
particular social groups or peoples by limiting their access to the distribution of valuable
resources in the social order. However, like Siegel, Gotanda’s broader argument is that the
color- and gender-blind trope as a metaphor in legal narratives is false; in fact, it authorizes the
very ideology it claims to suppress. Gotanda feels that, “the United States Supreme Court’s use
of color-blind constitutionalism—a collection of legal themes functioning as a racial ideology—
fosters racial domination” (2). He argues that while “aspects of the color-blind constitutionalism
can be traced to pre-Civil war debates,” its “modern concept developed after the passage of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments” (2). A further claim of Gotanda’s is that
“legal ideology legitimates racial inequality and domination” (3) in the same way MacKinnon
argues that law validates gender inequality and domination within the legal culture. However,
for Gotanda, the term “race” has gone through constitutional iterations “to cover four distinct
ideas: status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race” (4). This echoes Haslanger’s,
Gates’, and Dyer’s, argument that the term “race” is complex and defies precise and universal
rhetorical containers for the social order to discriminate and locate certain peoples and groups
within a rigid spatial geography.
Gotanda uses race as an example to demonstrate how identity can be codified within a
legal narrative with legitimized rhetorical and legal force to impose and deny voice in the
sociopolitical order. Restrictions on gender, like race, are imposed with the same structuring
ideologies given that the women’s right to vote needed a constitutional amendment to guarantee
this right. Within legal narratives gender operates dynamically with another sovereign
authority—religion. Together, both law and religion are evolutionary in character. That is, they
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are connected to the cultural and historical temperament just like other ideologies.
Like law, religion has a particular advantage over the construction of race and gender
representation—an exalted voice. However, in response to the changing needs of the citizenry,
even exalted voices like the rhetoric in law and religion are subverted and develop into
foundations for social movements with the aim to achieve universal human rights. For Willard
and Wells this seems especially poignant given they both drew upon the discourse of law and
religion as a part of their nineteenth-century modernized rhetoric for gender and racial equity. In
his essay, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834,” Charles Tilly suggests that
social movements employ different “repertoires” in their “contentious” emancipatory politics to
affect sociopolitical change. For Tilly, “repertoires of contention” shift their protest methods
according to the historical and cultural moment to denounce any political system if that violates
the human condition. Tilly defines his repertoires of contention theory in this way:
The word repertoire identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared,
and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. Repertoires are
learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or
take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle. People
learn to break windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonored
houses, stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, organize specialinterest associations. At any particular point in history, however, they learn only
a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively. (264)
In their roles as agitators, individually in their particular social activism and collectively in the
WCTU, Willard and Wells drew upon the discursive and rhetorical repertoires of law and
religion to consider the individual questions in their struggles. However, collectively, they did
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not modify their concepts very much given that they were founded on the same ideals of
Methodism. Yet, from their lively rhetorical argument developed a space for moral revelation
and a blueprint for self-discovery when they both were, in a sense, the mirror image of each
other to varying degrees.
Conclusion
Since legal narratives are interrelated with historical and cultural changes, their rhetoric is useful
in the study of “repertoires of contention” that were expressed in the social protests of the
nineteenth-century over gender and racial equity. Next chapter will consider the contradictions
in religious rhetoric and discover how Willard and Wells utilized these incongruities in the Bible
to challenge patriarchy and racism. The chapter will also consider the theological similarities
and differences between Willard and Wells and demonstrate how they gendered and racialized
their evangelical rhetoric by revising the jeremiad as a liberatory trope.
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CHAPTER 3
Brides of Christ: The Christian Rhetoric of Willard and Wells
__________________________________________
In addition, Gideon said unto God, if thou wilt save Israel by mine hand, as thou hast said.
-Gideon, Judges 6:36, KJV

Religious scholar, Stephen Prothero, sees religion as a major organizing ideology to the social
and political reality of the nineteenth-century. For Prothero, there is a close and intimate
ideological relation between theological beliefs and a culture; therefore, they are not separable
from characterizing the religious mood of the nineteenth-century. Prothero argues that many
Americans were, “inspired by [the] republican rhetoric of liberty and equality, and by a popular
revolt against deference and hierarchy” (47). This liberalizing spirit applied to the religious,
political, and domestic spheres inspired women to protest against the narrow role to which they
had been consigned by the existing hierarchy. The well-defined strictures of religion, like the
law, were structured in dominance; black women encountered its hegemony in both their
gendered and racial construction and white women principally by their gender.
However, both groups consciously reshaped the organizing framework of religion to
diminish its ordering of their lives within the public and private sphere. Prothero posits that
while “The Bible remained authoritative [. . .] Americans insisted on interpreting it for
themselves” (47), especially women who lived under its patriarchal construction. “In that
effort,” Prothero continues “they were assisted by a new culture hero: the populist preacher, who
combined evangelicalism and egalitarianism in daring new ways” (47). Prothero maintains that
it was “the rise of pulpit storytelling” (51) that allowed such reimagining of religious ideology.
Prothero goes on to argue that the “story sermon” (51) as a rhetorical style “did not catch on as
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fast in New England as it did in the South and the West (51),” a point that can explain the
revolutionary tone of feminist orators in those regions of America during the nineteenth-century.
An examination of Willard and Wells’ theological rhetoric illustrates its intersubjectivity
with the narratives of law. Further, it demonstrates that religion, as an ideology, is
simultaneously faith-based and political. The intersection of the pulpit and the court violated the
separate spheres ideology that confined white and black women to a rigid spatial ordering based
on gender and race in both the public and private sphere. However, with the rise of evangelical
religion during the Second Awakening the unification of these two domains—the pulpit and the
court—strengthened.
By rejecting the “predictable eighteenth-century style of chapter-and-verse preaching,”
Willard and Wells, as feminist orators, opened a wider space for the “feminization of American
religion” (56-58), which broadened and changed views on the nature of race and gender in the
social order. Prothero locates this feminization of religion in the context of a feminized Jesus,
arguing that women “made him [Jesus] over in the light of Victorian ideals of the feminine” (59).
This not only demonstrated the strength in those feminine characteristics, but also stressed the
radical nature of Jesus’ rhetoric, which feminist orators like Willard and Wells believed
advocated equality. Moreover, although the social gospel movement40 emerged in the early
twentieth century as an institutionalized form of Christian socialism, it can be argued that its
radical social Christian roots materialized in the nineteenth-century in the rhetoric of feminist
women like Willard and Wells. By putting aside the historical and traditional interpretation of
Christianity to mine it for its social reformist crusades on race, gender, and universal suffrage,
both Willard and Wells took a critical step in (re)presenting the signs of their otherness preserved
40
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in the canonical rhetoric of theology.
For Augustine in On Christian Doctrine, the rhetoric in Biblical scripture has an
enormous symbolic dimension. However, Augustine argues that a languages’ relation is not
easily transparent for the interpreter without distortions if the interpreter does not know the
origins of the language that the sign it embodies (34-53). Yet, this is the very type of
representation that Willard and Wells reject in authoritarian texts as a woman and as a black—
rhetoric that is indescribable and misunderstood because it avoids acknowledgement of their
gendered and racial subjectivity. By reauthoring the interpretation of biblical scripture and its
canonical voice on their subjectivity, both rhetors awaken a new rhetoric within the text by
worrying the line41 to transform the separate spheres ideology into a exploitative narrative that
would lose its power to shape and diminish their agency. In this way, Willard and Wells become
simultaneously storyteller and audience, for they are situated between the social realities of both
discourses. Further, by invoking a feminine interpretation of Biblical scripture and recasting its
historical and canonical nature from a prescriptive text to a descriptive text, Willard and Wells
reauthorize its ideology. They reject its rhetoric of exclusion as they emphasize the historical and
canonical inarticulateness of their individual subjectivities.
In this chapter, the jeremiad as a rhetorical trope is explored by appraising how it was
rhetorically encased within Willard and Well’s Methodist ideology. The chapter analyzes how
Willard and Wells subverted theological rhetoric for their own oratorical style by feminizing
civil and political rights with the moral clarity embedded in religious rhetoric. Additionally, this
chapter marks how Willard and Wells reimagined the rhetoric of theology in their oratory to
stress its endorsement of gender and racial equality in the political culture. The chapter also
41
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demonstrates that by counteracting the patriarchal rhetoric of the bible—ideologically heavy
with the language of subjugation used in slavery and the home (submission, obedience,
devoutness, confession)—both Willard and Wells free their own liberatory voices. This strategic
refocus of biblical scripture to gender and racial equity allowed them rhetorical space within
institutionalized Christianity to experience transcendence by drawing from the very ideology in
their Methodist social gospel rhetoric that contained and governed their lives in the public and
private lives.
Who . . . By Fire? The Social Gospel of Willard and Wells
Roxanne Mountford argues that “rhetorical spaces carry the residue of history within them” and
they inescapably evoke “a physical representation of relationships and ideas” (17) with
masculine power as the prevailing ideology in the pulpit42. Mountford is particularly critical of
the discontinuity that patriarchy induces in Christian discourses and specifically Protestant
rhetoric. Although the social reformist roots of Methodism gave Willard and Wells more
rhetorical space to voice their ideological conflict over the patriarchal history in theological
prose, they did not have authority to make institutional changes. Both Willard and Wells had to
radicalize their social gospel rhetoric to gain gender and racial equity in what Mountford calls
the sacred space of the pulpit (17-39). By reimagining the rhetorical space from an exclusively
masculine domain to include the political presence of women and blacks, Willard’s and Wells’
brand of liberation theology bridged two binaries from the pulpit to gain rhetorical space in the
public sphere: spiritual and civil rights. According to Mountford, the rhetorical space of the
pulpit is where “hierarchies of gender and status are worked out in the sacred geographies of
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Christian churches” (17). By disarming the considerable and canonical power of sacred
patriarchal scripture, Willard and Wells claimed their own rhetorical space.
In Willard’s diary entry on November 28, 1859, she offers a poignant glimpse of her
difficulty in adhering to her personal manifesto. There is a direct relation between the rhetoric of
her confession and the way in which white upper-class women performed their gender—even in
the private discursive space of their journals. Similarly, the power relations in the private
spiritual domain are allied in their subjugating patriarchal tone to public legal narratives in their
function to subjugate women’s desire to speak in their own voice. By occupying all the spheres
of women’s ideology, theological and legal narratives have similar aims that are based in power
and dominance to achieve the same results—complicity in a gendered performance sanctioned
by the revered rhetoric of Christianity and the law. Willard notes,
…Every morning I make these four resolves:-1. To keep my Temper.
2. To avoid “back-biting.”
3. To converse as well as I know how.
4. To “think over” every night, the deeds, thoughts, & acquirements of the
day.
I regret to say that every day I don’t keep, inviolably, any one of these
resolutions! . . . (Gifford 51)
It is noteworthy that Willard was not known to have a bad temper. In her much publicized
response to Wells’s accusation on lynching, Willard’s tone was decidedly calm and reflected no
anger despite her journal’s claim that it was an effort to keep her capital “T” temper in control.
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Most remarkable is that Willard’s alleged temper has never been mentioned in any discourse on
her although Well’s anger and bad nature is legendary. Could Wells’s race have anything to do
with her being labeled as irritable? Although both Willard and Wells write about their
disposition, why is Willard’s never a point of interest? Further, why did Willard perform her
gender more consistently than Wells performed hers? For Mountford, personal temperaments are
interpreted through the conundrum of race and gender. This argument reflects back to Social
Darwinism, which argues that behavior is genetic rather than personal. Mountford writes,
The bodies and behavior of human beings are interpreted through
historical, ideological processes that divide out experiences along racial
and gender lines. Because we are immersed in these ideologies, they often
seem inevitable and immutable. (40)
Willard’s second, third, and fourth resolutions reflect a rigorous constraining of the self and may
reflect societal pressure on women to behave in a certain way. This behavior again is ratified in
the ‘Cult of True Womanhood’ social contract that is imbued with moral and political
amendments to outlaw personal ideology. By performing the social representation of her gender,
Willard appears not to disturb theological views of the feminine. However, by reducing her
representation to the ‘feminine feminine’43 Willard creates a rhetorical space for another
interpretation by encompassing the precise gendered representation she rejects. For Mountford,
“[d]iscourses of suspicion and images of restraint of women’s bodily presence serve to reinforce
their exclusions from the public sphere” (68). I argue that exclusion based on bodily features is a
point of ideological departure where historical and canonical tropes on gender (and race) can be
43
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provoked and challenged for (re)interpretation. For this reason, nineteenth-century women and
blacks who were inculcated in the prescriptive tropes of Biblical scripture to restrain their
speech—that is their tongue—abrogated this theological dogma by re/storying the Biblical text
for inclusion into the political culture. For instance, one of the most theologically justifying
Biblical scriptures that encounters the body (tongue) with the mind (consciousness) argues, “If
any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own
heart, this man’s religion is44 vain” (James 1:26). This is quite evident in Willard’s
encapsulation of her personal manifesto that is powerfully opposed to the established authority
that she feels daily: “I regret to say that every day I don’t keep, inviolably, any one of these
resolutions! ” Her obsessive desire to make her body (her tongue) perform, is repressed by her
mind (her consciousness), which rejects the legislation of her body.
The process of interpretation by the body involves translating what the mind as a symbol
of meaning is signifying to it. If there is any rupture in translation—and I do not argue that a
break is never attempted—the body/mind configuration does not reflect or carry the identity the
subject chooses, but an identity that the social order has prescribed for it. Willard’s opposition to
established authority, that is her Methodism, led her to deny or reject the identity that was
imposed on her spiritually and morally as a Christian and as leader of the WCTU. Indeed,
Willard’s statement “I regret to say” is more a reflection of the important force of her
Christianity as an institutionalized power over her ideology than of her helplessness as woman
who cannot adhere to her belief system.
The Cartesian separation of the body/mind symbol system argues that meaning is
interpreted by the intersubjective performance of the two, rather than the performance of
44
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contrasting body/mind belief systems. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the body is not an object
void of discourse; it is a sign with meaning(s) attached to it, that is “a grouping of lived-through
meanings which moves towards its equilibrium” (177). Indeed, the body’s kinship with the mind
is not one of competition and struggle, but of coexistence. Moreover, for Merleau-Ponty “bodily
existence is never self-sufficient”(191) but exists in symbolic partnership with the body.
Therefore, the connection between the body/mind is ideologically determined and expressed
through the body/mind engagement. Willard quite candidly confesses that she is repentant
“every day” that “I don’t keep [. . .] any one of these resolutions.” Despite her intense daily
absorption in the written religious code, that is Biblical scripture, Willard could not escape the
relation between the body and the mind, and she struggled with the separation of the two in her
own life. Her attempt to diminish the body/mind tie demonstrates the significance of theological
systems within the social order as a rule of conduct prescribed by a divine authority to keep its
subjects, especially women, situated within a spiritually binding rhetorical space.
For black women, the emphasis on race in sociopolitical arrangements created an even
more challenging argument for their rhetorical space. Moreover, the source of the authority,
which structured middle-class white women’s domains, also doubly deprived black women of
sociopolitical rights and privileges. By subverting the social arrangements on race, Wells
revealed the similarities and disparities between gender and race. Although race and gender are
secured by the same subjugating tropes used in slavery (see chapter 2), race for black women
created separate and distinct discourses on their subjectivity, although no less traumatizing than
the dehumanizing gender discourse nineteenth century white women endured. For instance,
Wells was quite aware of the normative gaze on her dual identities, which shaped her delivery.
Mountford notes, “delivery involves, first and foremost, the presentation of the self in a form that
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will be acceptable to the audience” (69), which for Wells at times was overwhelmingly white and
male. It was, after all, white males who had the social status and legal authority to create or at
least influence political action against the tyranny of lynching.
In 1892 at New York’s Lyric Hall Wells delivered her testimonial “of that horrible
lynching affair” (79) to a crowd of two hundred and fifty influential black women from New
York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Wells was living in New York City because her life was
threatened if she were to return to Memphis with her anti-lynching rhetoric. While sitting on
stage waiting to speak, Wells was overwhelmed by the support of accomplished black women
who were doctors, writers, newspaper editors, and social activists, who, she writes, were “a solid
array behind a lonely, homesick girl who was an exile because she had tried to defend the
manhood of her race” (79). Although by that time Wells had a reputation for being authoritative,
hard-nosed, and difficult to get along with as an activist. While reciting details of the lynching
of Moss, McDowell, and Stewart, the traumatic event affected her much more deeply than she
had anticipated, and she cried in front of her audience. Wells feared her sophisticated audience
would interpret her tears as a masquerade for sympathy and perhaps even money when she only
wanted to raise the consciousness of the New Yorkers who “had the name of being cold-blooded
and selfish” (78) to events outside their social world. Although they were privileged, surely they
were aware that the black body—especially the black female body—remained a target for both
sexual and violent assault.
By shaping language to appeal to her audience, Wells foregrounds the visibility of race in
her discourse and, thus, claims her rhetorical space as the bodied other—black and woman. In
this way, Wells transforms her individual experience into a collective experience for her
audience to participate in by noting the split between the two worlds that they all lived in—
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privileged and elite—but still, black and woman. The sharp contrast of this binary between
progress and relapse denied Wells’ audience any room to assume that they were safe from
lynching because of their social status and education. Further, Mountford theorizes, “in any
treatment of rhetorical performance, rhetoricians must explore the ways that particular bodies are
marked by public assumptions of character” (69). Indeed, while Wells could not change the
political impact of her bodily color, she could transcend it by espousing its spiritual and
theological value. Moreover, by binding the image of the politicized black body within the
empowering rhetoric of the testimonial, Wells converts her political performance into a religious
call for justice. W.E. B. Du Bois speaks to the fusion of the spiritual with the call for justice in
reference to the protest rhetoric in the sorrow songs:
Through all the sorrow of the Sorrow Songs there breathes a hope—a faith
in the ultimate justice of things. The minor cadences of despair change
often to triumph and calm confidence. Sometimes it is faith in life,
sometimes a faith in death, sometimes assurance of boundless justice in
some world beyond. But whichever it is, the meaning is always clear: that
sometime, somewhere, men will judge men by their souls and not by their
skins. Is such a hope justified? (186)
Although Wells’ audience was comprised of middle-class black women, described as “race
women [who came out] for one of their number” (78) and who, like Wells, lived under the same
rigid sociopolitical strictures despite their social status, Wells’ tears during her first testimonial
did not lessen the structure and power of her delivery because many of the black women in the
audience knew someone who had been lynched. Further, as black women, there was a strong
cultural bond present which united their activism over their legal, social, political, and religious
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subjection. In fact, Wells’ performance, based on her description in Crusade, appears to reflect a
precise management of the body/mind dynamic, which is crucial to the oral tradition of
storytelling in black culture. Wells notes while she only wanted to “deliver an honest-togoodness address,” the memory of the Lynching at the Curve began to surface: “my mind went
back to the scenes of the struggle,” and, she continues, “I felt the tears coming” (79).
Wells’s tears are significant because they do not only speak to the intersubjective nature
of the body/mind. In addition to conveying her current emotional state, Wells’ tears—although
unintentional—are also symbolic representations and form part of the delivery and performance
that will be interpreted by the audience. As a lyceum trained orator, Wells is aware of this
body/mind complicity and its signifying effect on the audience. She writes, “a panic seized me”
as the memory of the Moss, McDowell, and Clark lynchings heightened, and she struggles to put
on her social mask as a means to erase what she does not want to reveal—the emotional
composition of her gender. “I was afraid I was going to make a scene” (79), as she continued to
recite her story. Then she says regarding her internal psychological dialogue, “I kept saying to
myself that whatever happened I must not break down “(79). By attributing her unintended tears
to an “exhibition of woman’s weakness” (80), that is her gender rather than a personal character
feature, Wells dislocates the connotation of the tears from the memory that it is associated with.
For Wells, emotional arousal on the part of the woman rhetor can only be interpreted as a form
of weakness rather than rhetorical strategy. Further, the symbolism associated with tears is
culturally acceptable in some groups, like African-American culture where it is interpreted not as
a sign of weakness, but as a source of strength, power, and dignity in the face of crisis. Yet,
Wells believes her tears were not effective, and she reflects, “Whatever my feelings, I am not
given to public demonstrations” (80). However, Wells’ conflict over her tears was bound in her
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own beliefs regarding the public performance of the woman orator rather than the effectiveness
of her testimonial on her audience. In fact, years later and still conflicted over her tears rather
than the tremendous impact they made on her audience she writes, “only once before in my life
had I given way to woman’s weakness in public” (80). Wells ironically never reveals that
moment in her autobiography for her audience to scrutinize. Despite the success of her tears in
her first testimonial and the positive connotation in black cultural and religious expression, Wells
warred over this aspect of her feminine subjectivity throughout her life. However, although
women like Willard and Wells made a discernable rhetorical break with the language used to
critically interpret them as women, the authorial construction of them by the sacred text of
Biblical scripture was not as flexible to reinterpretation, because it played both a cultural and
religious role in capturing and placing particular attributes on them as women.
The Sacred Act of Revisioning
In their chapter from Introduction to the Study of Religion, entitled “Scriptures, Canons, and
Creeds” Nancy Ring et. al have pointed out that “Each religious tradition has a collection of
stories, prayers, songs, curses and blessings, lists, incantations, and laws that it considers
powerful and authoritative” (178) to the members of the religious group. As evangelical rhetors,
Willard and Wells were provoked by the social engineering of their gender and race to displace
the interpretation of Biblical scripture on their identity. Moreover, from Ring et. al’s
perspective, “These collections shape the lives of its members in many ways” (178) although
with political meaning from the public sphere that is interpreted and fixed to the private sphere.
By expanding the rhetorical space of the pulpit to include the public sphere, where they spoke on
political matters for women and blacks, Willard and Wells recapitulated the interpretation of
Biblical scripture. Although “the process through which religious texts become scripture and
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scripture becomes canon is complicated” (184) the theological authority imposed on the
gendered and racialized body in the nineteenth century suggests biblical scripture marked being a
woman and black as inherently different from being male, which was considered natural and
normal. By dispelling the myth that divine thoughts were supernatural concepts to be followed
and not understood, Willard and Wells crafted an absorbing portrait of women and blacks that
located them within the larger human community rather than the limited social construction of
their gender and race. They argued that it is not Jesus—God in a bodily form—who endorsed
the noncitizenship of women and blacks; it was patriarchy. Thus, the news was good. Ring et. al
argue,
Gospels are stories of victory, “good news,” presented to the believing
community. Neither biography nor history, they are interpretations [my
emphasis] of the life and ministry, the death and resurrection of Jesus from
particular points of view; written for believers, they elaborate and
strengthen the faith already present in the community. (186)
Indeed, the reinvention of Jesus as a political advocate for women and blacks shifted the
meaning of their subjectivities, which had been anchored in a traditional canonical reading of
biblical scripture. In “When Outsiders Encounter Insiders in Speaking: Oppressed Collectives on
the Defensive,” for example, Detine L. Bowers argues that historically authoritarian hierarchies
have established rhetorical conventions to subvert marginalized voices. Bowers continues:
The dominant power structure sets not only the language rules but the
ground rules for which the language functions. It uses a creative range of
strategies to stifle voices of the oppressed. (493)
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In (re)interpreting the identification of Jesus outside the tradition of biblical scripture, Willard and
Wells were not only able to render a new vision of Jesus, but also reveal a fresh (re)presentation of
their subjectivity, which was motivated by the conflation of woman and woman and black to less
than.
In “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Revision,” Adrienne Rich offers a direct
connection to (re)presentation of the feminine (and racial), which she argues is tantamount to
continued existence. For Rich, replacing the aura of a text with its lived experience is liberation.
She notes that this act of disavowal is vital for women to turn the dangerously traditional and
canonical texts into a (re)presentation that reflects their subject position, rather than deflects from
their subject position. Rich writes:
Re-vision-the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an
old text from a new critical direction-is for us more than a chapter in
cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the
assumptions in which we are drenched we cannot know ourselves. And
this drive to self-knowledge, for woman, is more than a search for identity:
it is part of her refusal of the self-destructiveness of male-dominated
society. (18)
Even as Rich argues for women to‘re-vision’ the text, she cautions that this counter-move does not
come without risks and is “difficult and dangerous” (19). Further, she writes, the political act of
re-visioning is new to women, and “as we try to find language and images for a consciousness we
are just coming into, and with little in the past to support us” (19), the task may appear opaque and
pointless. However, muses Rich, the old tropes are quite “divisive and [. . .] ultimately
destructive,” and to believe in the “myth of the special woman,” is to be a “token woman,” (21)
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which at its core cannot articulate the multiple subjectivities that constitute the feminine. In short,
Rich argues, “writing is renaming” (23) and self-authenticating, which was an empowering trope
that both Willard and Wells embedded in their rhetorical strategy to disrupt the sociopolitical
balance that privileged man over woman and white over black.
The American Jeremiad: From Concept to Connections
Sacvan Bercovitch suggests in The American Jeremiad that the European Puritans mapped the
rhetorical structure for the jeremiad. While this form of “political sermon” (4) inspired their
moral action as the divinely chosen to spread the good news gospel in America, the most
prominent feature of the European Puritan jeremiad was “its unshakable optimism” (7). Further,
writes Bercovitch, the rhetoric in the Puritan’s jeremiad was redeveloped over time and served as a
model for the current conception of the American jeremiad. However, like Willard and Wells, the
Puritans believed they were specifically selected by the divine for a particular message and thus
revisioned Biblical scripture for their specific crusades. Moreover, writes Bercovitch, the rhetoric
of the Puritans was noticeably different and he posits:
[. . .] from the start they sounded a different note. Theirs was a peculiar
mission, they explained, for they were a “peculiar people,” a company of
Christians not only called but chosen, and chosen not only for heaven but
as instruments of a sacred historical design. [. . .]. To this end, they
revised the message of the jeremiad. Not that they minimized the threat of
divine retribution; but on the contrary, they asserted it with a ferocity
unparalleled in the European pulpit. But they qualified it in a way that
turned threat into celebration. In their case, they believed, God’s
punishments were corrective, not destructive. (7-8)
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By making the distinction in concept from a European jeremiad to an American jeremiad, the
Puritans were able to recognize the different cultural, social, and political patterns of America. As
a mode of rhetorical expression, the American jeremiad offered an adaptable form of creativeness
that the European model resisted. Thus, in its new conception the American jeremiad “posits a
movement from promise to experience—from the ideal of community to the shortcomings of
community life—and thence forward, with prophetic assurance, toward the resolution that
incorporates (as it transforms) both the promise and the condemnation” (16). According to
Bercovitch, “the American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand” (23) to
inculcate its ideology to an America still viewed as morally wild and untamed and thus “a culture
based on a faith in process” (23). Therefore, the new version of the jeremiad established in
America had to redefine its character if it wanted to become part of the cultural and theological
identity of America. In doing so, the “function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped
release the restless ‘progressivist’ energies required for the success of the venture” (23). As
Methodist women, both Willard and Wells joined the social and the political within the American
jeremiad and expressed the shared social and moral rules, values, and beliefs. Not only did the
jeremiad provide the raw material for their suffrage and anti-lynching campaigns, the jeremiad as a
fusion of the social and the political provided a theological model for their political rhetoric. That
is, both rhetors “absorbed the personal into the social errand” (25) since they had a lived
perspective to their social and political reform movements, which they assessed by a gendered and
racial perspective.
If It Be Your Will: The Jeremiad as a Gendered and Racial Trope for Liberation
Although the 1908 Social Creed was written several years after Willard’s death (1898) and
beyond the most active period of Wells’ anti-lynching crusade, it seemed to address all the social
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anxieties of the nineteenth century within its theological manifesto. However, while the 1908
Social Creed was essential to Methodism’s analysis of worker abuses in factories, it can be argued
that the rhetorical space which allowed voice into this political sphere were rooted in the gendered
and racialized rhetoric of Willard and Wells and its appeal to justice and morality. For instance,
while the 1908 Social Creed maintains its Methodist commitment to social and civic justice, it
avoids any mention of gender and race in its focus on abusive capitalist institutions such as the
textile factory mills45 in the northeast, which operated on the abuse of young immigrant girls and
women46. Ironically, the abuses that occurred in the mills simulated the very gendered, racial, and
class abuses that Willard and Wells addressed—feminine subjugation, racial targeting, and class
stratification. The 1908 Social Creed states,
The Methodist Episcopal Church stands:
For equal rights and complete justice for all men in all stations of life.
For the principles of conciliation and arbitration in industrial dissensions.
For the protection of the worker from dangerous machinery, occupational
diseases, injuries and mortality.
For the abolition of child labor.
For such regulation of the conditions of labor for women as shall
safeguard the physical and moral health of the cummunity.47
For the suppression of the "sweating system."
For the gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the
45
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lowest practical point, with work for all; and for that degree of leisure for
all which is the condition of the highest human life.
For a release for [from] employment one day in seven.
For a living wage in every industry.
For the highest wage that each industry can afford, and for the most
equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be devised.
For the recognition of the Golden Rule and the mind of Christ as the supreme law
of society and the sure remedy for all social ills.
While the Methodist social creed bridges the social and political mechanisms through which
gendered, racial, and class abuses occur, the manifesto’s conspicuous omission of gender and
race—groups most affected by exploitation—is reminiscent of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which legally defined citizenship as male. Although social and political restrictions based on
gender, race, and class created boundaries, the evangelical rhetoric of Willard and Wells
disarmed the embodied rhetoric of institutionalized power in the public sphere to gain equity in
the private sphere before the textual condemnation in the 1908 Social Creed.
In “Stepping outside the ‘Ladies’ Department’: Women’s Expanding Rhetorical
Boundaries,” Lisa Shaver strengthens the argument that the revolutionary claims of Methodism
valued theory over practice. That is, while Methodism set the tone for opening rhetorical spaces
for women in the pulpit and their discursive practices in the “Ladies Department” pieces”(54), a
column of the Christian Advocate written by and for women in the Methodist newspaper,
Methodist gestures were mediated by a traditional and canonical adherence to Biblical scripture.
Shaver writes,
Within these textual communities, women were cast into new roles that were
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institutionally sanctioned and widely disseminated. As a result, women were
converted into rhetorical agents [my emphasis] for the church—extending their
influence to audiences beyond their local congregations and communities (54).
While Methodism influenced the concept of blending social gospel with social activism in the
public sphere, it also paradoxically “helped confirm the canon of domesticity” (55). Further
according to Shaver, “At the same that the church was elevating women as models of piety, it
reinforced prescribed roles for them in the domestic sphere, attempting to contain them within a
patriarchal structure” (55). As rhetorical agents for Methodist social gospel Willard and Wells
no doubt were aware of Methodism’s evangelical façade, which lacked clarity in its
camouflaging of patriarchal legacies while at the same time incorporating progressive social
ideals on gender and racial equity. Shaver criticizes this theological ambiguity arguing,
In essence, the “Ladies Department” column acted as an ideological apparatus for
the church, encouraging a woman’s spirituality while reinscribing her “proper”
place. Women’s containment in the domestic sphere was intended to preserve
evangelical ministers’ perception of proper social structure [. . . ]. By
encouraging women as purveyors of piety, ministers were strengthening the
resolve and commitment of their most fervent followers, and, by keeping women
in subordinate positions in the kitchen, parlor, and pews, ministers were also
protecting their authority over them. (55)
Although Methodism seemed to endorse the inequalities of the sociopolitical sphere by its
embodiment of social and cultural norms in its manifesto, Willard and Wells disclaimed the
theological and political tropes by turning to their gendered and racial cultures for liberation. By
disassembling biblical scripture as a traditional and canonical sacred law from its previous
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patriarchal inscription, Willard and Wells invoked the Jeremiad48 as a co-operative rhetoric. At
the same time, they used the art of rhetoric to free the observation of biblical scripture from its
marginalizing analysis of their subjectivities by invoking their gendered and racial subjectivities
to generate a reaction against their representations as human subjects.
In The Afro-American Jeremiad: Appeals for Justice in America, David Howard-Pitney
maps the political and cultural geography of the jeremiad, or lament over oppression, which has
its biblical scriptural storytelling roots in the Judaic Diaspora. According to Howard-Pitney, “the
American jeremiad originated among seventh-century New England Puritans as a vital
expression of their self-identity as a chosen people” (7), to speak to the social and political
structures which were implicit in the moral crisis of their new home. Yet, “despite its dark tones,
the American jeremiad was filled with underlying optimism about America’s fate and mission”
(7) which in the nineteenth century strained to factor in the sociopolitical function of women and
blacks. For Howard-Pitney, while blacks have consistently reflected on the Messianic themes of
the jeremiad, it “addresses two American chosen peoples—black and white—whose millennial
destinies, while distinct, are also inextricably entwined” (15). Howard-Pitney argues that despite
this conjoined future between blacks and whites, blacks significantly related to the built-in
rhetoric of salvation and ruin within the oratorical structure of the jeremiad, and thus
appropriated cultural themes to claim it (13-16).
However, given its liberating tone and biblical endorsement for justice, the jeremiad does
not encase only one subjectivity perspective. In fact, while many blacks like Wells racialized the
jeremiad, similarly many white Methodist women like Willard genderized the jeremiad to raise
48
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the level of awareness of women’s lack of agency. This social gospel mission also had a forceful
presence in raising issues of black disempowerment. Yet, within the WCTU, the cultural force
of transformation fueled the identity tension between these two ideological approaches, which
surfaced over lynching between Willard and Wells. Conversely, the interlocking theme between
Willard’s and Well’s emancipatory social gospel is the jeremiad—an important rhetorical
methodology since both orator’s believed they were divinely inspired like the biblical character
Moses to liberate their people—women and blacks—from a similar bondage of oppression.
Take this Longing
In an August 13, 1861, journal entry, Willard recounts her desire for release from a middle-class
cocoon to a change that will validate or perhaps transform her vision, which at that point, had no
distinctive ideological contours. Willard, in a self-flagellating rage, argues with God for a
climactic experience in her life to validate the internal theological conflict that consumed her,
which she was unclear about, although the tension clearly elevated her social consciousness to a
new frame of reference. Willard writes,
Make me suffer—send troubles thick as the locusts of Egypt49, if need be, but
bring me out right; refine me in the fire, but oh! Infinite, Loving Father do not
leave me in the dark!” (Gifford 132)
Although Willard demonstrates a predilection for dramatic gestures, she projects a stern and
aggressive ethos, which later as president of the WCTU she subdued as the “feminine feminine.”
Her narrative also reveals spontaneity and ideological distance from orthodox self-control.
However, this forceful characteristic is perhaps connected to the “Temper” she wanted to
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restrain, but could not, in her daily personal resolution. Moreover, Willard appears all too
willing to submit to any distribution of darkness for the light that truth will bring, which is
encapsulated in a good/evil moral binary she subtly underscores. Willard’s awareness of her
changing consciousness based on the social transformation in the nineteenth century perhaps
contributed to her ideological abandonment of the Victorian pattern of sameness prescribed for
middle-class white women. One wonders if reconstructed consciousness has anything to do with
acknowledgement of her lesbianism through her alleged Boston marriage to her assistant Anna
Gordon (Capitani). Still, her angst over her impending conversion would not immediately reveal
its purpose for her until fourteen years later in 1875, when her divinely-inspired revelation grew
more pronounced in its detail. It was then, while at a WCTU-related meeting where her destiny
lost its incoherent veneer and her appeal for a revelation came into complete focus. She writes in
her autobiography, Glimpses of Fifty Years, of the revelatory and psychological emancipating
moment:
[. . .] while in Columbus for a Sunday engagement, [I] remained at home in the
morning for Bible study and prayer. Upon my knees alone, in the room of my
hostess, who was a veteran Crusader, there was borne in upon my mind, as I
believe, from loftier regions, the declaration, “You are to speak for woman’s
ballot as a weapon of protection to her home and tempted loved ones from the
tyranny of drink,” and then for the first and only time in my life, there flashed
through my brain a complete line of argument and illustration—the same that I
used a few months later before Woman’s Congress, in St. George’s Hall,
Philadelphia, when I first publicly avowed my faith in the enfranchisement of
women. I at once wrote Mrs. Wittenmeyer, with whom I had always been in
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perfect accord, telling her I wished to speak on “The Home Protection Ballot” at
the international Temperance Convention of Women, then being planned by us as
a Centennial feature of the movement. She replied mildly, but firmly, declining
to permit the subject to be brought forward. (351)
While Willard’s earlier revelations were cryptic and vague, this one appears quite lucid and
specific saying “You are to speak for woman’s ballot as a weapon of protection to her home and
tempted loved ones from the tyranny of drink.” In her journal reflection Willard writes that this
kind of detailed revelation occurred “for the first and only time in my life.” However, the most
interesting feature of Willard’s religious experience is how it outlines quite suddenly, as though
she had better grab it now or lose it, a complete rhetorical script for her to follow. Willard
writes, “there flashed through my brain a complete line of argument and illustration.” Willard
writes that she then “publicly avowed my faith in the enfranchisement of women.” Annie
Wittenmeyer, then president of the WCTU and with whom Willard says she “had always been in
perfect accord,” offered a stern and terse rejection of Willard’s divine authority and responded
“mildly, but firmly, declining to permit the subject to be brought forward.”
Even though Wittenmeyer did not grant Willard permission to speak on suffrage—a year
later, in 1876, Willard ignored Wittenmeyer’s authority over her divine sanction and spoke
without permission before a large audience while Wittenmeyer was present. This was a bold
theoretical and rhetorical risk for Willard because she had neither a conceptual articulation of
the Woman Question nor any rhetorical structure to her ideology other than what she gained
through her spiritual enlightenment. Vicki Tolar Collins argues that “Methodist women believed
God was their ultimate source of rhetorical power and authority and would guide the very
organization and content of their speech” (340). Willard’s compelling need to perform illustrates
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not only the temperament she could not bridle, but also reveals the political alteration of her
theological consciousness, which was the principal dialectic of her social gospel crusade. She
writes,
[. . .] disregarding the earnest, almost tearful pleading of my friends, I repeated
my “suffrage speech” with added emphasis. [. . .] I then gave the people my
argument, and though I could feel the strong conservatism of an audience of
Christian women, in New Jersey in 1876, I felt far more strongly the
undergirdings of the Spirit. At the close I was applauded beyond my hopes. The
dignified chairman [I understand this to be Wittenmeyer] came forward saying, “I
wish it clearly understood that the speaker represents herself and not the Woman’s
Christian Temperance Union, for we do not propose to trail our skirts through the
mire of politics.” These words were received in silence, and I knew then that the
hearts of the women were with the forward movement. As we left the hall my
honored chief [again, Wittenmeyer] whispered regretfully, “You might have
been a leader, but now you’ll be only a scout. ” (351-52)
Although Willard “could feel [and visually see] the strong conservatism of an audience of
Christian women,” she continued to chip away at the foundation of women’s social position—
patriarchal hegemony. Although her performance sounds carefully paced despite the glaring
resistance by conservative opponents she writes, “I felt far more strongly the undergirdings of
the Spirit.” Her beliefs gave her compelling force of will and divine authority to sustain her
performance to the end where she reflects “I was applauded beyond my hopes.” After
Wittenmeyer stands up before the same crowd to renounce Willard’s progressive position on
women’s suffrage, Willard appears characteristically smug and overly ambitious—a charge
111

Wells would also accuse her of during their lynching controversy. While Wittenmeyer castigates
her before the audience, Willard appears to sit stoically, but triumphantly, because, as she
recounts, “I knew then that the hearts of the women were with the forward movement” on
women’s suffrage. Her triumph became clear three years later, in 1879, when Willard unseated
Wittenmeyer as the president of the WCTU—a position Willard would claim until her death in
1898.
It is clear that the conceptual aim of Willard’s ideology restricted and suppressed the
overwhelming social and political marginality of women. It appears her brilliant performance
gave a fresh new argument for defining womanhood, given the robust response and her election
to presidency three years later. However, her political justifications for women’s rights did not
destigmatize the traditional and canonical representation of women, which was central to the
political right of citizenship.
Theological Politics of Universal Suffrage
Although authoritarian patriarchal policies were preserved in evangelical rhetoric, the nineteenth
century feminist ideology nonetheless advocated change. For instance,
Nineteenth-century American feminism was deeply rooted in evangelical
revivalism. Its theology and practice motivated and equipped women and men to
adopt a feminist ideology, to reject stereotyped sex roles, and to work for positive
changes in marriage, church, society, and politics. Most women’s rights
leaders—whether in the church, education, reform organizations, or the media—
were products of evangelical backgrounds or were deeply influenced by
evangelical culture, whether or not they acknowledged that debt or maintained
any allegiance to it later in life. (Hardesty qtd. Bizzell 379)
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While both white and black argued from a religious perspective, the self-justifying rage of black
women was also unveiled in the jeremiad, a lament that stressed the weight of racial oppression.
In Wells’s view, her subjectivity was reducible to race whereas Willard’s subjectivity was
reducible to gender. Both subjectivities have deep cultural and political importance. In each
case, structural barriers, like slavery and the cult of domesticity, shaped their marginality as
women and they were bound even tighter by theological idealism (McCurry). Clearly, though,
the weight of those gendered and racial influences on their consciousness has as much to do with
Willard and Wells’ perceptions of their subjectivities as with the structural impediments
themselves.
In a riskier move, since she lived under the threat of lynching (see Chapter 1), Wells
converts her private anguish into her public performance by invoking the universal experience of
sociopolitical alienation and oppression—two potent themes of the jeremiad that were etched in
white women’s and black women’s imaginary. Moreover, while Willard’s radical revision
reflected a gendered expressivity, Wells’ rhetorical style is an acknowledgement of Black
expressivity, which forsook the flamboyant imagery of Willard’s for a deep analysis of the
challenges that came with the politics of her slave ancestry. Its stylistic roots are in the African
American jeremiad, but it also reflects the social class influences post-bellum blacks picked up in
the places where they lived after they migrated from the South in record numbers.
Like Willard, Wells’ (re)representation of her subjectivity was embodied with religious
thought. Her subjectivity as a black, where she ideologically gazed into her otherness with a
myopic and temperamental focus, ironically created the very condition she fought against—
isolation. Moreover, like Willard, Wells gained liberatory knowledge she believed was also
divinely inspired. When she refused to join the Slayton Lyceum Bureau because she was told by
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Mr. Slayton50 (226) that she could not speak about lynching, Wells argues that it was her divine
conversion and not her own will that required her to join the anti-lynching crusade. She writes,
I told him that there was no other excuse for my being before the public
except to tell about the outrages upon my people; that I regarded myself an
instrument that had been chosen to do this and that I could not accept his
offer. [. . .] I felt that having been dedicated to the cause it would be
sacrilegious to turn aside in a money-making effort for myself. Not only
that, in the first eagerness of my endeavor with a crusade, I felt that my people
would rally to my support and hold up my hands in the fight I was making for
them. (226-227)
Unlike Willard, who readily performs her role as an privileged spokesperson for the divine,
Wells’ assumes a marginal and outsider status. In fact, she portrays herself as “an instrument,”
rather than a skilled orator. While this may not have been a cognizant move on Wells’ part, it
illustrates the patriarchal ordering of institutional religion in the black woman’s consciousness.
Although implicit, it demonstrates through Wells’ expressivity her outsider-status within both the
political and religious domain. While the gendered white female body was suppressed, the black
body, both male and female, was policed. Wells, unlike Willard, could not ignore or erase the
Cartesian relation to the body and its sociopolitical narrative at a time when blacks where being
lynched. Therefore, Wells argued she “was chosen” and being so was “dedicated to the cause”
of racial liberation. Wells also sternly rejected any material capital gain from her spiritual
command because she considered taking money for this “sacrilegious” and because she did not
want her vision quest to “turn aside in a money-making effort for myself” that would deflect
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from her spiritually ordained social gospel of racial liberation. For Wells, there is no distinction
between her theological and political representation—they coexist within her subject status as a
black and as a woman where both subjectivities are symbolic systems in meaning-making.
Wells illustrates the tight construction of her theological and political ideology in her
progressive position on Frederick Douglass’ white widow, Helen Pitts Douglass, who was
shunned by both blacks and whites when her husband died. However, Wells seems particularly
critical of whites who recoiled from Helen Pitts Douglass, rather than blacks. This suggests that
Wells’ political modes of thought were constituted in her cultural expressivity as a black, rather
than her gendered expressivity as a woman. She writes,
Because white people forget Christianity and good breeding when dealing
with those who belong to the darker races is no justification for this dark
race to do the same. I cannot see it any other way than that the truly Christian,
well-bred person is always so, no matter with whom they come in contact.
(Crusade 75)
While Wells’ criticism of white Christianity is cogent and well-taken, it is interesting that she
uses it as a moral background for how blacks should not behave. In this regard, Wells critically
approaches the black consciousness from a site of expressive imperfection by the illumination of
white moral violation.
Testimony and the Blues
Like the American jeremiad, the blues as testimony is a conflation of the social with the political.
While there are some poignant spiritual overtones in blues music, as a form of testimony in black
cultural expression it resists a static conception. However, the abstractness of this genre does not
mean it lacks a vigorous and dynamic ideology like the American jeremiad. In fact, a chosen
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speaker ground the roots of blues testimony in the sacred call in moments of crisis to deliver a
message. Moreover, while the American jeremiad has a national representation, testimony in the
blues is derived from the cultural tradition of storytelling. Like the American jeremiad,
testimony through the lens of the blues involves countering the political and the social by the
divinely inspired. Moreover, unlike the American jeremiad that speaks to conflict between the
subject and institutional hierarchies of power and dominance, testimony in the blues speaks to
the agonistic struggle over rights and privileges between blacks and whites.
In Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature, Houston A. Baker, Jr. contends that
there are no methodological conflicts in black cultural expression. He contests that the blues
contains a multifaceted cultural mechanism designed to sustain the varied aspects of “AfroAmerican culture” which he argues “ is a complex, reflexive enterprise which finds its proper
figuration in blues conceived as a matrix” (3). For Baker, although “The matrix is a point of
ceaseless input and output, a web of intersecting, crisscrossing impulses always in productive
transit” (3), it signifies a uniform aesthetic. Therefore, he posits, “the blues are a synthesis” (5)
of literary, cultural, and political forms to signify an ideological rhetorical space directed at the
institutional forces of power, though through the oral tradition of storytelling. As a visceral
cultural response inextricably linked to the diasporic struggle of blacks in America, Baker writes
that by,
Combining work songs, group seculars, field hollers, sacred harmonies,
proverbial wisdom, folk philosophy, political commentary, ribald humor,
elegiac lament, and much more they [blues] constitute an amalgam that
seems always to have been in motion in America—always becoming,
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shaping, transforming, displacing the peculiar experiences of Africans in
the New World. (5)
Moreover, argues Baker, the blues matrix is a form of black cultural expression which “avoids
simple dualities” (9) by rejecting a fixed stylistic domain given the multivocality of various
cultural perspectives that shapes it. Therefore, Baker envisages “the blues matrix [as] a “cultural
invention”: a “negative symbol” that generates (or obliges one to invent) its own referents” (9),
which is a crucial part of black expressionism though it discards a distinct form of delivery.
Although Wells associated blues music to the immoral behavior in a Chicago “good time
house” (Crusade 330), the blues influenced her oratorical delivery, which in essence was
storytelling. In spite of her poignant presentation before her black middle-class woman
audience, Wells discusses the limitation of her emotive response to a political topic, which
unquestionably formed the ideological content of her rhetoric. For example, in Crusade, Wells
evaluates the symbolic representation of her tears and the rhetorical style that her audience
interpreted as effective:
But the women didn’t feel that I had spoiled things by my breakdown.
They seemed to think that it had made an impression on the audience
favorable to the cause and to me. (Crusade 80)
Wells also recounts one of the few men in the Lyric Hall audience reaction. While Frederick
Douglass’ great granddaughter’s husband interpreted her tears’ impact on an audience of selfabsorbed New Yorkers, who were guided more by logical reasoning than emotional signals of
internal struggle. She contextualizes his and her comments saying:
it [her tears] did more to convince cynical and selfish New York of the
seriousness of the lynching situation than anything else could have done. He
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said that if I had deliberately sought a way to arrest their attention I could not
have done anything more effective. I had no knowledge of stage business, but I
was relieved and happy to know that they did not consider that I had spoiled
things on my first appearance before a New York audience. (Crusade 80)
It is clear that Wells’s tears opens up questions about the aesthetics of her delivery since it
reflects the thematic patterns in blues testimony of extreme loss and uncertainty that is balanced
by both spiritual renewal and hope. While Fredrick Douglass’ great granddaughter’s husband’s
and other members of the audience recognized the effective interplay of Wells’ tears with her
message. Further, her audience was sophisticated enough to comprehend that even if her tears
were a performance Wells “could not have done anything more effective” to emphasize the close
and emotional connection to lynching. Wells on the other hand viewed her tears not only as
marginal, that is feminine, but more importantly as showmanship. She proclaims, “I had no
knowledge of stage business,” which for Wells was a structural defect in sociopolitical matters.
Therefore, for Wells, her audience interpreted her tears as a theatrical background to defraud for
a personal advantage—a trick Wells accused Willard of during her visit to the South in 1890. In
addition, Wells views her feminized form of expression as having “the same effect as that of
acting” (Rhetoric 1404A), which clarifies the point about the body/mind dynamic made earlier.
Wells’ tears were more than just an example of the body/mind discourse—they are an
illustration of two distinct black cultural expressions within the context of the jeremiad—
testimony and the blues. As a rhetorical strategy, the blues as an expressionistic method of
delivery clearly contributes to the sociopolitical in black orators and as a form of cultural
expression although its method—testimony—may appear unfocused and unpersuasive.
Although embedding sociopolitical discourse within a cultural form of expression not only
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jeopardizes the credibility of the politic, but it also illustrates the challenges of preserving
cultural legacies under the watchful eye of a rigid historical and canonical critical lens.
Delivery in Black and White
In Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Canon and Antebellum Women Rhetors,” Lindal Buchanan
argues that “Delivery involves far more than a speaker’s use of voice, gesture, and expression on
a public platform.” Given delivery’s symbolic representation, she argues that delivery “involves
complex interplay among a speaker, an audience, and a plethora of social and ideological
factors” (3) which cannot remain securely within the rhetor’s domain of control—if such a
phenomenon exists. However, as Buchanan argues, any representation, for instance “a variable
like gender (or sexuality, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, age, class, disability, and so on),
affects rhetoric” (4) because it extends the rhetorical space of the orator by displacing old
rhetorical geographies while at the same time creating new rhetorical geographies. This new
rhetorical territory allow rhetors, especially marginalized rhetors like Willard and Wells, to go
beyond the traditional and canonical rhetorical domains of control which assert their sovereignty
by condemning the gendered and racialized rhetor’s voice as insurgent.
Ironically, though, these radical voices are often unaware of their own revolutionary
voices much less their opening up new rhetorical territories because they are accustomed to
neither hearing nor articulating their own voices within a sphere that welcomes their gendered
and racialized perspective. For example, aware of her new visibility following her emotional
display during her testimony, Wells like her audience is consciously altered by the fresh
awareness on lynching that she expresses. Although the destructive impact and full implications
of the decentered state of gendered and racialized rhetors can never be known, Wells’ sudden
lucidness in her own message is an example of the rhetorical effect of the rhetor’s voice on their
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personal consciousness. She recounts in Crusade, “So many things came out of that wonderful
testimonial” (80), which no doubt ignited the ideological content of her anti-lynching crusade.
Specifically, two material forms of social gospel rhetoric were spawned:
First, it was the real beginning of the club movement among the colored
women in this country.
Second, that testimonial was the beginning of public speaking for me.
(80-81)
Like Willard, Wells is also unacquainted with the symbiotic relation between her theological and
political ideologies. Further, both feminist rhetors are uninformed about the symbolic cues like
their gender and race, thus cultural behaviors, which orient the style and delivery of their
rhetoric. Although in the nineteenth century, there was a strict relation between the rhetorical
binaries of feminine/ masculine and black/white it is clear that Methodism did not substantiate
these rhetorical boundaries as rigidly as some religious bodies because they encouraged the
blending of the political and theological with social activism. Buchanan argues that “feminine
(and racial) delivery enabled women rhetors not only to defy dominant gender norms dictating
their public silence but also to maintain the appearance of femininity even as they moved and
spoke in domains coded as masculine” (80). Moreover, one can argue that Methodism, the
religious orientation of Willard and Wells, opened the rhetorical space for the receptivity of their
gendered and racialized rhetorical delivery.
Conclusion
Without question, the social gospel rhetoric of Methodist activism played a crucial role in the
oratory of Willard and Wells because if anything it opened up a rhetorical space for them. While
Willard genderized her social gospel for temperance and suffrage, Wells racialized her social
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gospel to speak out against lynching and to promote black women’s enfranchisement. Both
feminist orators also invoked their unique cultural aesthetics, including (although perhaps
unknowingly) to the jeremiad, which shaped and gave more emphasis to their crusades for white
women’s and black women’s rights. Further, like most dynamic orators, Willard and Wells
surrendered to the impulse of the religious call, though at times, in contentious dialectic with the
body/mind dynamic. However, this binary, once reconciled, was a motivating and dynamic
force in their rhetorical presence for their audience and, most surprisingly, for themselves.
Moreover, the amplification of the feminist rhetor’s voice in her own consciousness not only
makes her more aware of her ideological position, but it also unites her in a profound way to her
audience.
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CHAPTER 4
The Rhetoric of ‘True Womanhood’ – A New Discourse for Rebellion
__________________________________________
We’ve pretty much come to the end of a time when you can have a space that is “yours only”—
just for the people you want to be there. Even when we have our “women-only” festivals, there
is no such thing. The fault is not necessarily with the organizers of the gathering. To a large
extent it’s because we have just finished with that kind of isolating. There is no hiding place.
There is nowhere you can go and only be with people who are like you. It’s over. Give it up.
-Bernice Johnson Reagon,
“Coalition Politics: Turning the Century.”

Even before the Civil War, which offered many doors for women to articulate their political,
social, and feminist consciousness, Victorian society51 argued about the woman question: What
is the meaning of womanhood? How is being a woman different from being a man? What is
woman’s suffrage going to accomplish? While the “‘woman question’” during the Victorian era
was generally about the sociopolitical role of white women in the polity, as anti-slavery rhetoric
began to reach a critical velocity, the woman question and slavery—that is, black women and
slavery—came to the forefront as well. As the political consciousness of both white and black
women increased and as their conformity to the “Cult of True Womanhood” ideology decreased,
they became even more aware of their spatial limitations as subjects within the sociopolitical
spheres. White women recognized their marginal status as being equal to black women when the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (see chapter 2) provided suffrage to black men over white
women who also had lobbied aggressively for enfranchisement.
However, uniting white and black womanhood to seek universal suffrage was a
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also adopted including the emphasis on religion and spirituality.
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dangerous first in examining the nature of womanhood because the supposed unification of the
two groups chose white womanhood as the symbolic frame to depict womanhood—theory that
black women argued against and rejected. Paradoxically though, both black and white women
used a similar discourse, the jeremiad, in their evangelical rhetoric to disarm and reconstruct
notions of womanhood outside the traditional and canonical scripture in the Bible. As
Methodists, both Willard and Wells argued that sociopolitical problems were curable with the
moral tone of Christian thought. In short, Willard and Wells employed evangelical rhetoric as a
driving ideological force when speaking to their audiences so that a modern version of
womanhood might emerge. In this way, their political-evangelical fusing created a paradox for
their critics. By blending the sociopolitical to their theological narratives, Willard and Wells
illuminated and projected the feminine voice for social reform. It is important to understand the
role of womanhood in the lives of Willard and Wells during the nineteenth century since their
choices and the consequences of those choices were based on their social construction and
representation as women. These choices and consequences in a sense led to the inclusion of both
black and white women into the political sphere, which embodied a distinct woman’s
consciousness within the rhetoric of Willard and Wells.
This chapter begins with an examination of the nature of “‘True Womanhood.’”Second,
the investigation of the jeremiad as a gender and racial rhetorical trope in Willard’s and Well’s
rhetoric continue to demonstrate its cultural and political force to both obscure and make women
visible. Additionally, this chapter provides an analysis of both the intertextuality and
intersectionality of Willard’s woman suffrage campaign and Wells’ anti-lynching crusade to
demonstrate that the rise of these two movements were generated during the same kairotic
moment.
123

Nineteenth Century Black and White Women: A Beneficial Partnership?
Social and political transformation in the nineteenth century promised new possibilities for
inclusion into the political culture for both white and black women. With the rigid strictures of
the separate-spheres ideology losing its power to constrain women within the limited spatial
confines of the home, these first-wave feminists generally agreed that they needed congruity in
the rhetoric for women’s suffrage because it was still a fragile political objective. However, one
of the main threads that prevented a collective women’s rhetoric from subverting the prescriptive
and normative discourse of womanhood was the master status of white women over black
women. The question of what constitutes woman quickly turned from its epistemological
character to an ontological nature given its complication by the humanity of black women, which
was still under debate by Southern Conservatives who were still resistant to the new articulation
of blackness in America.
The subtle exclusion and sometimes outright rejection of racial issues within the larger
public sphere created an atmosphere of alienation and forced assimilation for black women who
found it difficult, if not impossible, to share the same vision of womanhood as their white
WCTU sisters. Black women again emerged as marginalized subjects with no agency. Although
the tolerance for black women within the WCTU was offensive, black women would not
concede to the dominant white images of womanhood that Willard and the WCTU projected as
the future of image of all womanhood. While white women’s subjectivity was grounded in a
reflection of lived white marginality, black women’s subjectivity was based on a lived reality of
both marginality and alienation. Therefore, the vision of an alternate America that included
women from all racial categories was intrinsically intertwined with the political image of black
womanhood, which was not only a reminder of the slave past, but also the most promising
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example of the transformation that a post slavery America presented. According to black
journalist and clubwoman Victoria Earle Matthews, the sociopolitical fates of black and white
women were especially interconnected. Although there was an ambiguous and tenuous relation
between black and white women regarding the recharacterization of womanhood, Matthews
argued the disagreement could not overshadow the realization that:
We need them. We have always needed them . . . in the work of religion, of
education, of temperance, of morality, of industrialism; and above all we need
their assistance in combating the public opinion and laws that degrade our
womanhood because it is black and not white; for of a truth, and as a universal
law, an injury to one woman, is an injury to all women. (qtd. in Carby 118)
Despite black women’s skepticism of white women, activist black women like Wells would
remain undisturbed by their overall objective of self-mastery; that is, an inner freedom that was
based on an ideology of independence and resistance to their expected conformity of white
womanhood. Black women provided a powerful political aesthetic for the WCTU to look more
progressive, more inclusive, and more tolerant of the changing social and political geography of
inclusiveness that the Reconstruction Era ushered in. By including black women as members,
Willard visually characterized the WCTU as a united feminist social movement that blended race
and class and superimposed the ideal of a mythic America with the manipulation of true
womanhood ideology. By criticizing the ethos of Willard on lynching, Wells jeopardized the
credibility of Willard’s visual representation of universal womanhood in the WCTU; when
Willard invited black women to become members, Wells knew this created a symbolic rhetoric
of inclusion rather than a genuine one. However, both black and white women were structured
within the same masculine hegemony framework that denied them the democratic freedom of
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political and civil liberties, which in their view was the same equal citizenship right of men.
Used as a strategic politic to collapse structural inequalities for women, but most profoundly for
white women within the political culture, Willard’s vision of freedom for white women once in
focus, differed from Well’s vision of freedom for black women. Indeed, for black women,
freedom was mental independence and disengagement from a slave past where their bodies were
at the discretion of the white male master for sex and the female mistress for domestic labor. For
white women, freedom was also mental autonomy; but in addition, white women believed
freedom was tantamount to civil liberty—a political desire they recognized as critical to the
principle of citizenship affirmed in the Declaration of Independence. However, both conceptions
of freedom were contained within the same complex sociopolitical mechanism of patriarchy that
gave them no authority either as white women or as black women within any political debate,
which affected their lives as women.
Although the changing images of America’s citizenry and their subjectivity have deeply
influenced the conceptualization of freedom, the fundamental principle of freedom is never
concentrated within a particular and stable ideological space. While all notions of freedom must
be regarded within the threshold of history from which it is carved, freedom, as a political
discourse, is determined rather than reflects the subject’s situatedness given articulations of
freedom are construed and constructed by the political power of dominant groups. In this
approach, freedom, then, is an ideological map best articulated by the subjects’ identity within a
particular social/historical moment. Eric Foner notes that freedom also experiences radical
transformation that stirs debate from different theoretical, political attempts to locate and define a
fluid meaning. Therefore, Foner is quick to note that:
It is pointless to attempt to identify a single “real” meaning against which others
126

are to be judged. Rather than seeing freedom as a fixed category or
predetermined concept, I view it as an “essentially contested concept,” one that by
its very nature is the subject of disagreement. Use of such a concept
automatically presupposes an ongoing dialogue with other, competing meanings.
(xiv)
With this understanding, there is no authentic version of freedom because “at different periods of
American history different ideas of freedom have been conceived and implemented” (Foner xv)
to evoke the a sense of justice for subjects outside and below the institutions that embody and
distribute social, political, civil, and economic rights and privileges. The design of freedom is
ideological in its nature and thus is associated with the continued transformation of American
democracy. Foner argues that is why “the clash between dominant and dissenting views has
constantly reshaped the idea’s meaning” (xv). If the subject’s identity within the sociopolitical
order is tied to the conception of freedom, it is no wonder that its meaning is bound in historical
struggle. Further, as a concept, freedom plays a defining role in the sociopolitical
characterization of the subject since the current historical discourse of freedom will shape and
exercise how particular subjects are viewed and ordered within the polity. Moreover, efforts to
give a static meaning to freedom is fraught with paradoxes because the nature of freedom is a
highly politicized and ideological conception produced in the imagination by struggle with new
versions of its ambiguous character always under construction. With this perspective, Foner
goes on to say:
Since freedom embodies not a single idea but a complex of values, the
struggle to define its meaning is simultaneously an intellectual, social,
economic, and political contest. A morally charged idea, freedom has
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been used to convey and claim legitimacy for all kinds of grievances and
hopes, fears about the present and visions of the future. (xv-xvi)
The significance of articulating a new conception of freedom in the rhetoric of ‘true
womanhood’ involves re/storying52. That is, to select from one’s own cultural practices the
symbols that signify and constitute the multivocality of the subject’s life experiences. In doing
so, the subject’s re/storying not only overturns the historical and canonical representation of
them, it also reverses their totalizing and prescriptive claims on the subject’s agency. Therefore,
the subjects’ subjectivity is interpreted by their own vibrant cultural symbols of identity rather
than the sovereignty of master narratives. Moreover, morality must also play a key and
considerable role in the conceptualization of freedom since its nature is characterized principally
by its transformation, which is bridged between the articulation of the subject and the historical
moment that ushers in a new rhetorical declaration of freedom. In this way, the symbolic
meaning of freedom is not trapped within the cultural roots of any particular group in power.
Rather, its symbolic manifestation can both persevere and develop across cultural boundaries.
For nineteenth century white women, and particularly for black women, the act of
re/storying meant removing the Darwinian account of their subjectivity that was a major trope in
defining them as noncitizens. Thus, by reordering the authority of a god-ordained system that
was socio-politically hostile to both black and white women, Willard and Wells rejected
Darwinian ideology by modernizing Biblical scripture to fit the philosophies that appealed to
woman’s and racial emancipatory rhetoric. In doing this, the “woman question” forced a
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Although the term “restory” is used largely by creative writers, social scientists, and psychotherapists, I am using
it as a political term by the subject to reinterpret their subjectivity with their own cultural knowledge rather than the
“stock story” of the master narrative based on their race, gender, ethnicity or any representation that stereotypes the
subject.
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profound shift in thinking about the rights and status of womanhood and civil liberties but there
was one key ideological difference to include in the rhetorical deliberation on universal
woman—black womanhood. The rhetorical neutralization of historical and canonical images,
language, and representation as opposition to the dominant imagery of womanhood no doubt
signaled an ideological turn towards mental freedom by both black and white women. By
constructing their representations of womanhood absent of the rhetorical casing of “True
Womanhood” ideology, a rhetorical agenda was inevitably intertwined with a political agenda.
While it may be argued that the issue is merely semantic, some feminist theorists have suggested
that feminists are justified in revisiting dominant language expressions because they have played
a leading role in directing the social formation of what constitutes womanhood. For example
Mary E. Hawkesworth explains,
[. . .] feminists have long recognized the centrality of the politics of
language to their multifaceted undertakings. Despite important
differences concerning conceptions of equality and justice, and marked
divergence in their choice of issues and strategies, feminists have agreed
that the realization of their goals requires an assault on language in
language53. Thus feminist rhetorics have consciously attempted to reveal
mystifications and legitimations embedded in dominant discourses. (444)
Empowering rhetoric used to articulate a coherent and comprehensive narrative representation of
women ignores the many threads of womanhood, which contribute to the multivocality of
womanhood. The narratives that drive the representation of womanhood in the sociopolitical
order are not hidden and lacking rhetorical authority. Rather, they become part of the entrenched
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regulatory system with already existing spatial lines of exclusion to direct the rhetorical space of
women. Different articulations of new womanhood opens new insights to define, expand, and
refresh the meaning of womanhood rather than keeping the term preserved within a particular
social/historical moment. For Hawkesworth, “As discursive constructions, feminist rhetorics call
worlds into being, inscribe new orders of possibility,” and “validate frames of reference and
forms of explanation, and reconstitute histories serviceable for present and future projects” (44445). In this model, then, while revised dominant narratives appear impartial and articulate and
promote a clever ideology, the most successful triumph of patriarchy is its use of hegemony and
exploitation as a means to legitimize its authority by confirming the subject’s complicity in their
social and political condition. From this perspective,
an autonomous women’s voice has played no role in these
determinations. Yet to create a façade of consent, women’s desire itself
had become the locus of artful manipulation. To secure women’s
collusion in their own subordination, patriarchy has devised a
sophisticated ideology to mystify women’s minds and to constrain their
hopes and expectations. Variously coded as philosophy, science, religion,
law, this ideological edifice has so distorted woman’s perspective that it is
impossible to think in terms other than those of the oppressor. (Hawkesworth
445-46)
In order to have a deepening understanding of how to rewrite, revision, and re/story their social,
cultural, political, and legal exclusion, nineteenth century women simultaneously conceded to the
traditional and canonical rules of culture and biblical scripture while at the same time engaged in
agonistic behavior to combat their separation from the sociopolitical order. In effect, this is
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measured appeasement and agitation as rhetorical strategy to gain access to a valuable
resource—full and unencumbered inclusion within the political culture irrespective of gender or
race—in short, suffrage and the rights and privileges that came with citizenship. To illuminate
the social and political in their voices, Gerda Lerner concludes in her historical study of
feminism that women should expand the notion of a feminist consciousness to include multiple
conceptions and articulations of womanhood, rather than keeping the term locked within a
narrow homogeneous comprehension that isolates and overpowers less conservative
perspectives. Lerner identifies her vision of feminist consciousness as, “(1) the awareness of
women that they belong to a subordinate group and that, as members of such a group, they have
suffered wrongs; (2) the recognition that their condition of subordination is not natural, but
socially determined; (3) the development of a sense of sisterhood; (4) the autonomous definition
by women of their goals and strategies for changing their condition; and (5) the development of
an alternate vision of the future” (274). While this critical re/storying of women’s particular
belief system is vital to reversing and reshaping the master narratives on women’s representation,
within a feminist social movement like the WCTU it can directly affect the ethos of the
organization. For instance, if one group of women maintains a dominant status over the other
women within a FSM, cooperative relations among the groups will suffer. Further, not only does
agonistic behavior risk replicating what Lerner describes as the “patriarchal state” (276) or
dominant hierarchies in the larger sociopolitical order, it also creates a monopoly on the
ideological packaging of the FSM by marginalizing the voices of women who encounter similar
hostilities within the sociopolitical culture they are confronting.
Postbellum Black Women: Renaming a Troubled Representation
Activist black women confronted the major ideologies of womanhood established by the
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dominate white power structure which included both white men and women by renaming and
redefining womanhood with their history of struggle and resistance in mind. Although their
renaming womanhood contrasted starkly with the universal image of a shared commonality that
activist white women preferred, black women recognized the importance of their political
relations with white women and according to historian Hazel Carby:
[. . .] knew that in order to transform the social and political condition of black
women alliances with white women were important, if not crucial. But the
recognition of the need for allies was not the signal for compromise; an alliance
would work only if white women’s organizations made the black woman’s cause
their own. (118)
Despite their uneasy relations with white women, black women would not waver in constituting
a black woman identity separate from a white woman identity. While this may have created
tension to the sisterhood narrative that progressive white women adopted to demonstrate solitary
between the races, black women were aware of, and could not dismiss, the social marking and
representation of their body. That is, postbellum black women were a political, aesthetic, and
sexual compression of America’s slave past—a past that the nation was on an immense
sociopolitical journey to get beyond. Therefore, with the branding of their bodies as a chronicle
of American slavery, activist black women realized the critical need to translate their subjectivity
from the pathology of slavery in order to participate in the political geography. For Carby, white
women were both allies and antagonists of black women and the political relations between the
two groups were often a mixture of collaboration, ambiguity, and conflict.
Black women intellectuals were advocates of a transformed women’s movement
and an alliance with white women, but at the same time they knew they had to
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forge a culture of black womanhood out of a history in which sisterhood had only
rarely existed and most white women had betrayed, abandoned, or excluded most
black women from their lives. As an elite, black women intellectuals could only
maintain a representative black female voice if they weighed the advantages of
forming an alliance against the knowledge that for the mass of black women
white women were not potential allies but formidable antagonists. (118)
In trying to convert their representation so that it might have valuable symbolic meaning in postslavery America, black women became ideological threats to white women’s articulation of
womanhood. Considering the master status of their race and the privileges that came with
whiteness, no doubt white women felt inherently superior and qualified to edit and shape the
innovation of all womanhood. However, black women not only protested the imagery that white
women were designing for womanhood, they also were enraged by white women subtly invoking
the master-status of whiteness as the symbolic foundation and reinforcement of womanhood.
Therefore, the normative framework of womanhood situated in whiteness was the tinderbox that
sparked the agonistic rhetoric over the imagery and representation of universal womanhood
between black and white women54. Indeed, while America was struggling to create and grasp its
new ideal by the sweeping industrial changes of the nineteenth century, the only unambiguous
and identifiable representation of its former self was the coherence of white womanhood. In the
words of Barbara Welter, “It was a fearful obligation, a solemn responsibility, which the
nineteenth-century American woman had—to uphold the pillars of the temple with her frail
white hand” (152), which ironically was the very monument that was critical in redefining the
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While the “cult of womanhood’ was indeed a dominant ideology, this is not to suggest that all white women
identified with its social, political, and religious arrangement of their lives. However, it is important to note the
magnitude in which this popular representation was used to define the status and rights of women.
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new America.
Ellen Carol Du Bois posits that black women were nothing more than setting on the
elaborate stage of the universal suffrage campaign, and their presence “was more rhetorical than
real” (69) to the progress towards transformation. The theatrical role that activist black women
had in shaping a universal image of womanhood gave them moral conviction to part
ideologically with activist white women. Black women made a decisive sociopolitical move to
situate themselves in a previously excluded space. However, when black women’s symbolic
imagery was caught between a political struggle that lost its fluency and political power to
influence woman’s suffrage, black women’s representation as a contribution to the ‘woman
question’ was irrelevant. Du Bois writes:
These first years of the Equal Rights Association were the one period in which
woman suffragists gave consistent attention to black women. As the possibilities
for a joint struggle for black and woman suffrage evaporated, and as the woman
suffrage forces became increasingly independent of abolitionism, the image of the
black woman—for she had never been much more than an image—receded into
the background. (71)
Like many activist black women, Wells was suspicious of white women and their liberal voices
in the racial uplift campaign. She considered white women’s contribution as charitable work and
was doubtful and guarded when activist white women participated in generating ideas for blacks,
and especially for black women’s inclusion into the polity. For Wells, only black women could
credibly define and articulate black women’s subjectivity. Further, Wells was also dubious of
any real understanding that white women could have of black women since she believed white
women had an inherent social and cultural ethos that black women would never experience.
134

For example, Wells was particularly apprehensive about the intentions of wealthy white
socialites like Mary White Ovington who were very vocal in the production and dissemination of
the imagery and representation of the postbellum black despite their master-status of being white
and female over being black and female. Wells supposed that privileged white women like
Ovington had a peripheral engagement with only elite and educated blacks, rather than the poor
and uneducated working-class black, and that, therefore, Ovington could not possibly
comprehend the vile ideology behind black exploitation, marginality, and outsider status.
Speaking about Ovington, who was one of the founders of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and a lifelong advocate for black empowerment
Wells muses:
It is impossible for her to visualize the situation in its entirety and to have the
executive ability to seize any of the given situations which have occurred in a
truly big way. She has basked in the sunlight of the adoration of the few collegebred Negroes who have surrounded her, but has made little effort to know the soul
of the black woman; and to that extent she has fallen far short of helping a race
which has suffered as no white woman has ever been called upon to suffer or to
understand. (Crusade 327-28)
In Wells’ mind, the imagery of the white woman—liberal, elite, oblivious—emerges as a striking
contrast to the portrait of black women—disadvantaged, soulful, socially conscious. From this
delineation of Ovington, Wells marks out a totalizing description of white womanhood that
undoubtedly played a profound role in her argument over lynching with Willard. Surely, she
projected her depiction of white women on Willard’s character who did very little, or could do
very little, to counter Wells’ view of her. Wells’ myopic gaze of Willard, and perhaps all white
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women, may have been developed in part by her theory around the sexual politics involved with
the lynching of black men. From Wells’ perspective, in order to mask their sexual desire for
black men white women plotted the rape/victim narrative to conceal their sexual relations.
Wells’ strict adherence to her distrust/suspicion of white women was the motivating force behind
her encounters with most white women. She surmised that the sharpest division between black
and white women was “[. . .] our white women friends were not willing to treat us on a plane of
equality with themselves” (283), which in Wells’ perspective, was grounded in white women’s
master-status over black women.
White Women’s Representation: Discovery and Claiming
While the master/slave dynamic and sexual exploitation contributed to the negative imagery of
the nineteenth century postbellum black woman as noted in chapter one, the subjugation of white
women emerged from the same master/slave apparatus. Although the political message of white
women’s subjugation was also disguised in theological tropes, white women’s peripheral
rhetorical space in the nineteenth century cannot be fully appreciated without recognizing the
essential hopelessness of their subjectivity—without suffrage, white women were efficiently and
effectively locked out of civil discourse. That is, given the excessive force (efficient) of the legal
argument that prevented them from owning property, and the (effective) authority of religion to
generate a divinely inspired structure to their subjugation, white women were impossibly
subdued to propose and voice any rigorous resistance to their social condition.
While white women could discuss their fate in civil society with their husbands, they
could not participate in any active mode on those perspectives. As agents of private/public
ideologies, religion and politics reinforced the perennial passing over of white women’s
argument for enfranchisement. However, the historical joining of religion and politics as a
136

powerful dialectic against woman’s suffrage—ironically and paradoxically—constructed the
rhetorical space for women to enter into the public pulpit to reculture the patriarchal state on the
“woman question.” Willard’s rhetorical argument for revolt against the politicized and iconic
imagery of white women in the nineteenth century is perhaps the most overt resistance to the
split between the domestic sphere and the public sphere for women.
For Suzanne M. Marilley, for example, the social mechanisms that enabled a system
which favored women’s subjugating role was perhaps a less daunting task to reform than the
ideological bonding women had to their social role. Marilley hypothesizes that reformist
activists like Willard had to help women understand and overcome their panic that they were not
only making moral adjustments to their daily living conditions, but ideological reform to their
characterization of themselves, which was learned and not innate. Marilley writes that:
The first task women reform leaders faced was overcoming their members’ fears
of change; the second task was transforming political resistance, especially on the
part of men, to the idea of full citizenship for women. The suffragists both
recruited followers and tried to persuade men to enfranchise women by
demonstrating the incompatibility of the concept of equal rights with the political
exclusion of women. (125)
Unlike other suffragists who promoted the home as a refuge for women and children and no
doubt from a religious perspective, Willard spoke against the home in a lesser vision. While
“other notable women used motherhood to develop ideologies,” writes Marilley, “Willard is the
only one who used it to mobilize mass numbers of women to undermine male domination”
(Marilley 126). For Willard then, women and children needed a sanctuary from the home since
it was so closely identified with the abuses that came with extreme alcohol consumption by the
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protectors of the home—men. Willard’s argument, according to Marilley, was novel because
Willard repackaged the commonplace ideology that home was safe from vile and violent outside
forces when in fact the home was the space where survivorship was uncertain when men became
drunk and disorderly. Starting with this unequal distribution of power in the home, Marilley
argues,” Willard’s penetrating critique of the assumption that males protect females, her
contention that motherhood should be the model for political leadership, and her urgent appeals
to women to protect themselves through collective political participation make her a contributor
to the feminism of fear” (126). Yet, despite Willard’s altruistic goal to increase the awareness of
white women’s limited rhetorical space in the private and public sphere, “Willard’s success as a
political mobilizer has not overshadowed the ethnocentrism and racism embedded in her
ideology” (Marilley 126), since it limited the rhetorical growth of black women’s voices in the
WCTU. Therefore, Willard’s condemnation of overall masculine immorality reinforces the
Darwinian view of male superiority, which included the black male’s pathological and deviant
sexual and overpowering coveting of white women’s bodies. With this equation, Marilley
writes:
Feminists of fear make a similar sort of conflation in the assertion that most
behaviors oppressive to women derive from inherent evils in men. This sort of
cruelty crept into Willard’s feminism of fear. She berates men for their lack of
conscience, inability to resist drinking in groups, and toleration of political
corruption—all behaviors that she considered to result from men’s primary
motivation, the primal instinct of self-preservation. (127)
While most subjects are not isolated from the elements of their sociopolitical environments, the
power exercised over them is often invisibly internalized by the subject though their
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ideologically position is not explicitly apparent in their political rhetoric. Therefore, Willard was
“unable to escape her time,” and as “a leader who wanted to engender and sustain middle-class
white women’s political participation” Willard “appealed to the symbols, ideas, and goals of her
audience” (Marilley 127), that narrowed the conceptualization of womanhood to white
womanhood, which excluded black womanhood. Similarly, to postbellum black activist women,
Willard had to disarm the theological control over women’s agency that was deeply embedded in
their daily pressure to conform to a representation quickly dissolving into history.
Willard activated women’s political participation by coupling temperance goals to
woman suffrage and authorizing both goals with innovative interpretations of
biblical mandates that called women to exercise public roles as moral authorities.
These new interpretations challenged those who invoked the Bible to justify
women’s political exclusion, especially to deny women the vote. (Marilley128)
As an astute rhetor with an understanding of the significance and cultural force of the
transforming sociopolitical structure, Willard did not back away from the uncertainty of the
complex post-slavery society like so many of her feminist contemporaries. For instance, “After
she captured her audience, Willard shifted away from temperance and instead linked symbols of
republican motherhood to voting and lobbying” (Marilley 131). For Willard to create this new
rheorical space that promoted political activism to improve social conditions was significant
because it involved disarming theologically prescribed behavior adopted, though perhaps not
wholly embraced, by intelligent and progressive nineteenth-century white women. Willard gave
voice to women to speak out againt this subjugating rhetoric and, according to Marilley,
“Willard’s basic method for generating support for political participation, particularly the vote,
was to convince women in her audience that their God-given motherly duties required political
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action” (131). While she encountered cultural and political resistance to her feminism of fear,
Willard did not promote a less oppressive vision of the home since her close ties to the
temperance movement gave her knowledge and facts about the home conditions of women and
children regarding the effects of alcohol abuse by men. Thus, “Willard chose to
strenghten women’s identities and preseve women’s roles as moral authorities by fusing these
identities and deeds to the human mission ordained in the Bible and using modernized images to
overcome fears of change” (Marilley 139). Although Willard’s missionizing efforts did not
avoid the conflicting ideologies of black women as members in the WCTU on the imagery of
womanhood, her important refiguring of white womanhood with its overarching aim of
reclaiming white womanhood imagery from its hegemonic representation presented a rebellious
framework to contrast the imagery of the “cult of true womanhood” ideology. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the struggle for women’s suffrage from black and white women established
challenges that invoked resistance to a socially prescribed attachment to their construction.
Resistance to the Pillars that hold the Temple of Womanhood
Resistance starts with the social (re)presentation of gendered language by looking at the
ideological packaging of historical texts and politics, for indeed rhetoric and the scope of its
power is what connects language to action—they are never disconnected. It is in history and its
artifacts where the representations of society and the subject overlap thereby proving crucial
insights into the codifying of knowledge. In her important examination of the intersubjectivity
of gender and politics, historian Joan Wallach Scott argues that while “knowledge is not absolute
or true,” it is “always relative” (2) since it determines the way social relations occur. Scott also
suggests that knowledge consists of more than just abstract facts, that it is comprised of different
social, institutional, and structural elements. Therefore, Scott explains, “Knowledge refers not
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only to ideas but to institutions and structures, everyday practices as well as specialized rituals,
all of which constitute social relationships” (2). With this in mind, the historical representations
of gender are also shaped by the morphology of knowledge, which dictates the social direction of
the meaning attached to physical differences. In short, these meanings add order to the social
system that are adopted and therefore:
It follows then that gender is the social organization of sexual difference.
But this does not mean that gender reflects or implements fixed and natural
physical differences between men and women; rather gender is the knowledge
that establishes meanings for bodily differences. These meanings vary across
cultures, social groups, and time since nothing about the body, including
women’s reproductive organs, determines univocally how social divisions will
be shaped. (Scott 2)
In this reading, it is not sexual difference that requires interpretation, but social information; that
is, knowledge that legitimates the representation of and cleavage to the conceptualization of
sexual difference within the society. Therefore, to understand sexual difference it is important to
consider the patterns of the development that make the key features of gender emerge and
socially recognized as male and female. From that vantage point:
We cannot see sexual difference except as a function of our knowledge about the
body and that knowledge is not “pure,” cannot be isolated from its implication in
a broad range of discursive contexts. Sexual difference is not, then, the originary
cause from which social organization ultimately can be derived. It is instead a
variable social organization that itself must be explained. (Scott 2)
While it is important to trace the morphological stages of sexual difference in its rhetorical
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practices, “history figures [. . .] crucially as a participant in the production of knowledge about
sexual difference” (Scott 2). Further, because “history’s representations of the past help construct
gender for the present” (Scott 2) it is difficult to characterize the attributes involved in the
production processes of sexual difference since they become part of our everyday discourse and
practices. With this perspective, developing new ideological frames for women’s representation
is next to impossible because “those operations are difficult to implement, especially if one lacks
an analysis of how gender hierarchies are constructed, legitimated, challenged, and maintained”
(Scott 3). With the seamless embodiment of historical and rhetorical packaging of women, their
signifying practices animate rather than distinguish the incongruities in the knowledge that
legitimizes the social attachment of women’s representation in the sociopolitical culture. The
hegemonic imprint of patriarchy in the nineteenth century was clearly embedded in the lives of
all black women and restricted their spatial movement; in contrast, while some white women
adopted the prescriptive organizing of their lives, a subculture of progressive and activist white
women like Willard were breaking down the ideological canons encased in rhetoric and
validated by history. By devaluing patriarchal hegemony that relied on women’s favorable
reception to keep them subjugated, the sociopolitical character of nineteenth century gender
differences, which favored male over female, was losing its influence. In providing alternative
interpretations of the nineteenth century woman, the subcultural rhetoric of Willard not only
highlighted the uneven structure and dynamics in the spatial relations between men and women,
but it also provided rhetorical space for new narratives to emerge.
Like Scott, Paula A. Baker notes there was no political coexistence between the genders
in the nineteenth century since all spatial activity was organized around difference. “Throughout
the nineteeth century,” she writes “gender was an important division in American politics” (622).
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For Baker, the segregation between men and women was not only spatial, each group had
“distinct political subcultures, “ and functioned autonomously “with its own bases of power,
modes of participation, and goals” (622). However, with this division, the identities of white
women to disarm the hierarchical and assymmetrical structure of patriarchy came into focus.
Most notably, according to Baker, the sociopolitical struggle of the domestic sphere was now
being reshaped to define not only its significance in the daily lives of nineteenth century white
women, but its spatial ordering in the larger political culture as well. Baker goes on to say:
Ideas about womanhood and separate spheres, as well as forces as diverse as
urbanization and the resurgence of revival religion, gave women’s political
activity a new prominence. But that female sphere had now grown. Men and
women would probably have agreed that the “home’ in a balanced social order
was the place for women and children. But this definition became an expansive
doctrine: home was anywhere women and children were. (631)
Baker continues by emphasizing the intricate interplay of the word “woman” that assumed an all
encompasing ideology and crossed boundaries:
We should recognize, too, that the vision of the home as embracing all women
and children had an important corollary: “woman” was a universal category in the
minds of organized women, as it was for others who held the doctrine of separate
spheres. Because all women shared certain qualities, and many the experience of
motherhood, what helped one group of women benefitted all. “Motherhood” and
“womanhood” were powerful integrating forces that allowed women to cross
class, and perhaps even racial lines. They also carried moral and political clout.
(633)
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In reformulating the narratives about white women, the question of suffrage in the nineteenth
century could not be avoided. By devaluing the power of enfranchisement to nineteenth century
white women and its connection to the home as a poetic politic only dismisses the severe social,
cultural, and political domination they lived under. Not only would enfranchisement collapse the
spatial divison of the genders, it would also shape a new and more symmetrical relation between
men and women with regard to rights and privileges within the polity. However, like all new
political discourses, enfranchisement would displace the rhetorical and historical traditions,
beliefs, and practices that had articulated the subjectivity of both genders. For Baker, suffrage
was more than just granting white women the right to vote, suffrage would also bring about a
cultural phenonmenon and open the door for more significant transformations to occur not just in
the domestic sphere but also within the larger political culture for other marginalized groups.
From Baker’s perspective:
Suffrage represented the antithesis of the glorification of separate spheres that lay
behind the political activities of the early organizations. For these women and
many men, suffrage was indeed a radical demand. By involving women in the
male political arena, women’s right to vote threatened to end political separation.
It implied—and suffragists argued—that men and women should be treated as
individuals, equal in abilities and talents, and that neither men nor women were
blessed with a special nature. Women’s suffrage threatened the fraternal,
ritualistic character of male politics, just as it promised to undercut female
political culture. (634)
In order to correct the balance of the white male/female dynamic, the constrained racial ordering
of black women would also have to play an important role in the suffrage victory. With black
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men having gained the right to vote, though denied the opportunity to vote in most Southern
cities, white women’s enfranchisement ambition would hang in the balance since the historical
argument still favored men—although black men—over white women in the political culture.
By importing the theological argument into the suffrage argument with Biblical scripture, the
ideological rhetoric behind denying women’s enfranchisement and lynching black men
pioneered the rhetorical moment for black and white women to gain entrance into the political
geography. Yet, activist women, both black and white, as dislocated members of the political
culture developed a tenuous bond in subcultural feminist social movements like the WCTU to
replace historical and canonical narratives of women’s construction by changing sociopolitical
representations that culturally educated both genders to participate in prescriptive behavior.
Although the reimagining of woman met with resistance from male and female members from
both groups, Willard and Wells consistently structured their emancipatory rhetoric by
distinguishing it from merely a woman’s cause. Rather, they informed their audiences with
factual and discriminating information and statistics to exemplify their resistance to domesticity
and lynching. With the complex relations between black and white women and the cultural and
social distance between Willard and Wells, the political content of both rhetor’s discourse was
sharpened and intensified by their membership in the WCTU since their movement issues —
woman’s suffrage and anti-lynching—were inextricably intertwined within the WCTUs, which
gave rise to their rhetorical campaigns for reform.
Nineteenth-Century Womanhood: The Challenges of Negotiating a Symbol
The intertexuality and intersectionality of the woman’s suffrage and the anti-lynching
movements came from their challenges to the master narratives on the representation of gender
and race that both Willard and Wells were trying to reverse. Although both black and white
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women seemed to agree in theory to universal suffrage for all women, with the rise of lynchings
and the threat that black women endured because of their racial category, the politics over
lynching may have distracted attention away from woman’s suffrage. However, this did not stop
neither Willard nor Wells from engaging in a spirited and spiritual struggle for their own
respective ideological positions. In this sense, prophecy as a political rhetoric was used by them
and accepted as a legitimate form of discourse in the nineteenth century because of the close
relation to the moral argument with the sociopolitical argument. Faced with the task of
revisoning the archetype of the black and white woman from the domiant sexual and domestic
imagery in the cultural imagination, the task for Willard and Wells, one can argue, was
impossibly high. However, with their strong religious observance to their Methodist faith,
Willard and Wells revolutionized their reform movements and invoked prophecy described as:
[. . .] a social practice of many cultures, in forms that modern commentary links to
shamanism, ecstatic vision, charismatic authority, founder myths, and social
criticism. It thus names the public role of those who address a community by
mediating its relationship to the larger realities conditioning its existence and
choices. As a social practice, prophecy is open to revision and intense conflict,
for people argue about the definition of the role and about whose words to
recognize as having authority. (Shulman 2)
While both Willard and Wells appealed to their own notion of prophecy in their social movement
campaigns that was deeply rooted in the jeremiad (see chapter 3), the discourse cultivated a
moral play between the two groups over voting rights for black women. For instance, one of
the major divisions between black and white women within the WCTU and perhaps other
progressive feminist organizations was black women’s support of black male suffrage over white
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women’s suffrage. However, if white women were approved the right to vote, it can be argued
that it would have been difficult for constitutional framers to deny all women the right to vote.
Therefore, no group would have been more profoundly affected by the privileges of
enfranchisement than the nineteenth century black woman would since they were considered to
have striking and abject differences in their femininity, morality, sexuality, and intelligence than
white women. No doubt, the decision weighed heavily on black women who were exposed to
more challenges in their subjectivity as blacks rather than sexist challenges in their
representation as a woman. Yet, their political determination to support black men rather than
white women in enfranchisement goals opened them up for some of the most severe criticism
from their white women allies55. Contemporary black cultural critic and theorist bell hooks
assesses the political dynamic between women and men of color and concludes:
Their life experiences have shown them that they have more in common with men
of their race and/or class group than with bourgeois white women. They know
the sufferings and hardships women face in their communities; they also know the
sufferings and hardships men face, and they have compassion for them. They
have had the experience of struggling with them for a better life. This has been
especially true for black women. Throughout our history in the United States,
black women have shared equal responsibility in all struggles to resist racist
oppression. Despite sexism, black women have continually contributed equally to
anti-racist struggle [. . . .]. (70)
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Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were the most prominent and vocal critics of black women who
aligned themselves with black men over enfranchisement rather than women.
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Despite their support of black manhood, black women were still subjected to the destructive
“cult of true womanhood” ideology that black men and the larger social order placed on their
subjectivity. Like white women, “true womanhood” ideology transmitted the same familiar
strategies for ordering the lives of black womanhood in the domestic sphere. While black men
were not against the enfranchisement of black women, as men, they felt entitled to the right to
vote first. This argument not only exposed the self-justification of male hegemony among black
men, it also illustrated the unprotected status and marginality of black women within their own
culture. Further, the claim of black manhood over black womanhood also demonstrated the
echoing of not a racialized hegemony, but a masculine hegemony that spoke more to a gender
divide than a racial divide. The rhetoric of male hegemony not only reinforced separate speheres
ideology, it also exemplified the two discourses of power that black women were subjected to
since black men reflected the dominant masculine and condescending view of women, rather
than a cultural view of their women, which was one of a shared struggle and fight for equality.
Kathleen Ann Clark, argues that white male ideology was reproduced with Christian
orthodoxy by black men “to reemphasize the fact that the church’s real mission was to make
men”56 and further that “true [black] womanhood would come about only as a product of real
[black] manhood” (74). By reconstructing the structure and social arrangements of the
male/female dynamic, black women became “willing subordinates to strong and capable men”
(75) despite their conflicts regarding the spatial relations they acquiesced to within the political
culture. However, black women took understated but transforming steps to remove themselves
from the shadows of white men, white women, and black men. By constructing their own selfdefinition of womanhood, black women clearly disturbed the theological and political order in
56
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religious organizations like the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church and risked cultural
fallout from black men in the AME church. From Clark’s view black men primarily,
[. . .] were concerned with asserting the rights of men—and the concomitant
subordination of women—because AME women continued to challenge male
prerogatives within the church. Like earlier generations of women who disputed
men’s control of the pulpit, female members during the postwar years acted to
broaden their role and subtly expanded the boundaries of men’s definitions of
liberty. (77)
The rhetorical space that black women were creating for themselves in the pulpit and beyond
was both a moral and political argument regarding their geographical space. Not only did they
provoke the dispute behind the ethics of black manhood over black womanhood regarding
enfranchisement, they also complicated the ideology behind their spatial limitation within the
public sphere. For instance, although black women visibly participated in public events that
celebrated black empowerment and freedom during the post bellum years, they were still
typecast within the sexualized imagery of slave women by whites.
Southern white observers also took note of [black] women energetically partaking
in late-night dances, barbecues, and other festivities associated with
commemorative and patriotic occasions. Denying the possibility of freedwomen’s
civic and political interests, many whites interpreted their presence at public
ceremonies as a sign of illicit sexual activity. (Clark 82)
While black women’s radical approach to have a significant presence in the public may have
been considered “unwomanly,” Clark tacitly implies it may not have been accidental:
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[. . .] freedwomen’s self-assertion clearly extended into the public sphere.
Freedwomen acted both individually and collectively, to influence civic and
political affairs in their communities. Freedwomen attended—and voted—at
mass meetings held by freedpeople to debate pressing political issues and
forcefully voiced their opinions at Republican Party conventions. Moreover,
freedwomen tended to view suffrage not as a separate gain for black men but as
an important step forward for all African Americans. After black men were
enfranchised, women continued to engage in electoral politics by organizing
political societies, helping to get out the vote, and even standing guard to protect
male voters at the polls. (83)
Although the private and public institutions of power were dependent on spatial ordering to keep
black women within a limited geography, Clark argues that “African American women asserted
their own notions of history, citizenship, and freedom” (83) by withdrawing from a gender
identity counterfeit to their subjectivity. By rejecting the dominant cultural model of white
womanhood, black women reinforced the political nature of their identity by essentially
disrupting the force of white womanhood over them. In broadening their rhetorical space within
the domestic and public sphere, black women disposed of the appearance that they were trying to
emulate white womanhood.
This shift in black women’s public ideological opposition to white womanhood speaks to
their yearning, struggle for self-definition, and agency despite the stigmatization of being judged
sexually loose and unwomanly by whites. Yet, even in open and friendly relationships between
black and white women, the possibility of offending one another was always present since both
groups were privately mapping their own rhetorical space with regard to their race and gender.
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However, by focusing their constructions of womanhood based on race and gender, rather than
the exclusionary politics of patriarchy, black and white women were building barriers to
negotiating an all-encompassing symbol for womanhood, which would argue for universal civil
and political rights.
For instance, despite Wells’ difficult relations with Willard’s ethics on lynching and with
her position as a privileged white woman, Wells had great admiration for and fostered a
friendship with suffragist Susan B. Anthony, one of the most vocal opponents to black male
enfranchisement. In Crusade, Wells’ autobiography, she reflects on her intense disagreement
with Anthony over woman’s suffrage, men, and their theories of political change and
development if woman’s suffrage were won. As Wells writes:
[Whenever] the question [came] up for discussion as to wrongs, injustice,
inequality, maladministration of the law, Miss Anthony would always say, “Well,
now when women get the ballot all that will be changed.” So I asked her one day,
“Miss Anthony, do you really believe that the millennium is going to come when
women get the ballot? Knowing women as I do, and their petty outlook on life,
although I believe that it is right that they should have the vote, I do not believe
that the exercise of the vote is going to change women’s nature nor the political
situation.” Miss Anthony seemed a little bit startled, but she did not make any
contention on that point. (230)
As an anti-lynching orator and activist-journalist, it is no surprise that Wells’ rhetoric describes
the law as “wrongs, injustice, inequality, [and] maladministration” since laws are a legal
inscription of the culture that they reflect and represent (see chapter 2). Wells’ response also is a
reaction to the silent inaction of the legal system to the lynching of black men. Although Wells
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expresses her politics within her racial subjectivity, Anthony’s politics is articulated strictly
within a feminist discourse to address her gendered subjectivity. Wells also responds to the
socially visible distinctions between race and gender in the nineteenth century as well by asking
Anthony, “do you really believe that the millennium is going to come when women get the
ballot?” For Wells, the structures, systems, arrangements, and institutions of inequality were not
going to magically collapse to allow women, and especially black women, into their power
center when they were so efficient and effective in keeping them spatially dislocated.
Perhaps one of the most striking observances of Wells’ rhetoric is her biting statement
about women’s “petty outlook on life” which further illustrates her disconnection to her gender
rather than her race. For instance, while it is likely that she is speaking directly about both black
and white women’s trivial perspectives on their subjectivity, since she had combative relations
with women from both racial groups, it is more likely that Wells is speaking exclusively about
white women—and particularly privileged white women like Willard. Therefore, Wells had
neither tolerance nor patience for women, particularly not for privilege white women like
Willard, whose lives she believed were absent of real struggle and survival.
While Wells concedes to Anthony enfranchisement that “is right” for women, she
reiterates her early statement that voting would not “change women’s nature or the political
situation.” In Wells’ vision, voting would have symbolic importance for status-sensitive white
women, like Willard, but would not provide genuine civil and legal rights for black women.
Wells also repeats her patriarchal argument against woman’s suffrage noting that it would not
“change women’s nature” which mirrors the disturbing ideology of Darwinism. Further, after
Wells objectifies women in front of perhaps the most popular feminist of that time, and with the
domesticating and dehumanizing philosophy of Darwinism, Wells becomes silent and waits for a
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rebuttal from Anthony. Moreover, Wells appears bemused that Anthony “seemed a little bit
startled” and “did not make any contention” regarding her contradiction between Darwinian
ideals in relation to women, and her theories on politics and their capacity to change the
sociopolitical order. Yet, perhaps Anthony was taken aback not by Wells’ portrayal of the facts,
but by how considerable the ideological space of Well’s position on woman’s suffrage was from
hers and other white women’s. Surely, Anthony had to walk away with the belief that if her
friend Ida57, who had such voice, status, and knowledge on civil and political rights could take
this position, then why not other similarly progressive black women?
At first blush, it may appear that Wells’ attitude towards white womanhood is justified
until one realizes that the foundations of social protest rhetoric by black and white women have
always been on twin paths to civil and political inclusion within the polity. In fact, it is difficult
to separate the historical and political struggle for agency between black and white women in
America since both groups’ marginalization were rooted in scientific theory, patriarchy, slavery,
and religious ideology. Therefore, the framework of their social protest rhetoric intersected on
the same historical threshold in opening a space for cultural, political, and social transformation.
Moreover, it is no wonder that spirited and divisive rhetorical encounters between black and
white women activists over the construction of a universal womanhood occurred seeing as they
replicated similar rhetorical patterns of resistance in their discourse.
During the American Revolution, white and free black women activists joined political
forces and invoked civic rhetoric as a crucial emancipatory step to resist their marginal status
during the colonial era. In their social protest rhetoric, Revolutionary war woman activists
emphasized the discontinuity in their lives as noncitizens by comparing it to the continuity they
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believed independence would bring to their lives as citizens if they were enfranchised. The
strong discontinuity/continuity metaphor argued by Revolutionary war feminists no doubt
resonated because the colonies were on a similar path to self-governing that England was
denying them. From Janet Carey Eldred’s and Peter Mortensen’s perspective, Revolutionary war
feminists rejected the cultural and political construction of their lives, and like black and white
activist women during the Civil War (see Chapter 1), used the space of war to participate
civically as a segue to enfranchisement. Eldred and Mortensen observe, “in the years
surrounding the American Revolution, rhetoric [. . .] drew heavily on images of tyranny and
liberation, anarchy and restraint, lawlessness and justice” (174) to illustrate the incongruities
among the meaning of liberty in a country that was at war because it was not politically
acceptable to be under anyone’s rule. Eldred and Mortensen express their understanding of civic
rhetoric as “the kind of political discourse common to speeches, printed addresses, essays, and
tracts—a discourse concerned with government and governance” (174). That is, political speech
that leads to action for civil and political change by influencing policy-making. In relation to the
linkage of civic rhetoric and women’s issues during the Revolutionary era, Eldred and Mortensen
are quick to note that women “theorized the politics of language” (180) as a way to isolate and
examine the ideological and historical aspects of civic rhetoric and its kinship to women’s issues
during the Revolutionary Era. Angela G. Ray argues a similar line of reasoning in how women
used emancipatory rhetoric to define their status and rights. For Ray, activist women during the
Reconstruction Era invoked civic rhetoric as a rhetorical tool in a distinctly political way to
criticize their space in the social order. Ray asserts, “the Reconstruction Amendments provided
fruitful rhetorical ground for the development of a variety of legal arguments to support women’s
voting” (4) and to assist them in shaping the rhetoric in their politics. Yet, instead of invoking
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the main argument of women and patriarchy within their social reform campaigns, Ray contends
“debates were framed as race versus sex,” and she concludes, “activist African American women
faced painful, impossible choices (5) regarding that critical question which white women were
neither confronted with nor had to address.
While Eldred and Mortensen, and Ray examine the strengths and weaknesses in social
protest rhetoric by black and white women and their feminization of liberty (McGee 42-43),
Susan Zaeske analyzes the rhetorical dimensions of petitioning by the two groups. Zaeske points
out that both free black women and bourgeois white women worked as collaborators to help
include the ‘woman question ‘within policy-making decisions. Zaeske argues “[. . .] the
antislavery petition campaign marked one of the first instances in which large numbers of white
and free black American women engaged in collective petitioning of Congress in an attempt to
reshape public opinion and influence national policy” (1), in the consolidated effort of women’s
liberation to denounce and collapse patriarchal ideology. With this effort, white and free black
women integrated their political argument by creating an alliance and collaborating on the
common theme of women’s rights within antislavery movements (Hoganson 561-74). While this
unification may have thrust forward the ‘woman question’ it may have also reinforced and
confirmed the patriarchal belief that women should remain in the domestic sphere since the
contentious rhetoric of these early collaborative efforts by white and free black women for
political empowerment was situated in nothing less than enfranchisement. Further, the shift in
their rhetoric from a moral authority to a constitutional right to enhance their sociopolitical
power may have contributed to the contentious image of women as political activists. Moreover,
the share of power and the unification over the woman question significantly mobilized white
and free black women into emerging political activists to watch.
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This change in the rhetoric of female antislavery petitions and appeals, from a
tone of humility to a tone of insistence, reflected an ongoing transformation of the
political identity of signers from that of subjects to that of citizens. Having
encouraged women’s involvement in national politics, women’s antislavery
petitioning created an appetite for further political participation and more rights.
After female abolitionists established the right of women to petition Congress
collectively on political issues, countless women employed that right to lobby
their representatives and agitate public opinion to promote causes such as
temperance, antilynching, and ultimately, woman suffrage. (Zaeske 2)
While petitioning may have created a new desire for political activism in white and free black
women, petitioning may have also ignited the contentious image over the nature of womanhood
as well between white and free black women. For instance, Zaeske also explores the rhetorical
foundations of a petition and says, “At its core a petition is a request for redress of grievances
sent from a subordinate (whether an individual or a group) to a superior (whether a ruler or
representative)” (3). Without question, Zaeske’s subordinate/superior model is similar to the
master/slave dynamic—a system that subordinated free black women as former slaves and black
women who were still slaves. Therefore, it is not surprising that the dissension between black
and white women during the Reconstruction Era over the construction of a universal womanhood
occurred since the relations between black and white women became fragmented by the
elevation of race within the ‘womanhood question.’ Still, Willard’s gender harmony campaign
within the WCTU, although politically motivated did not diminish white women’s master-status
over black women in either the WCTU or the larger political culture. In fact, the political
relations between black and white women within the WCTU was the most vexing dilemma for
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Willard who became a public target for moral/ethical hypocrisy in her failure, as president, to
treat both groups, and particularly black women equally. At the same time, white women’s
misunderstanding, and their undermining of black women’s subjectivity frustrated black women.
Yet, despite black and white women’s different ideologies on the ‘woman question’, the political
culture of the nineteenth century was largely not open to endorsing any widespread feminist
ideals sensitive to either group’s subjectivity. Indeed, the ideological commitment to increasing
women’s civil and political rights would not reveal its greatest moment until decades later with
the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920, which prohibited the denial of voting based on
gender.
Conclusion
While their public pronouncement of collaborating on the nature of a universal representation of
womanhood may have been true, the master-status of white women over black women within the
sociopolitical order and in feminist organizations like the WCTU disrupted any black/white
womanhood dynamic. Thus, black and white women were framing their identity within rhetoric
to address the realities that their particular representation signified in the sociopolitical order,
rather than in terms of how they were defined as women with reference to the patriarchal
hierarchies that made both black and white women invisible. The incongruity of their rhetoric
over their race and gender subjectivity is that while the status of white women was better than
the status of black women, it was not considerably better. The social and political consciousness
of black and white women were different, and, therefore, while both groups wanted to replace
the traditional and canonical mapping of their lives, their reasons for the change were not the
same. While a coherent interpretation of womanhood did not emerge in their rhetoric, Willard
and Wells recognized the need for freedom that included both blacks and women—though
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neither rhetor could tell when that might be achieved. Moreover, both Willard and Wells
recognized that the social, legal, and economic implications for one group of women in America
would have great importance to the situatedness of all women in America.
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CHAPTER 5
Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century:
The Persistence of Gender and Race in Rhetorical Slugfests
__________________________________________
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is, said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
-Lewis Carroll
Through the Looking Glass

The rhetorical battle between Frances Willard and Ida B. Wells over the question of lynching
reached, to some extent, a resolution. Four years after her controversial and divisive statements
in the New York Voice (see chapter 1), Willard took the remarkable step of publicly denouncing
the lynching of black men in her annual address at the 1894 WCTU’s national meeting. Her
rhetoric was measured and carefully scripted:
Resolved that we are opposed to lynching as a method of punishment, no matter
what the crime, and irrespective of the race by which the crime is committed,
believing that every human being is entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers.
(Erbach)
Although Willard’s speech may have been composed in legal overtones rather than moral
suasion, and although it may have been inspired more to revive her image than by a genuine
moral stance against lynching, it served to end the public slugfest between the two orators.
While there is no evidence that Wells ever reconciled with Willard after her open censure of
lynching, or that Willard, in her capacity as president of the WCTU, privately offered an olive
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branch to Wells to end the public conflict, their rhetorical battle over lynching was laid to rest,
and both women continued to emerge as powerful feminist voices during the nineteenth-century.
Despite Willard’s public change in policy, the WCTU still struggled with the issue of race;
however, they did increase the visible presence of black women within the feminist social
movement to stress the importance of a shared vision of womanhood (Mattingly 95). Willard
also increasingly asserted a woman’s suffrage agenda over temperance (Bordin 175-189), while
Wells’ conception of her political-ethical philosophy progressed into civic and civil rights rather
than just her antilynching crusade (Schechter 182-212). With this shift in their rhetoric from a
narrow definition of rights based on race and gender to an expansive woman’s political
consciousness, Willard and Wells broke with the strict orthodoxy of their Methodist orientation
for a more secular course. In this way, both orators created rhetorical spaces that continue to be
a distinctive feature of secular contemporary feminist social movements where all women can
collectively engage in sociopolitical discourse by reformulating the interpretation in the
traditional practices of rhetoric to include a feminist argument (Ede, Glenn, and Lundsford 41820) based on their particular subjectivity.
The social protest rhetoric of Willard and Wells was indeed radical because to embrace
the canonical structure of rhetoric was also an act of rejection of its patriarchal ideology since the
ancient roots of the canons (invention arrangement, style, memory, and delivery) established by
Aristotle were not all-inclusive to women, slaves, or people of color. Therefore, Willard’s and
Wells’ comfort with rhetoric was not with what it espoused in its Aristotelian traditions, but with
what it opposed—civic and civil liberties based on race and gender. Moreover, by subverting
Aristotelian rhetoric’s conservative stance on marginalized groups, Willard and Wells were able
to use the foundation of rhetoric as an effective instrument with regard to their social protest
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rhetoric to collapse the political limitations based on race and gender58 in the nineteenth century.
Yet, the master-status of race and gender as ideological tropes were present once again in 2008
when the Democratic National Party was seeking a presidential candidate and the election
process provided new and rigorous debate on these contested subjectivities. It also demonstrated
how gender and race discourses frame the subject in creating meaning by its symbolic
representation when they are juxtaposed. The conflict between Willard and Wells raised the
important issue of identity based on the master status of race and gender because these
subjectivities served as the core for their social protest rhetoric. For Willard, gender was the
important issue and the basis for her association with the WCTU. For Wells, however, the racebased issue of lynching loomed large and interfered with her ability to wholly espouse the tenets
of the WCTU. Painstaking deliberation on the contested subjectivities of race and gender and
how their discourses frame the subject continues into the twenty-first century and gives cause for
contemporary feminist social movements (FSM) to learn lessons taught by the early rhetors of
the WCTUs movement on temperance and woman’s suffrage.
While Willard’s and Wells’ views on gender and race cannot be contained within the
nineteenth-century and comprehended without raising the question of their ideology and the
complex functioning of gender and race within a society, their meaning and practice are still
poignant political issues and a mirror to how the subject is constituted and represented in the
twenty-first century social order. Therefore, the master status of gender and race continue to
function as a dominant symbolic representation for the sociopolitical actor within moments of
considerable political transformation with the signifying effect often being invisible to the
subject. The issue of master status of race and gender during the 2008 Democratic National
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Class was also significant in boundary crossing for women and blacks in the nineteenth-century; however,
because of their gender and race, most women and blacks were disproportionally located in a lower class-status.
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Convention (DNC) Presidential Nomination between Senator Barack Obama from Illinois and
Senator Hillary Clinton from New York, were thrust once again on the political stage
(Pinderhughes 47-48), and with considerable conflict and confrontationa, just as it was in the
nineteenth-century between Willard and Wells over lynching. During the Obama and Clinton
slugfest, all Americans, but women in particular, had to revisit gender and race as social,
political, and symbolic markers of identity. Activist black and white women of the DNC had to
decide between casting a vote for the person who could potentially become the first woman
President of the US and the person who might become the first African-American President.
With the election of Senator Obama, the national election results validated the notion that in
moments of political crisis, subjects remain tightly bound to their social representation that
isolates them the most. For black women it is race, and for white women it is gender; however,
once again, black women were caught between the boundary of their race and gender—either
choice estranged them from their other “otherness” since neither representation is without
meaning.
Although there have been definitions of race such as “a concept that signifies and
symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies”
(Winant 172)59 it is clear that race, like the representation of womanhood, remains a vague and
often rhetorically frustrating discourse given the utopian and historical desire of both these tropes
to define subjects exclusively under their gender or racial construction. A further relevant
problem in establishing and describing womanhood is its historic failure to recognize the social,
political, and symbolic meaning that comes with the different articulations of womanhood. This
special attachment to the subject’s racial category is equally problematizing since race is an
59
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ascribed status and subjects connect themselves to groups that reflect their racial category. Yet,
veiling the master tropes of race and gender reinforces their legacy as inherently divisive social
and political forces, a view of which Willard’s and Wells’ conflict over lynching provided
perhaps the clearest illumination.
This final chapter examines the continuing ideological conflicts between the master status
of gender and race. It proposes that twenty-first century feminist social movements must
understand the rhetoric in political history that is actively working against them in recognizing
and accommodating an expanded articulation of womanhood. It also suggests that activist
women must acknowledge that confrontational rhetoric is not divisive, but desirable (see chapter
1) since it can serve as the foundation for active political engagement, although within the
context of struggle. It contends while gender and race signify difference, and are often
confrontational, gender and race difference can function to disarm hierarchical structures that
oppress and subjugate. Finally, this chapter argues that the rhetoric of FSMs must continually
“negotiate womanhood” from many gendered and racial perspectives since their articulation
resists neat and discreet symbolic representation within the sociopolitical order.
Gender versus Race: Persistence of an Ideological Conflict
The coalition troubles of nineteenth and twentieth-century feminist movements 60 were rooted in
the belief that agonistic struggle was disastrous although according to some political scientists
long and complicated discourse is the mark of successful political initiatives61. In addition, the
60

For a review of nineteenth and twentieth century feminist movements see, Shulamith Firestone. The Dialectic of
Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. New York: Bantam Books, 1971. Aileen S. Kraditor. Up From the
Pedestal: Selected Writings in the History of American Feminism. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968 and Belinda
Robnett. How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
61

See Jane K. Cowan’s “Culture and Rights after Culture and Rights.” American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 9-24.

163

failure of past feminist movements to bring solidarity among racial, ethnic, class, and sexuality
boundaries has added to their irrelevance in the contemporary political culture.62 Commenting
on the inhospitality grounded in racism to women of color within the 70s women’s movement,
Angela Davis observes that “Such racist influences, as long as they pervade the women’s
movement, will continue to obstruct the building of multiracial organizations and coalitions”
(33) and women’s political status. While the rhetoric of a feminist social protest group is never
ideologically pure, Davis also mentions that the movement’s discourse is crucial “in bringing
about radical changes in the socioeconomic structures of this country” (33) but only with the
integrated voices of women from diverse classes, races, and sexualities.
Perhaps significantly for the understanding of Davis’ position, Iris Marion Young
observes “[f]eminist discourse and practice should become and remain open, its totality
permanently deferred, accepting and affirming the flows and shifts in the contingent relations of
social practices and institutions” (716) to engage contemporary debates over the
contextualization of feminism. That is, such discourse must serve as an intervention to the
changing attitudes, beliefs, and values rather than remaining faithful to a synthetic discourse of
history, which neither signifies the rhetorical development of the contemporary moment nor the
subject’s situatedness to its historical ideology. Young notes that historically FSMs were imbued
with patriarchal rhetoric and that “essentializing assumptions and the point of view of privileged
women dominate[d] much feminist discourse” (716). These assumptions, ironically, isolated and
had a destructive impact on the marginalized voices they wanted to integrate within the
movement. Young’s view not only confirms the significance of a movement’s ideology, it also
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clarifies the point that the rhetoric of a movement’s ruling ideology can be interpreted as hostility
by new movement members from different classes, races, ethnicities, etc. despite the feminist
movements attempt “to avoid such hegemonic moves” (716-17). By re/conceptualizing their
ideology, FSMs can consciously analyze the implicit and explicit theoretical underpinnings in
their rhetoric since FSMs will be cast in an image that they cannot easily withdraw from if the
ideology is separatist. In this way, abstractions that can play a hidden role in narrative and breed
tensions within the movement are avoided. However, this is not to say that an ideology should
be absent of what sociopolitical forces it stands against outside the FSM. In fact, ideologies are
the rhetorical architecture of a movement since they circumscribe the representational features of
the movement’s ethos. Further, ideology establishes an epistemological agenda to neutralize,
disarm, or disable oppositional and repressive forces that are harmful to its members, and
perhaps the larger polity. In the words of Teun A. van Dijk,
ideologies are representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our
values are, and what our relationships are with other groups, in particular
our enemies or opponents, that is, those who oppose what we stand for,
threaten our interests and prevent us from equal access to social resources
and human rights [. . .]. In other words, an ideology is a self-serving schema
for the representation of Us and Them as social groups. (69)
Even as an ideology states the fundamental values of a movement, it also represents what a
movement advocates against and guides its discourse. Yet, in focusing on its core beliefs, the
movement should not replicate hierarchies in its rhetoric or movement structure that contribute to
the social distance that alternative voices experience in the social order. Rather, the movement’s
ideology should motivate loyalty and a sense of shared meaning through the strategic
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employment of its rhetoric. However, the movement must not become so rigid in its ideological
goals that it is not open to negotiation in its representation. Rather, by framing a rhetoric of
negotiation within its ideology, the nature of the movement expands its representation beyond a
limited group of subjects. Accordingly, the consciousness of the movement remains in a
transforming state of renewal and revival and “the development of consciousness [becomes] an
ongoing process in which groups reevaluate themselves, their subjective experiences, their
opportunities, and their shared interests” (Taylor and Whittier 114). By remaining dynamic, a
movement’s social protest rhetoric acknowledges that the subjects do not live in isolation of their
lived experiences nor are they de/contextualized of discourses that have a central role in the
treatment and representation of the subject within the polity.
A vivid example of the subject’s ideology composed and related by their lived experience
and the denial of that experience is Wells’ reaction to Willard’s perception that white women
could not willfully engage in a sexual relation with a black man. Further, Willard, in Wells’
view “had gone out of her way to antagonize the cause [antilynching] so dear to our hearts by [. .
.] a studied, unjust, and wholly unwarranted attack upon our work” (60). From Wells’
standpoint, there is a distinction between appearance and reality—a distinction that Willard
made, she believes, not in isolation of her ideology, but with an unrestrained and perhaps racist
reflection of it. Wells’ argument against Willard’s point of view was that it represented the
white gendered and privilege perspective that denied and doubted the credibility of black men’s
innocence. Nevertheless, more importantly for Wells, Willard’s speech63 signified what Willard
tried to conceal—her consciousness. Willard’s words are:
The zeal for her race of Miss Ida B. Wells, a bright young colored woman, has, as
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it seems to me, clouded her perception as to who were her friends and wellwishers in all high-minded and legitimate efforts to banish the abomination of
lynching and torture from the land of the free and the home of the brave. It is my
firm belief that in the statements made by Miss Wells concerning white women
having taken the initiative in nameless acts between the races she has put an
imputation upon half the white race in this country that is unjust, and, save in the
rarerest exceptional instances, wholly without foundation. This is the unanimous
opinion of the most disinterested and observant leaders of opinion whom I have
consulted on the subject, and I do not fear to say that the laudable efforts she is
making are greatly handicapped by statements of this kind, nor to urge her as a
friend and well-wisher to banish from her vocabulary all such illusions as a source
of weakness to the cause she has at heart. (Willard qtd. in Wells 60)
In reaction to Willard’s comments, Wells writes:
This paragraph, brief as it is, contains two statements which have not the slightest
foundation in fact. At no time, nor in any place, have I made statements
“concerning white women having taken the initiative in nameless acts between
the races.” Further, at no time, or place nor under any circumstance, have I
directly or inferentially “put an imputation upon half the white race in this
country” and I challenge this “friend and well-wisher” to give proof of the truth of
her charge. Miss Willard protests against lynching in one paragraph and then, in
the next, deliberately misrepresents my position in order that she may criticize a
movement, whose only purpose is to protect our oppressed race from vindictive
slander and Lynch Law. (On Lynchings 60-61)
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It is clear that Willard and Wells remained locked in the master-status positions of gender and
race despite their similar religious and social action sensibilities. As Taylor and Whittier have
noted, cleavage to identities and their representation shapes the consciousness within the subject
that is not easily nullified by the mutual act of coming together in a FSM. Thus, it is important,
as Taylor and Whittier have hypothesized, that a rhetorical space or voice in FSMs is created for
all subjects to uncover the characterizations of their identity-formed consciousness so that they
may cross ideological borders on unrelated issues for social action on related issues. However,
in order for the subject’s consciousness to be shared within the FSM, the reception of the
subject’s ideology must not remain in the sphere of difference/other as it is represented in the
sociopolitical order.
For example, throughout Willard’s speech, she adopts an uncharacteristically racial tone
and juxtaposes race against gender to objectify Wells’ racial representation. Further, Willard’s
feminine representation is pathos driven: she appeals to the emotional and moral sensibilities of
her privileged white audience who no doubt share her social and sexual spatial mapping of white
women and black men. In fact, Willard also implicitly calls on Wells to choose her loyalty
between her gender and race: “it seems to me, clouded her perception as to who were her friends
and well-wishers in all high-minded and legitimate efforts to banish the abomination of lynching
and torture from the land of the free and the home of the brave.” Willard also appears to take
offense at a suggestion that white women were taking ownership of their sexuality with black
men by arguing against Wells’ alleged assertion that “white women [were taking] the initiative in
nameless acts between the races.” She also claims that Wells has spoiled the entire
representation of white womanhood by her “imputation upon half the white race.” Willard also
sharply rebukes Wells to refrain from creating an image of white woman/black man sexuality
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since it may dilute Wells’ antilynching support from the WCTU, and goes on the say that the
“laudable efforts she is making are greatly handicapped by statements of this kind.” Willard’s
speech also paints the nineteenth-century ideological stance that any sexual relation between
white women and black men is abject and demands that Wells “banish from her vocabulary all
such illusions” of this debased and pornographic visual sexual image.
Wells’ counter to Willard’s speech not only iterates her personal feelings on the topic of
the lynching of McDowell, Stewart, and Moss (see chapter 1), it also demonstrates the analytical
skills Wells acquired as a journalist. In this regard, Wells’ takes a decidedly masculine stance
with her logos-motivated confrontation of Willard’s pathos-rich speech, saying there are “two
statements which have not the slightest foundation in fact.” This simple statement illustrates the
restricted agency Wells acquired as a journalist, but did not gain as a black woman journalist,
which illustrates the cultural, social, and political context and dynamics of Wells’ gender and
racial objectification during the nineteenth century. Although Wells was a respected journalist
and spoke before black and white groups, she was first recognized as a black and then as a
woman. Indeed, her profession as a journalist may have allowed her some rhetorical voice
within the sociopolitical order, but Wells was firmly located by her race and gender within a
limited sphere. Another example of Wells’ skill as a fact-checking journalist is the way in which
she employs Willard’s text from her speech to overlap and form her argument against Willard.
Further, Wells refutes all of Willard’s accusations “directly or inferentially” and invokes legal
discourse in her “challenge” to Willard “to give proof of the truth of her charge” that was a direct
offense to Willard’s ethos as moral leader of the WCTU. Finally, one of the most critical
elements in Wells’ counter reaction is the manner in which she mocks the supposed sisterhood
between her and Willard, but also the shared sisterhood within the larger context of black and
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white women within the WCTU. By strategically encasing Willard’s phrase “friend and wellwisher” within quotation marks, Wells’ tactical rhetorical move is also a subtle reframing of
Willard’s notion of sisterhood and a tacit question mark next to Willard’s morality. Wells’
rhetorical enclosing of “friend and well-wisher” no doubt signified to her middle-class black
audience that Willard was white—different—Other. With this reframed view of Willard, Wells
inhibits Willard’s rhetorical framework of sisterhood—implicit and explicitly—from achieving
its collective identity of universal and shared sisterhood. Furthermore, Wells suggests to her
audience that Willard “deliberately misrepresents my position” to undermine the antilynching
“movement” which Wells concluded to her middle-class black audience that her sole purpose “is
to protect our oppressed race from vindictive slander” that Willard was engaged in against
blacks.
The knowledge that Willard gained through her gender and Wells through her race and
gender were both spatially and bodily determined. That is, neither woman could defer the
meaning they would gain as a woman and as a woman and a black. In short, both Willard’s and
Wells’ epistemologies were constructed by the confinement of nineteenth century restrictive
sociopolitical norms based on their gendered and racialized bodies. Donna Haraway supports the
idea that knowledge is situated. She posits that knowledge evolves from a complex chain of
events in the gendered woman’s life and not from a single source. She argues for “a feminist
writing of the body that metaphorically emphasizes vision again” as a method for feminist
women “to reclaim that sense to find our way through all the visualizing tricks and powers of
modern sciences and technologies that have transformed the objectivity debates” (582) and that
inhibit a feminist perspective. Haraway challenges feminist women to (en) counter their
gendered and racialized self in order to counter the power systems that ask for their knowledge
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credentials at the door when they are in spaces that they do not presumably know how to
critique. The burden of responsibility, as Haraway argues, is with feminist women: “We need to
learn in our bodies, endowed with primate color and stereoscopic vision, how to attach the
objective to our theoretical and political scanners in order to name where we are and are not, in
dimensions of mental and physical space we hardly know how to name” (582). Although
Haraway’s call for a feminist vision is well taken, when feminist women and women of color are
engaged in the practices of sociopolitical critique, their perspective based on knowledge they
gained in their gendered and racialized bodies is often viewed as a revolt against the
sociopolitical order rather than a revealing of the inequities in the social structure. From
Haraway’s perspective:
[B]odies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their
boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping
practices; “objects” do not preexist as such. But boundaries shift from within;
boundaries are very tricky. What boundaries provisionally contain remains
generative, productive of meanings and bodies. Sitting (sighting) boundaries is a
risky practice. (595)
Sociopolitical criticism from a gendered and racialized perspective cannot be exclusive of its
politicized identity since the cultural roots of the subject are framed by hierarchical structures.
These dominant systems make a gendered and racialized vision difficult, if not impossible,
without the narratives from the domains of power interrupting the subject’s rhetoric and ordering
an explanation that is flanked by resistance and struggle. The issue at stake is how feminist
women, and women of color, represent their oppression, exploitation, and subjugation in their
critique without their discourse being viewed as aggression towards the systems, institutions, and
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social structures that invented them. This challenge often leads to a mixture of negotiation and
constrained rhetoric especially for the feminist woman of color who is imbued with an
ideological mix of subjectivities: black/woman, Chicana/lesbian, etc. That is, she is often forced
to eliminate the perspective of one subjectivity to gain agency for another. However, as some
feminist women of color note, all critiques of the sociopolitical systems are represented within
the context of struggle to reverse old hegemonic practices and to prevent new subjugating
discourses from emerging.
Gender and Race Within the Context of Struggle
In relation to the racialized woman’s identity and representation, Chicana lesbian feminist,
Gloria Anzaldúa argues “As long as woman is put down, the Indian64 and the Black65 in all of us
is put down” (Anzaldúa 106). For Anzaldúa, then, since both identities—Indian and Black—
share a common theme of uncompromising difference. Anzaldúa correctly notes that the
racialized woman’s dislocatedness in the social order is so underestimated that her racial
category is often separated from her gender construction and targeted as a mechanism for
repression. This holds particularly true for Evelyn Higginbotham, who argues that the subject’s
racial category is the most powerful marker of difference that can be used for discriminatory
practices in the social domain. To Higginbotham the transference of
race not only tends to subsume other sets of social relations, namely gender and
class, but it blurs and disguises, suppresses and negates its own complex interplay
with the very social relations it envelops. It precludes unity within the same
gender group but often appears to solidify people of opposing economic classes.
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Whether race is textually omitted or textually privileged, its totalizing effect in
obscuring class and gender remains. (255)
Higginbotham posits that the subject’s racial category instigates the most profound and coercive
form of dominance by social forces and institutions of authority to limit and/or deny access to
valuable resources in the polity, which include sociopolitical power. Further, argues
Higginbotham, the subject’s race, unlike class and gender, remains hostile to the social order by
its inability to move into the dominant power structure through assimilation. For Higginbotham,
then, race is a totalizing discourse—absolute and set in motion to take center stage over class and
gender by its comprehensive mark of difference. To Teresa de Lauretis, gender is also a
totalizing discourse, but for de Lauretis, gender representation resists identity coherence since
gender has the transcendent vision to recast its image by traversing through, in, and beyond
historical and ideological spheres. She argues that “the movement in and out of gender as
ideological representation [. . .] characterizes the subject of feminism, is a movement back and
forth between the representation of gender (in its male-centered frame of reference) and what
that representation leaves out or, more pointedly, makes unrepresentable” (26). In this way,
gender frequently retreats from the power and gaze of patriarchy by assigning its own discursive
value and expressions to contested and canonical narratives that represent them, and often from
the perspective of the sociopolitical borders. From de Lauretis’ perspective gender
is a movement between the (represented) discursive space of the positions made
available by hegemonic discourses and the space-off, the elsewhere, of those
discourses: those other spaces both discursive and social that exist, since feminist
practices have (re)constructed them, in the margins (or “between the lines,” or
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“against the grain”) of hegemonic discourses and in the interstices of institutions,
in counter practices and new forms of community. (26)
Although Higginbotham and de Lauretis argue that race and gender are more internalized within
the power structure than the subject’s imagination, like Haraway and de Lauretis, Raka Shome
warns against disregarding sociopolitical space as a major site of negotiation for discourse. For
Shome, in addition to cultural influences, the subject’s identity formation is also shaped by a
time-space dynamic. Shome extends the argument of space as having a direct and immediate
coherence to the subject’s perceptions, and argues that
we need to resist making the framework of identity the singular fixture of the
contemporary cultural landscape, the sole background against which all other
analyses of cultural relations occur, for in doing so we risk rendering invisible the
situated practices of space and place through which identities are continually
reworked, contested, and reproduced ( 43).
The tempering of race and gender subjectivities for a more pronounced critique of sociopolitical
space to be explored and identified that Shome espouses does not cancel oppression and
exploitation based on identity. In a harmonizing approach, critique based on race and gender
that Higginbotham and de Lauretis make a case for, and the critique of sociopolitical space that
Shome argues for, are all fundamental to the disarming of canonical and traditional practices. To
separate critiquing space on identity, to privilege a critique based on sociopolitical space can
elevate one over the other since the master narratives embedded in the systems, institutions, and
social structures all have a key relation in the subjugation of marginalized voices. Expanding the
scenario for transformation to include all perspectives from marginalized rhetorics creates a
wider sphere of opportunity to erode, subdue, and disrupt the enduring influence of a patriarchal
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vision and interpretation of the sociopolitical order. For example, in her influential anthem on
theories by feminists of color, scholar activist Chela Sandoval argues that a democratized global
culture can “consolidate and extend what we might call manifestos for liberation in order to
better identify and specify a mode of emancipation that is effective within first world
neocolonizing global conditions during the twenty-first century” (2.2). That is, for Sandoval, to
encourage new and broader perceptions that strengthen “coalitional consciousness” (78) that
evokes individualist rhetoric. In this way, a model to dismantle the historical, canonical, and
patriarchal authority by energizing and examining the significance of discourses that resists
internalizing normative theories and methodologies in their research or activism is needed that
will not ideologically crumble under the influence of institutional norms. For Sandoval, “a
methodology of the oppressed, which is composed of the technologies that make possible
differential social movement” (71), is critical to disrupting the historical internalization of
dominant and authoritarian discourses within the social order. This may be because they have
been resilient in perpetuating their methods, values, and beliefs to compete with shifts in
historical and cultural ideologies.
Modest ideological steps to generate Sandoval’s conception of “coalitional
consciousness” within feminist social movements to counter inequities across gender and race
must be juxtaposed with the polemical rhetoric that comes with being different. In short, being a
woman and a woman of color is not institutional friendly since these subjectivity positions
require constant management of the complexities and oppressions that come with gender and
race difference. Further, women and women of color react offensively and defensively to
discrimination, prejudice, stereotyping and—perhaps the most damaging but most subtle form of
polite hostility to their subjectivity—tolerance.
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In Wendy Brown’s conception, “tolerance appears as a discourse of pure normativity, of
pure recognition and its limits; what this appearance hides is the inequality and the regulation
(achieved through the governmentality of tolerance dispersed in society), and not simply the
normative marginalization organizing its subjects” (75)66. While there is no overt repression in
tolerance, it is still an institutional structure used to block privileged access to power in its
attempt at gendered and racial pluralism. Further, the knowledge gained by the vision of the
other is subordinated by stressing liberal harmony, which “has prided itself on its universality
and politically inclusionary character” (Mehta 427): this also weakens the subject’s right to
critique the canonical practices and the historical knowledge of institutions as a member.
This outsider representation of knowledge based on difference is most vividly reflected
by the identity power movements of the 70s (Asian, Black, Chicana/o, American Indian,
gay/lesbian and feminist) that were a critique of the sterile institutional spaces that appeared
inclusionary by their tolerance of them. However, gendered and racialized subjects realized their
cultural and ideological knowledge was rejected since the institutions of power believed that
activists’ knowledge served no epistemological function outside the domain from where it
emerged. In Michel Foucault’s analysis, counter-theories involve not only a critique of coercive
discourses, criticism also signals an astute comprehension for institutional change during a
particular time and place in history—the kairotic moment:
So I would say: for the last ten or fifteen years, the immense and proliferating
criticizability of things, institutions, practices, and discourses; a sort of general
feeling that the ground was somehow cracked, even and especially that which
seemed most familiar and solid to us and closest to us, our body, our everyday
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gestures. But alongside this crumbing and the astonishing efficacy of
discontinuous, particular, and local critiques, the facts were also revealing
something that could not, perhaps, have been foreseen from the outset: what
might be called the inhibiting effect specific to totalitarian theories [. . .] (6)
In rejecting the structuring of totalitarian theories 70s identity-based movements similar to
Willard’s and Wells’ nineteenth century temperance, suffrage, and antilynching movements were
not declaring that hegemonic discourses lost their authority to articulate their cultural
experiences the point in the “criticizability” of identity-based movements was that those
normative discourses were never valid. Therefore, the debunking of old epistemologies with
new rhetorical practices illustrates that methodologies which take an essentialized view of the
Other are transformed by fresh (re)presentations. In Foucault’s words, the challenge of the
(re)presentation is that “[. . .] the critique in fact indicates something resembling a sort of
autonomous and noncentralized theoretical production, or in other words a theoretical production
that does not need a visa from some common regime to establish its validity” (6). Moreover, the
criticizability of methodologies opens up a rhetorical space for previously ignored and devalued
expressions involving cultural knowledge and experiences based on identity. Yet, those who
insert cultural knowledge as methodology not acknowledged by canonical foundations for
criticizability are viewed as divisive and antithetical to dominant systems of knowledge. It is
unjustifiable to argue that cultural knowledge within the context of struggle should be distinct
from criticism of institutions since the voices of marginalized groups are often characterized by
the structural characteristics that define them. Therefore, the normative codes that constrain and
subjugate peripheral rhetorics must be drawn upon to accurately label and locate the nature and
extent of their effect.
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Signifying Difference: The Rhetoric of Confrontation
Agitation is a balancing act for both the subject and the oppressor since learning the language of
the other and its signification within the sociopolitical order is key to disarming negative
judgments. Sociopolitical borders and boundaries that spatially contain the subject based on
their gender and race have had a profound effect on their agency. Still, there should be an
unfulfilled need by the FSM to cultivate ideologically the racial or gendered subject to their
vision within the movement without dissension based on otherness. When members agree to
engage in intercultural rhetoric, all experiences that emerge out of the stigmatizing effect of
difference can be viewed as source of knowledge to remapping the sociopolitical order. In the
words of Foucault, it is “these disqualified knowledges that make the critique possible” (8)
because subjugated knowledge can be the threshold to provide a rhetorical challenge, through
agitation, against the exalted discourse of canonical ideology. Indeed, it is because of the
disqualified knowledges that transformation occurs since they coerce, when the historical
moment is on their side, dominant ideologies to rethink their hegemonic practices. Indeed, it is
because of the disqualified knowledges that transformation occurs since they coerce, when the
historical moment is on their side, dominant ideologies to rethink their hegemonic practices. This
is especially so when canonical discourses come in conflict with marginalized groups that
articulate their humanity in a language that is self-reflexive of their lived reality, rather than
interpretive of their lived reality, by the generalized and nullifying rhetoric of hegemony.
Therefore, it is no accident that both black and white feminist women were core to the
dismantling of slavery and the call for woman’s suffrage since slavery and women’s subjugation
derived from the same ideological source—religion and politics (see chapters1 and 3).
Misunderstanding based on rhetorical style can be examined in the relationship between
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Willard and Wells. In her statement at the annual WCTU convention regarding Willard’s
comments that she [Wells] “put an unjust imputation upon half the white race” (On Lynchings
60) Wells confronts Willard and demands that she expose her source of information since the
alleged comments did not come directly from Wells. Wells writes:
On the same day I had a private talk with Miss Willard and told her she had been
unjust to me and the cause in her annual address, and asked that she correct the
statement that I had misrepresented the W.C.T.U, or that I had “put an imputation
on one-half the white race in this country.” She said that somebody in England
told her it was a pity that I attacked the white women of America. “Oh,” said I,
“then you went out of your way to prejudice me and my cause in your annual
address, not upon what you heard me say, but what somebody had told you I
said?” Her reply was that I must not blame her for her rhetorical expressions—
that I had my way of expressing things and she had hers. I told her I most
assuredly did blame her when those expressions were calculated to do such harm.
I waited for an honest [and] unequivocal retraction of her statements based on
“hearsay.” Not a word of retraction or explanation was said in the convention and
I remained misrepresented before that body through her connivance and consent.
(On Lynchings 67)
It is clear that Willard and Wells did not speak the same language. That is, they did not share the
same cultural influences as a woman and as a woman and a black that shaped their consciousness
and which would serve as an internal—though perhaps not conscious—link to their ideological
system. Important lessons can be carried from these early misunderstandings into present day
rhetorical situations. It is never practical to assume that subjects engaged in agonistic rhetoric
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are from the same cultural domain. Just as Willard and Wells were unable to mask their racial
bias against each other’s views, conflict can be expected in all exchanges when people of
different ideological backgrounds engage in debate. A subject’s rhetoric always carries her
cultural anchors and do not preserve a strict and discernible rhetorical break on a political issue
since their ideological stance function as the apparatus for dissent or consent in discourse. The
ideological underpinnings of the subject, as expressed rhetorically, represent the embodied
beliefs, values, morals, and ethics of the subject; they also express opposition to those they are in
conflict with. Thus, they function as a contextual window for defining the subject. For Craig
Calhoun, this interpretive judgment is based on hermeneutics—the theory of interpretation.
While Calhoun takes a critical social theory approach, he nonetheless argues that subject’s
cultural knowledge/expression/difference remains situated within their ideology rather than takes
flight from it. Calhoun writes:
Differences of context may also stem from the internal cultural construction of
meaning. Such differences arise in language, in schemes of identification and
valuation, and in orientations to social practice. They bear on the fact that
understanding human beings is not just a matter of interpreting their action, but
also of understanding the ways in which their own interpretations and
constructions of meaning shaped their action. (49)
It is interesting to note, given the social practices of the nineteenth century that many activist
black and white women crossed racially conceived and institutionally controlled spaces in the
name of social action. While the social function of these spaces was to illustrate the authoritative
power of hierarchal spaces regulated by race, their constituting effect was also tied to the
performance of a woman (see chapter 2) who gave legitimacy, by her adherence to the contested
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spaces clarity, unity, and reinforced power. For example, Wells comments that “On the same
day I had a private talk with Miss Willard.” The very act of their meeting and conversing as
equals clearly violated the nineteenth century hierarchy of space, imbued with racially conceived
constructions of performance. Willard also violated the terms of this racially defined sphere by
opening the space for Wells to confront her. This illustrates that activist black and white women
were far more progressive than their less active feminine counterparts were in their revolutionary
rhetoric and practice to reorder nineteenth century social roles and arrangements. What is most
profoundly revealing about the rhetorical space that Willard and Wells occupy is the
transformation of the space from one of racial hierarchy—white over black—to the middle—
where they meet as activist women in agonistic struggle. Wells notes that she “told her [Willard]
she had been unjust to me and the cause in her annual address, and asked that she correct the
statement that I had misrepresented the W.C.T.U.” The vitality and directness of Wells
comments also illustrates how class status and educational achievement are sociopolitical
brokers when trying to disarm authoritarian power. It is hard to conceive that a black woman
with less agency than Wells could approach Willard, and receive an expansive rhetorical space
for confrontation. Wells’ and Willard’s confrontational rhetoric is also relevant because it offers
a glimpse into the new system of agonistic struggle between black and white women over
fundamental differences in ideology, which emerged out of the cultural transformation of the
Reconstruction Era (see chapter 1).
As president of the WTU, Willard no doubt respected Wells on some level or she would
not have given her such an open rhetorical space to speak with her during the convention when
Wells could have caused more trouble by a public demand of renunciation. However, Willard
rather astutely replied, “that I must not blame her for her rhetorical expressions—that I had my
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way of expressing things and she had hers” without a full theoretical understanding that her
cultural knowledge and rhetoric were not the same as Wells’ despite their common gender.
Wells’ reply to Willard was also quite cogent when she notes, “I told her I most assuredly did
blame her when those expressions were calculated to do such harm” given the space [annual
WCTU convention] and context [during the lynching crisis] in which they were spoken. The
truth is both Willard and Wells were right: their gendered and racial ideologies were so woven
into their consciousness and reflected their cultural knowledge, values, beliefs, and morals,
which ideologically defined their social protest rhetoric on temperance, suffrage, and
antilynching. Neither Willard nor Wells tried to de/radicalize their voice since it embodied what
they could not disguise in their rhetoric—the shape of their consciousness. Wells’ lobbying for a
rebuttal of the comments did not have any obvious effect on Willard. Wells writes, “Not a word
of retraction or explanation was said in the convention and I remained misrepresented before that
body through her connivance and consent” (67).
However, a little over a month after the WCTUs Annual Convention and Willard’s
address, which indicted Wells for accusing white women of initiating sexual liaisons with black
men, an editorial in the Union Signal wrote the following statement on December 6, 1894, as a
retraction of the statements on behalf of Willard. Perhaps fearing the loss of ethos among Wells
and both black and white antilynching sympathizers, Willard again adopted a more mainstream
position to diffuse the hostile racial tone, which Wells believed was both political and advocated
a racially based judgment against all black people, rather than just black men. The editorial
reads:
In her repudiation of the charges brought by Miss Ida Wells against white women
as having taken the initiative in nameless crimes between the races, Miss Willard
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said in her annual address that this statement “put an unjust imputation upon half
the white race.” But as this expression has been misunderstood she desires to
declare that she did not intend a literal interpretation to be given to the language
used, but employed it to express a tendency that might ensue in public thought as
a result of utterances so sweeping as some that have been made by Miss Wells.
(On Lynchings 67-68)
In the editorial, Willard’s rhetorical strategy is detached, for although she endorsed the editorial,
the style was inaccessible to Wells because it was a mixed rhetoric of Willard admitting some
fault, but not totally absolving Wells of the alleged comments. The editorial, which indeed was
Willard’s voice, though uncharacteristically in obscure and vague language, confounded Wells
and her interpretation of the editorial which was sharp—precise—and analytical. As Calhoun
notes, “the problem of interpretation across lines of difference is at work in any conversation”
(49) but with race and gender as apparatuses to define meaning, the sphere of interpretation is
more problematized by the signifying effect of cultural knowledge. Wells notes:
Because this explanation is as unjust as the original offense, I am forced in selfdefense to submit this account of differences. I desire no quarrel with the
W.C.T.U., but my love for the truth is greater than my regard for an alleged friend
who, through ignorance or design misrepresents in the most harmful way the
cause of a long suffering race, and then unable to maintain the truth of her attack
excuses herself as it were by the wave of the hand, declaring that “she did not
intend a literal interpretation to be given to the language used.” (On Lynchings
68)
The unfolding of a perspective by women and women of color through the lens of gender and
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race is often constricted by the enduring discourse of the master narratives that questions the
validity of the gendered and racialized subjects’ knowledge when it is drawn from their cultural
space. This confrontation between the subject’s cultural knowledge and the essentialized
narratives of ideology creates a tension often revealed by gendered and racialized others having
to interconnect their cultural knowledge within a discourse, and with a fluency, that may not
reveal exactly their perspective. As Calhoun notes, it is “no accident that many approaches to
this problem [interpretation] focus on a model of conversation” (Calhoun 49). Further, the
gendered and racialized others must also valorize their cultural knowledge without the normative
perspective of the dominant ideology suppressing, devaluing, or even imposing its ideological
view on their narrative.
Gender and Race as the Lens of Perspective
Gender and racial perspectives are imbued with/by cultural expressions and experiences that
reflect the marginalized Others’ attempts to represent their role in the sociopolitical order. While
their strategies may appear invalid, and are often defined that way, gendered and racialized
perspectives invoke methodologies and strategies to interpret their experiences that emerged out
of their marginalized rhetoric, rather than the rhetoric of dominant discourses. While these
rhetorics of marginality diverge from the language of the canon, they are indeed an important
way to learn about feminine interrelatedness and differences. Chandra Mohanty, who comments
on the dynamic relation between cultural methodologies and feminism, supports this idea.
Mohanty observes,
that the challenges posed by black and Third World feminists can point the way
toward a more precise, transformative feminist politics based on the specificity of
our historical and cultural locations and our common contexts of struggle. Thus,
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the juncture of feminist and antiracist/Third World/postcolonial studies is of great
significance, materially as well as methodologically. (107).
The emic perspective, which is an accretion of cultural symbols, traditions, and meaning,
disables the etic perspective, which is grounded in analytical conceptualization, by giving the
sociopolitical actors agency to tell who they are rather than being told who they are.67 In this
way, the lived reality of the subject’s identity is not subsumed by and in institutions of power
(political, social, education, legal, law, medicine, and psychology) that presume a theoretical
confidence grounded in truth which is detrimental to the ethos of the gendered and racialized
subject. In the words of Mohanty, “one of the tasks of feminist analysis is uncovering
alternative, nonidentical histories that challenge and disrupt the spatial and temporal location of a
hegemonic history” (116), so that its knowledge is not codified and elevated over other forms of
knowledge as truth for the masses. Mohanty’s challenge to develop new theories and knowledge
from alternative perspectives to disarm the constitutive effect of patriarchal history
underestimates the power and force history as an ideological instrument. While cultural
knowledge is politically unacceptable, it is nonetheless made by subjects that ideologically
problematize the authority of master narratives by the signification of their gender, race, culture,
class, and ethnic perspectives against those dominant discourses.
In a contemporary example of this premise, Federal Appeals Court Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, the first Latina woman nominated as a US Supreme Court Justice, argues that gender
and cultural/ethnic cleavages are not silent signifiers in judicial decision-making (see chapter 2);
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Emic refers to cultural articulations from the members of a cultural group, while etic refers to an analytical
articulation from individuals outside the cultural group. See “Song to Speech: The Origins of Early Epitaphia in
Ancient Near Eastern Women’s Lamentations by Jan Swearingen in Rhetoric Before and Beyond the Greeks
Lipson, Carol S. and Roberta A Binkley. Albany: SUNY Press, 2004. 213-225.
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rather they “will have an effect on the development of the law and on judging” (Sotomayor qtd.
in Savage). For Judge Sotomayor, the signifying effect of gender, culture, class, and ethnicity do
not operate within a separate sphere outside the subject’s identity in isolation but “our gender
and national origins may and will make a difference in our judging” (Sotomayor qtd in Savage).
In explaining the constitutive effect of these multiple subjectivities within the social order, and
particularly race, Judge Sotomayor notes that “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the
richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white
male who hasn’t lived that life” (Sotomayor qtd in Savage). In understanding the inequities
within the sociopolitical order that having a racialized identity brings Judge Sotomayor
comments, “I wonder whether by ignoring our differences as women or men of color we do a
disservice both to the law and society” (Sotomayor qtd in Savage) given the signifying effect that
race has on the structure and production of knowledge. However, in emphasizing the effect of
her gender and race on her ideology, Judge Sotomayor was harshly criticized for her perspective
although it was produced within and by the marginal space that she was relegated to as a Latina
woman. Judge Sotomayor’s musings are evidence of an ethic regulated by the pervasive and
influential counter resistance to liberal exclusionary politics, which for Mehta “works by
modulating the distance between the interstices of human capacities and the conditions for their
political effectivity” (430). Judge Sotomayor’s comments are equally reflective of her refusal to
separate her gendered and racial experiences from her ideological perspective since her
disqualified knowledge was developed out of her marginal status within sociopolitical order.
Liberal exclusionary ideology, continues Mehta, “settles boundaries between who is included
and who is not” (430), an assessment that gendered and racialized subjects, such as Sotomayor,
are aware of and cannot easily dismiss since they are defined by structural boundaries in the
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sociopolitical order. Further, the rhetoric of liberal exclusionary politics, as defined by Mehta,
portrays and reflects the prevailing historical assumptions that the identity of difference, which is
harmonized through gender and race (see chapter 1 and 2), is predictable, analyzable, and
inferior—a conundrum that requires the theoretical processes of Western patriarchal discourse to
engage and unravel. It also suggests that the sociopolitical actor should value the vision of a city
on a hill68 that excludes them—a balance that requires a neutral stance when the symbolic
representation of the gendered and racialized subject is anything but neutral in the sociopolitical
order.
The desire for autonomy, inclusion, and justice is inextricably linked to the subject’s selfauthorship, which is bound in the symbolism and representation of gender and race. However,
shared beliefs over the consequences that emerge out of the aesthetic realities of gender and race
can produce effective and unifying opposition to eliminate, social, political, and economic
inequities in society. Therefore, the questions that emerge out of the master-status of race and
gender must be considered and balanced within the historical and political moment where new
questions, theories, perspectives, and subjectivities arise if only to announce that they exist.
Suspending the ideology in which difference based on race and gender is inferior rather than
unlike, promotes interaction and creates a rhetorical space where inside and outside subjectivity
perspectives are connected with each other because of similarities, rather than contrasted to look
for distinctions. In this way, “The new cultural politics of difference can thrive only if there are
communities, groups, organizations, institutions, subcultures, and networks of people of color
[and gender] who cultivate critical sensibilities and personal accountability—without inhibiting
individual expressions, curiosities, and idiosyncrasies” (West 108) as the by-products of their
68
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identity rather than counter rhetoric to dominant discourses. In placing emphasis on their
identity by invoking images, symbols, and their rhetoric in a context related to their gender or
race, the subjects acknowledge their profound social exclusion. However, the racial, gendered,
and rhetorical consciousness of the subject has “significant degrees of freedom to shape the
messages that we send, even if we cannot escape the consciousness itself” (Gutmann 168), a
point that both Mohanty and Judge Sotomayor have demonstrated in theory and practice.
Moreover, although symbolic representations of gender and race cannot be neutral since they are
often created in, and marked by, contested historical and cultural moments, it would be a mistake
to presume that they are absent of interlocking signifiers. Thus, in the process of unconsciously
resisting the ideological conflict that their identity stirs, in a liminal state, subjects attempt to
both manage and reverse objectifying historical narratives in dominant discourses, which claims
their gendered and racial identity is nothing more than a pathology of symbols with no
representational value outside their cultural geography.
Conclusion
The challenge for twenty-first century feminist social movements is the creation of an ideology
that can accommodate the evolving state of womanhood in a global world. With the enormous
signifying effect of race and gender in history, politics, religion, and the legal system, there is
always a threat of divergence by the unstated tension constructed around these representations
when they are bound within a shared rhetorical space like a FSM. It is a mistake to presume that
U.S. feminist ideologies are an interior rhetoric and do not cross international borders. Still, the
struggle to diminish social, political, and economic inequities based on race and gender in the
U.S. calls for a particular ethos since there remain enormous institutional disparities that
discriminate against subjects on the political and economic periphery of the social order. The
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profound but fragile moment in the political culture elicited by a Western nation in electing its
first black (male) president must not be lost on women because it signifies a major shift in social
relations, perspectives, and ideologies. Historical moments such as President Obama’s election
and Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to the US Supreme Court widen the rhetorical space
for all women and people of color. Willard’s and Wells’ contributions are part of the tapestry of
change that both mutually and independently inspire an ideology for twenty-first century
feminism; an inclusive feminism encompasses history, politics, technology, and global borders
to create new rhetorics for all people to emerge within their sphere of difference, rather than
outside it.
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